WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY

1985 IN REVIEW

R9372 - 1 U 4/86

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

USCR was established in 1958 to inform the public about world refugee issues and populations. It set itself the tasks of consulting regularly with refugees, government leaders, and United Nations officials; stimulating research on refugee problems; and working closely with American voluntary agencies. USCR has always been privately supported; it receives no government funding. For a time in the 1970s, it was closely associated with the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation.

On January 1, 1982, USCR and the American Council for Nationalities Service were formally merged under the laws of the state of New York. The continuing nonprofit corporation is ACNS; however, the distinctive USCR name and program of public information and advocacy regarding the world's refugees continue.

The year 1961 saw the first issue of the *World Refugee Survey*, then and annually since then a review of the status and fate of refugees around the world. Newsletters and pamphlets on refugee situations have supplemented this publication, including, in recent years, issue papers on Cambodian, Afghan, Ugandan, Iranian, and Tamil refugees, and pirate attacks on Vietnamese boat people.

Recent site visits to Thailand and Malaysia, Uganda and Rwanda, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Hong Kong, and six countries in Central America have allowed staff to learn first-hand of circumstances of refugees and the agencies dedicated to assisting them. Published reports based on such visits are provided to governments and the public.

USCR corresponds with government officials in the U.S. and abroad, as well as with other refugee-oriented organizations around the world, to assure attention to refugee problems, equitable and humane treatment of refugees in asylum countries, and safety of refugees in the ultimate resolution of their situations. Also, USCR cooperates closely with UN programs in the refugee field.

In 1985, USCR received awards for its humanitarian efforts from Rav Tov, the Cambodian Association of America, the Philadelphia Service Center, and the New York Association for New Americans.

USCR has received important support from the Ford Foundation and the Exxon Corporation for its public information and research activities.

Officers

Benjamin Gim
Chairman

Edward B. Marks
President

Mrs. Joy Kaiser
Vice President

Lawrence Rosenthal
Treasurer

Matthew Guiffrida
Secretary

Board of Directors

Mrs. William T. Andrews
Nan Borton
David Carliner
Mrs. Mary Carswell
Herbert H. Chaice
Mrs. David H. Cogan
James Dumpson
Joseph Fitzpatrick, S.J.
G. Gray Garland, Jr.
Berjoohy Haigazian
Mrs. Frances Haight
Christian G. Halby
Wade J. Henderson
Frances Humphrey Howard
Mrs. J. Mitchell Jablons
Victor Jacobs
Ngoan Le
Theodore J. Majka
Marjorie Margolies
Sheila Avrin McLean
Sid L. Mohn
Mrs. Ruth Anne Sparlin
Leonard Unger
Andrew J. Valuchek
Ivan Veit
Herbert West

Executive Director

Wells C. Klein

Director
Roger P. Winter

WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY
1985 IN REVIEW

Virginia L. Hamilton
Editor

James Silk
Associate Editor

Koula Papanicolas
Assistant to the Editors

Bill Frelick
Gary Young
Lisa P. Sementili
Staff Contributors

@ American Council for Nationalities Service 1986

ISSN 0197-5439; ISBN 0-9365-48-05-3

Single copy: $6.00; 10 or more copies: $4.00 each

The views expressed in signed articles in the World Refugee Survey are not necessarily those of the U.S. Committee for Refugees or the American Council for Nationalities Service.

Federal Identification Number 13-1878704
USCR is a program of ACNS, a private, nonprofit organization; contributions to USCR are tax deductible.

95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858.
815 Fifteenth Street NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 667-0782

Table of Contents

Letter from President Reagan 2
The Year in Review 3
Roger P. Winter

Articles

To Make the Reasons of the Heart Prevail 4
Poul Hartling
Two Perspectives on Asylum in the United States
U.S. Asylum Policy 5
Laura Jordan Dietrich
The Refugee Act's Unfulfilled Asylum Promise 5
Arthur C. Helton
Safe Haven for Central Americans 12
Dale S. de Haan
Rewriting the Refugee Story 16
Reverend Nicholas DiMarzio
Refugees and the Black Community 18
Norman Hill
Land Vietnamese in Thailand—An Inadequate Response 19
Congressman Bill McCollum
Sudan Emergency—A Personal Account 21
Nicholas van Praag
Chadian Refugees: Coming and Going 26
Joseph C. Kennedy

Updates

1985—Rumors, Realities, and Emigration from Russia 31
Jerry Goodman
Refugee Women: In 1985, No Longer "The Forgotten Majority" 32
Nancy Iris
League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 34
Richard W. Bergstrom

1985 World Refugee Statistics and Country Reports

Introduction 36
Statistical Tables and Graphs 36
Country Reports
Africa 41
East Asia and the Pacific 52
Europe 55
Latin America and the Caribbean 57
Middle East and South Asia 61
North America 66
Glossary 68
Directory 69
Bibliography
Refugee Policy Group 73

Cover Photo by Marcus Halevi: *These Cambodian children—living at the Thai border without benefit of international protection or of education—are among the world's two million refugee children. The UN designated 1985 as International Youth Year. Our cover, along with many photographs throughout the* Survey, *recognizes the dilemma these children face.*

A Letter from President Reagan to Survey Readers



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 12, 1985

America's capacity to do good is extraordinary.

Over the years, courageous people from every nation have come here and worked together to forge a democratic system that is man's best hope on earth. Since World War II, the United States, time and again, has offered haven to those fleeing oppression and persecution -- Hungarians, Cubans, Indochinese, and so many others. Our efforts to rescue refugees and provide them the opportunity to construct new lives have been richly rewarded by the loyalty and industry of these new citizens.

America is also the largest single provider of assistance to refugees in every region of the world. Our response to the uprooted in Africa alone has made the difference between life and death for hundreds of thousands. Our program of refugee resettlement exceeds that of the rest of the world combined. These are deeds in which I as President, and Americans everywhere, take great pride.

During the last ten years the American people have opened their homes and churches, towns and cities to nearly 800,000 refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Many had fought with us for the freedom of their homelands. Their resettlement here has not been without difficulty -- but it has not daunted our desire to lend a hand.

The job is not yet done. We continue to put an end to pirate attacks against refugees trying to escape by boat. We continue to work for the release of Amerasian children and the so-called "re-education camp" prisoners remaining in Vietnam.

Some believe the wellspring of American generosity is running dry. Nothing could be further from the truth. The drive of our people to assist refugees in need overseas and to resettle those who need it is an integral part of the American ethic. I am convinced that with God's help we will continue to meet our responsibilities to the world's refugees.

Ronald Reagan

The Year in Review

Roger P. Winter

During 1985, 230,000 Cambodians remained trapped in Thailand at the Cambodian border without the protection of international refugee status. Marcus Halevi

The past year—as the several that preceded it—has been a time of all too few solutions for the uprooted. The world refugee scene has been characterized by interminable refugee-producing problems and long, debilitating camp stays for refugees. The major refugee dilemmas in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, South Asia, and Central America all began five or more years ago. Many of us involved with international refugee matters have developed a craving for a breakthrough, a victory, a solution.

Generally, a solution for an entire group of refugees only comes about when the underlying political conflict which has precipitated their displacement is resolved. This hasn't happened often lately, certainly not often enough. This situation, some say, has created compassion fatigue amongst many compassionate souls.

The truth is, however, that solutions are found for individual refugees every day of the year. If one only looks for *issues* permanently resolved, it is possible to lose sight of the thousands of *individuals* whose lives have been saved and whose futures have been restored. Such, for example, is the case with refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. While the situation drags on, the rescue of human beings effected by the international community over the last decade has been a stunning humanitarian success.

Still, it is necessary to dream great dreams about solving the refugee dilemma and then get cracking on achieving them. These are among the tasks of those who are our political leaders; they are the principal tasks of those who lead both the U.S. and international refugee assistance systems.

Of primary importance is the task both new UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Jean-Pierre Hocke, and a new U.S. Ambassador for Refugee Affairs have of restoring constructive momentum to the refugee assistance network. This is true because, on balance, progress over the last few years in particular areas has been undermined by deterioration in others.

The following examples are indicative of the negative side of refugee-related developments over the last year or so:

In late December, fifty **Vietnamese** boat refugees were murdered by pirates in the South China Sea in a single incident. These almost routine attacks continue at staggeringly high rates.

Honduran military units entered the Salvadoran refu-

Roger Winter is the director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

gee camp at Colomoncagua, precipitating an incident which left numerous injured and two dead, including a two-month-old child.

The **Soviet Union** continued to deny emigration permission to most who sought to migrate as refugees to Israel and the United States.

From January 1 to July 1, 1985, **Thailand** engaged in a routine practice of pushing back Lao nationals, including Hmong and other hill tribes people, some of whom were seeking asylum in Thailand as refugees.

Drought exacerbated tenuous conditions in the **Horn of Africa**. Combined with the negative effects of the internal resettlement and agricultural policies of the government of **Ethiopia**, it produced a refugee and humanitarian tragedy of historic proportions.

Western Europe, in general, continued to display a pinched response to those seeking asylum, especially Sri Lankan Tamils.

Uganda, rather than realizing the hopes that were implicit in its change of governments on July 27, 1985, remained a nation in turmoil. But another change in government in February 1986 brought new hopes for an end to the violence.

Vietnam, despite repeated, highly publicized offers in the past, refused to release for resettlement in the United States inmates it has held in reeducation camps for up to a decade.

The **United States** continued its practices of interdiction at sea, long-term detention, and deportation in regard to particular groups of asylum seekers, practices which are recognized by the world at large as retreats from responsible asylum practice.

The essence of the task of the new UN High Commissioner for Refugees *and* a new U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs is to provide leadership to the humanitarian forces who wish to see the high ideals of international and U.S. public policy finally implemented on behalf of the world's refugees—protection of the endangered, international burden sharing, promotion of human rights, fostering of solutions for people in need.

The new High Commissioner has signaled the right attitude. Speaking immediately after his election on December 10, he said, "There is no room for gloom if one is determined to act. I have good reason to believe that [the refugee] problem can be defused, and that in the long run it can be fought even at its roots."

The people of this country and of this world repeatedly show themselves willing to do their part and more—when and if they understand the issues. Indeed, governments and their officials have more often failed to interpret adequately the needs of refugees to their people than have the people failed to sense their common humanity with refugees in need.

Leadership, humanitarian leadership, has been the rub. In his farewell address to the nation on November 4, 1985, retiring Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere focused on refugees:

> We Tanzanians have always understood that the borders African countries inherited from the former colonialists have disrupted our natural geographic unity and our African culture. Therefore, right from the beginning we also understood that our unity will not be limited to inside our borders only, but that the liberation and the unity of the whole of the African Continent was vital to all African peoples, including ourselves. As a result of our stand, we welcome tens of thousands of refugees escaping from wars or oppression in other parts of our continent. Although sometimes the burden seems to be heavy, despite assistance from the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations, *these are expenses we have recognized as essential for the furtherance of our brotherhood.* [emphasis added]

These same thoughts, generalized from a continent to the globe, are a part of the ultimate rationale for supporting generous humanitarian responses to thorny refugee tragedies throughout the world. Such efforts are expenses essential for the furtherance of our humanity. This is a message from our leaders that people will hear; it may not solve issues, but it will save people.

To Make the Reason of the Heart Prevail

Retiring UN High Commissioner for Refugees Poul Hartling made the following observations on the role of those who work with refugees when he spoke to the thirty-sixth session of the executive committee of UNHCR in October 1985.

This year we commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations. One of the very first tasks of the newly created world body was work on behalf of refugees, so we can also say that it is the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations efforts to solve refugee problems. . . .

. . . I deem it a privilege to work for the refugees. It is a privilege because it is nonpolitical work. . . . The nonpolitical character of the work is to my opinion the cornerstone for the house we try to build. Here, the object is not to obtain political gains, but to defend human rights. Do not think that I hold the political work in contempt. I have the greatest respect for the political efforts made around the world and in the United Nations. They are the basis and the presupposition for our humanitarian work. But it is important, in fact crucial, to keep the work for the refugees humanitarian. . . .

"Entirely nonpolitical." That means that our work is purely humanitarian work. It is an effort to save human beings, individuals, men, women, children, and defend their right to live in freedom and dignity and to enjoy human rights. It is a privilege to work for the individual. We do not despise statistics—we use them; we do not despise economic, technical, legal means—we cannot do anything without them. But fundamentally, the goal is not any one of those things in itself. It is to protect and assist the individual.

It is the task of the High Commissioner to make the reason of the heart prevail over the reason of the state. I believe you all, here in this room and the governments you represent, share the conviction and the will to achieve that goal, despite all the obstacles which must be overcome. A year ago I said . . . that the High Commissioner had to be a professional optimist. I remain unshaken in that view, for I know that with patience and courage, as in the past, solutions will be found.

Two Perspectives on Asylum in the United States

The U.S. Committee for Refugees invited Laura Dietrich and Arthur Helton to present their perspectives on U.S. asylum policy. Their responses follow.

U.S. Asylum Policy

Laura Jordan Dietrich

The asylum policy of the United States is a straightforward one. The United States is morally committed to grant asylum in accordance with our laws to individuals who demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution in their own country because of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group or political opinion. America's openness to refugees—people fleeing from persecution in other parts of the world—is one of this country's most cherished traditions; it has been enshrined in our national law. America is a signatory to the 1967 United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees; our own Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, implements the substance of this Protocol, and forms the basis for our judicial and legislative procedures on asylum and refugee admission questions. An individual physically present in the United States may apply for asylum in this country; every application is given a careful review. The burden of proof rests with the applicant, who must demonstrate a well-founded fear of such persecution to be eligible for asylum in the United States. Our record of fairness and generosity is beyond dispute. In fiscal year 1985 alone, America issued immigrant visas to 567,000 persons and admitted some 70,000 refugees.

At the same time, U.S. asylum policy makes distinctions that are critical to our own country's well-being as well as to the prospects of those individuals around the world seeking protection from persecution. One distinction is that the United States cannot grant asylum to people who are not individually targets of persecution, but who suffer from general conditions in their own countries of war, civil unrest, or economic crisis; nor, even, can America grant asylum solely because applicants live under communist regimes or other kinds of dictatorships. If America were ever to broaden the definition of a refugee in this manner, then literally hundreds of millions of people around the world could be considered to be eligible for U.S. asylum or refugee admissions. In order to safeguard the national interest—as well as the interest of people who are in special need of protection—we have to make careful determinations on an individual basis about persons admitted as refugees or granted asylum.

The 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol, subscribed to by the United States and by 94 other

Continued on page 9

The Refugee Act's Unfulfilled Asylum Promise

Arthur C. Helton

Five years after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, its mandate that uniform and neutral standards be used in the asylum adjudication process remains unfulfilled. Rather, the Act's mandate is subservient to foreign and domestic policy considerations which continue to dominate asylum decision making. This article will discuss how the standards and practices used by immigration authorities in the asylum process, including alien interdiction and detention programs, violate domestic and international law and jeopardize the very right to apply for asylum. Finally, specific recommendations will be offered for improving the administration of asylum law in the United States, with a view toward depoliticizing the process and ensuring prompt and fair adjudications.

The United States has traditionally proclaimed a generous and compassionate approach to refugee problems. The accomplishments of our refugee policies, however, have varied widely. In practice, refugees fleeing communist-dominated regimes traditionally have been favored over those fleeing other repressive and authoritarian regimes, particularly those with which the United States has dealings. Differential treatment has also occurred in applying the standards for refugee recognition, with some nationalities facing virtually insurmountable burdens of proof.

To remedy the inequities, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, which established a uniform and nonideological standard for determining refugee eligibility. Congress intended this standard to be compatible with the international obligations of the United States under the United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Central to the Act was a statutory definition of *refugee,* which conformed to that of the Protocol. Hence, a refugee was defined as a person who has a "well-founded fear of being persecuted" based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social standing. The Protocol definition was incorporated to excise ideological bias from the law and to facilitate the granting of refuge to aliens in this country by requiring only that they prove a well-founded fear of persecution.

In accordance with the Act, the "well-founded fear" standard was adopted to determine claims for asylum and claims for withholding deportation. Prior to the 1980 Act, immigration authorities applied the more restrictive "clear probability" of persecution standard to determine

---

Laura Jordan Dietrich is Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, in the U.S. Department of State. She has responsibility for the political asylum division of the Bureau.

Arthur Helton is director of the Political Asylum Project of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.

whether or not to withhold the deportation of an alien who would face persecution in his or her homeland. Even though Congress emphasized that it wished a uniform nonideological standard through the enactment of the Refugee Act, immigration authorities after 1980 continued to follow the clear probability standard in deciding requests to withhold deportation. The stringency of the standard has been demonstrated repeatedly in the cases.[1]

Despite the clear congressional intent to establish a uniform standard for determining refugee status consistent with the Protocol, the Supreme Court in *INS v. Stevic*[2] recently affirmed the use of the clear probability standard for determining eligibility for withholding deportation. The Court, however, declined to decide upon the standard to be used in determining eligibility for asylum. Nevertheless, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, suggested that to qualify for asylum under the well-founded fear standard, an alien must prove but a "reasonable possibility" of persecution, a standard more generous than being required to prove clear probability of persecution. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision, most lower courts addressing the issue have held that the well-founded fear standard to be applied in asylum claims is less stringent than the clear probability standard.[3] The issue will likely be resolved conclusively by the Court in the near future.

• • •

Ideology also continues to dominate asylum decision-making, translating into ready grants of asylum for applicants who fled communist-dominated regimes and into far less generous grants to those with which the United States has good relations, irrespective of their human rights records. This imbalance is blatantly apparent in the overseas admission program. Although the United States agreed to admit up to 70,000 refugees in 1985—above and beyond the normal immigration ceiling of 270,000—only 3,000 of these refugees could come from Latin America, 5,000 from the Middle East, and 3,000 from Africa. The remaining 59,000 were reserved for individuals from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Indochina. The ceiling for 1986 is the same, with 1,000 numbers being reallocated to the Middle East.

Actual admissions are even more disproportionate. While more than one million people have fled El Salvador and Guatemala, only 93 Salvadorans and no Guatemalans were admitted as refugees in 1984. In 1985, there have been no Salvadorans or Guatemalans admitted as refugees.

Ideological discrimination also confronts those asylum seekers who manage to enter the country. In 1984, only 1 percent of the Guatemalan, 2 percent of the Salvadoran, and 6 percent of the Haitian cases decided received political asylum. In sharp contrast, 52 percent of the Bulgarian, 51 percent of the Russian, 49 percent of the Polish, and 40 percent of the Romanian cases received political asylum, all involving persons fleeing communist-dominated regimes. This imbalance is again reflected in the statistics for 1985. For example, only 3 percent of the Salvadoran and about 1 percent of both the Haitian and Guatemalan cases decided received political asylum. However, 73 percent of the Libyan, 59 percent of the Romanian, 57 percent of the Czechoslovakian, and 46 percent of the Russian cases received political asylum.[4]

• • •

Domestic policy considerations have encroached upon the asylum area, as well. U.S. immigration authorities have sought to deter asylum applicants by intercepting them on the high seas and returning them to their home countries before they reach our shores, by imprisoning them once they arrive, and sometimes depriving them of a fair opportunity to present their claims.

By exchange of diplomatic letters and presidential proclamation in September 1981, the United States initiated an interdiction program which permits Coast Guard vessels to intercept and board Haitian flag and other vessels, and to make inquiries to determine if passengers are undocumented Haitians bound for the United States. If so, they can be returned to Haiti, provided they are not political refugees. They do not have access to counsel to assist in their identification as refugees.

The only country with which an agreement has been made in the interdiction program is Haiti. Approximately 6,000 Haitians now have been intercepted under the program. Aside from a few who required immediate medical treatment, not one has been permitted to seek refugee status in the United States, and all have been returned to uncertain fates in Haiti.

Interdiction represents a radical departure from normal inspection and inquiry procedures which afford an alien the opportunity to present his or her case, through counsel, to an immigration judge. As to refugees, interdiction runs afoul of the obligations under the domestic withholding provision and its international correlative, Article 33 of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees—to refrain from refoulement. This is the duty not to expel or return a refugee to borders where his life or freedom would be threatened because of race, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

In the summer of 1981, the United States embarked upon a new alien detention policy. Prior to 1981, traditional administrative practice regarding the detention of aliens seeking admission to the United States, at least since the close of Ellis Island in 1954, had been to release them absent a demonstrable security risk or likelihood of absconding.[5] This practice applied to arriving aliens with or without a passport or visa, as well as to applicants for political asylum in the United States.

The liberal release practice changed dramatically in the summer of 1981. In particular, Haitians who arrived in Florida during that summer were immediately confined without consideration of whether they were security risks or likely to abscond. In October 1982, the Service published alien detention regulations in response to challenges to the Haitian detention program, which provide for the detention of arriving aliens without valid travel documentation (passport and/or visa). The approach taken was one of equal mistreatment for all. Release is limited, irrespective of nationalities, to persons of advanced or tender age, those with medical conditions, or beneficiaries of a relative petition.

International experience has demonstrated that asylum seekers frequently flee persecution in their home countries without a valid passport or visa.[6] Indeed, it would make little sense for a person fleeing persecution to seek a passport or exit visa from the persecuting authorities. A detention program that focuses upon undocumented aliens falls heavily upon asylum seekers and raises a host of troubling legal questions. A measure which burdens some asylum seekers with imprisonment and which penalizes them from petitioning for asylum would violate the right to pursue asylum and the right not to be penalized or unnecessarily restrained in their movements under the Refugee Act and the Protocol.

Despite the questionable legality of the detention policy, the United States government is preparing to increase significantly its capacity to detain aliens, including asylum applicants. Towards this end, Congress has purchased a site and has allocated $77 million for the building of a 1,000-bed detention center in Oakdale, Louisiana. Oakdale is a town with a population of 7,000, including five practicing lawyers. After completion of the facility, scheduled now for March 1986, the INS will be able to hold close to 5,000 aliens, which almost doubles its current national detention capacity. The operation of this facility has been challenged, in part, on grounds that the detainees will inevitably be denied their rights to counsel in immigration proceedings.

> **"We hear often of a 'crisis' in asylum in America. That crisis, however, lies not in the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, but in whether the right of asylum can withstand the expedient policy solutions which until now have governed the process."**

• • •

The manner in which the law has been administered has also deterred arriving aliens from applying for asylum. Often, asylum seekers are denied a fair opportunity to present their claims, and fair consideration of those claims once presented. In the context of Haitian and Salvadoran cases, federal courts have found numerous instances in which INS employees have sought to coerce or mislead aliens into not applying for asylum or into abandoning their claims once filed.[7]

The prevalence of domestic immigration policy considerations in the asylum process is recognized in an internal 1982 INS report which explains that while "refugees and asylees must both meet the same statutory definition . . . the standard appears to be less strict for refugees overseas than it is for asylum applicants in the United States."[8] Differentiating between asylees and refugees in this fashion contravenes the neutral principles for decision making established by the Refugee Act.

The United States is not immune from the world-wide phenomenon of large numbers of displaced persons and refugees moving across borders, and shortly upon its enactment, the 1980 Act was sorely tested in this regard. Statistics provided by the INS indicate that in fiscal year 1980, 15,955 aliens arrived in the United States and applied for political asylum. The numbers, moreover, continued to mount. In 1981, 63,202 aliens applied for asylum, and in 1982, 37,202 applied. In 1983, however, only 8,423 asylum cases were filed. The number of applications again escalated somewhat, with 24,295 aliens applying in 1984, and 16,622 applying in 1985.[9]

While asylum cases still have a relatively low priority in the INS, the agency has been able to decide more cases. Information provided by the Service shows that 598 applications were completed in 1980, 4,521 in 1981, 12,064 in 1982, and 9,798 in 1983. Although 40,622 cases were decided by the INS in 1984, it is impossible to determine how many of these cases have received a final disposition. Applicants who have been denied asylum have a right to renew a claim before an immigration judge. About 11,000 cases were filed in those courts in 1985. Consequently, only a relatively small percentage of the 32,344 asylum cases that were denied in 1984 have been finally adjudicated. In 1985, 18,757 cases were decided.[10]

In contrast to the rate of processing asylum claims, the Service in 1981 received 1,880,000 petitions and applications for various immigration benefits and completed processing with respect to 1,770,000 of those matters. [11]

Additionally, the INS has invested only minimal resources into the development of the asylum adjudication process. Despite the large numbers of asylum petitions filed over the past five years, there are presently only 20 to 25 INS officers who process asylum claims on a full-time basis. Furthermore, the INS has held only three in-service programs for some of its asylum officers, and only two programs have been held for immigration judges.

Since the Refugee Act of 1980 sought to introduce fair and ideologically neutral standards into the asylum process, the lack of instruction on asylum standards has had an especially pernicious effect. Absent training and the development of any independent expertise, asylum officers and immigration judges are forced to rely almost exclusively upon the required "advisory" opinions of the Department of State regarding whether or not the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution. In the words of an INS adjudicator: "I would never, never overrule the State Department."[12]

This excessive reliance on State Department opinions violates the applicants' due process rights, because the advisory opinions ordinarily constitute findings of ultimate fact by the State Department, providing no meaningful hearing. It also violates their rights under the Refugee Act of 1980, because the advisory opinions improperly introduce foreign policy considerations and political bias into the asylum process. The State Department is dedicated to furthering our foreign policy interests, and that mandate influences the nature of the asylum decisions it proposes by taking into account the consequences to foreign policy. The information upon which the advisory opinions are based is ordinarily disclosed neither to the asylum seeker nor to the immigration adjudicator. Consequently, the ideological allocation of asylum continues in practice under the Refugee Act, and the principal vehicles through which this distortion is accomplished are the State Department "opinions."

There are means by which the Refugee Act's unfulfilled promise can be kept. The following recommendations offer specific methods for returning to asylum seekers the fair treatment upon which the Act is premised.

The new alien interdiction and detention programs violate the rights of refugees, as does overly restrictive application of the refugee standard. The focus of reform should not be on deterrence, which is designed to encourage refugees to return to or stay in their home countries and run the risk of persecution. Rather, the focus should be on establishing a fair and expeditious asylum adjudication system.

Traditionally, immigration judges have come from the ranks of the INS. Judges inculcated with the law enforcement ethos of the INS sometimes lack sensitivity to the rights of aliens. Immigration judges, therefore, should be recruited from outside, as well as from inside, the INS.

Also, immigration judges and other immigration adjudicators should be instructed in the law and history of human rights and refugees. In addition to initial instruction, adjudicators should be exposed to different perspectives through creative in-service training programs. This ongoing training should involve groups such as the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the international organization charged with supervising the compliance of state parties with the Protocol, as well as nongovernmental advocates of the rights of asylum seekers. While modest efforts in this regard have recently been attempted, much more time and attention is warranted.

The State Department should not provide opinions on the ultimate question to be decided in individual cases—whether the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution. Such conclusory pronouncements simply serve to continue the practice of ideological allocation of asylum which the Refugee Act of 1980 was designed to change. Should the State Department wish to make information on general country conditions available to the immigration adjudicator, then that information should be revealed to the INS, as well as to the alien and his or her counsel. Only through such disclosure can proper weight be given to the position of the State Department.

One desirable procedural safeguard in the review of agency asylum determinations is formal involvement in the process by UNHCR. Such a role would depoliticize the process and encourage independent review of asylum determinations.

The role of UNHCR in the determination of refugee status varies from country to country.[13] In Belgium, the minister of foreign affairs has delegated refugee determination to UNHCR, while in Italy, Somalia, and Tunisia, UNHCR is one of the decision makers in the process. In seven other countries, UNHCR is represented on an advisory commission that interviews applicants and makes recommendations to the final decision maker. In Spain, UNHCR is consulted before a decision on refugee status is made, and in Austria UNHCR may express its views prior to a decision.

Other countries facilitate UNHCR oversight of the refugee determination process by various methods. For example, UNHCR is informed of all applications for refugee status in Austria, Greece, and New Zealand, while in West Germany, a UNHCR representative may attend applicant interviews with the federal official who decides on applications. A formal role for UNHCR in the United States would serve to rationalize a now overly politicized asylum process.

• • •

In conclusion, despite the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the integrity of the right to asylum in the United States is threatened. The Act continues to be subverted through the legally questionable practices of interdiction, detention, and unfairness in the adjudication process. The right to apply for asylum itself is under attack. We hear often of a "crisis" in asylum in America. That crisis, however, lies not in the increasing numbers of asylum seekers, but in whether the right of asylum can withstand the expedient policy solutions which until now have governed the process. Full and fair implementation of the Refugee Act requires the depoliticization of the asylum process, the recognition of the uniform Protocol standard, serious commitment of resources, and above all, the acknowledgement of the minimal individual rights and dignity of asylum seekers. Only then will the promise of the Refugee Act be fulfilled.

Footnotes

1. *See*, e.g., *McMullen v. INS*, 658 F.2d 1312. 1319 (9th Cir. 1981).
2. 104 S.Ct. 2489 (1984).
3. *See*, e.g., *Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS*, 749 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1984); *Youkhanna v. INS*, 749 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1984); *Carvajl-Munoz v. INS*, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984). *Cf. Sotto v. INS*, 748 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1984).
4. These statistics are available from the Central Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

   A State Department spokesperson has recently suggested that the currently low approval rate for Nicaraguan refugees seeking asylum in the United States contradicts the notion that ideology is an important element in asylum decision making. *N.Y. Times*, Wednesday, October 2, 1985, A26:3. This example, however, is not so much a testament to the nonideological character of asylum decision making, as to the confluence of foreign policy and domestic immigration policy. Approval rates for Nicaraguans have traditionally been rather high since the fall of the Somoza regime, including, in 1981, a rate of 41 percent and, in 1982, a rate of 26 percent. These grants of asylum mainly concerned individuals fleeing from the newly established Marxist regime. As the character of the refugees has changed, however, approval rates have fallen—for 1984, about 13 percent, and for 1985, 9 percent. This is not due to reformation in the asylum area. Rather, domestic immigration considerations have become dominant, and overly restrictive standards are utilized to discourage the arrival of large numbers of "feet people" from areas of relative proximity. This is an element of the prejudgment also faced by other Central Americans and Haitians seeking asylum.
5. *Leng May Ma v. Barber*, 357 U.S. 185 (1985).
6. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1979)* at para. 106.
7. *Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith*, 541 F.Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal 1982); *Nunez v. Boldin*, 537 F.Supp. 578 (S.D. Tex), *appeal dismissed*, 629 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1982).
8. INS, *Asylum Adjudications: An Evolving Concept and Responsibility for the Immigration and Naturalization Service* 54 (June and December 1982) (hereinafter, *Asylum Adjudications*) at 62.
9. *See* note 4, *supra*.
10. *See* note 4, *supra*.
11. 1981 Atty Gen. Ann. Rep. 160.
12. *Asylum Adjudications* at 62.
13. Note on Procedures for the Determination of Refugee Status Under International Instruments, U.N. doc. A/Ac. 96/INF.152/Rev.3 (1981).

Continued from page 5

countries, provide a clear definition of a refugee: a person who

> *. . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.*

A refugee, in other words, is someone who has been singled out for persecution for one of five specified reasons. For example, virtually everyone in the Soviet Union is oppressed by government restriction, but Soviet Jews may be especially harshly treated because of their religious ancestry. Jews who flee from the Soviet Union have shown that they have suffered persecution or that they would almost surely be singled out for harsh treatment if returned to their homeland. The same is true for other groups, like the Vietnamese "boat people" who fled their country after the communist takeover in 1975. The United States admitted many of these people as refugees, as the great majority had been subject to persecution or would be persecuted, often because of their affiliation with the overthrown South Vietnamese government; had America turned these people away, they would have suffered grave punishment on returning to their own country, or else deprivation, illness, and death at sea as they drifted from one place to another rather than return to persecution in Vietnam.

On the other hand, there is the case of a young Nicaraguan who flees from his country and presents himself to U.S. immigration authorities. He disagrees with his country's policy and bitterly resents the government's abridgment of freedoms; it may even be true that a close friend or a family member has been imprisoned, or worse, for a political offense. The economy is in a poor state, and the man is impoverished. He refuses to serve in the Nicaraguan military and fears he will be punished for his refusal. This man is languishing in his own country and would like to make a life in this country. Is he eligible for refugee status, and for asylum in the United States?

According to the law, he probably is not unless he can show that he, individually, would be singled out for persecution. Few people would dispute the man's story, or would deny that it represents the state of affairs in Nicaragua today. Even so, the general conditions of poverty, of political oppression, and of civil unrest are not—under U.S. or international law—grounds for granting asylum. On the contrary, the law does not provide that asylum be given to an individual who is seeking an escape from conditions that every other citizen of his or her country faces—no matter how deplorable the conditions, and no matter how U.S. policy may oppose or condemn the conditions. Rather, the law says clearly that asylum can be given only to individuals, not to entire nations; in order to be eligible for it, an individual has to show that he is a special target of persecution, or would likely be a target of persecution if returned to the country of nationality.

Unfortunately, in Nicaragua and in other countries, oppressive treatment and desperate conditions are visited not just on individuals or groups, but on entire populations. The United States is sensitive to these problems, and is addressing them every day in its foreign policy. This country is continually engaged in political and diplomatic efforts which oppose oppression and aim to reduce violence and poverty. The plight of nations can best be resolved by political and diplomatic activity. In contrast, asylum and refugee measures are capable only of aiding individuals.

Another distinction that exists in America's asylum and refugee programs—also arising out of law—is the distinction between refugees and economic migrants. This is confusing to many Americans, for reasons of our own national heritage. For centuries, America built itself up with unlimited immigration. People came to this country to escape the oppressive conditions in the Old World, and also to make better lives for themselves; political, religious, social, and economic motives were closely intertwined. Early in the twentieth century, American lawmakers realized that the country had overreached its capacity for absorbing immigrants freely, and that a fair and sensible immigration policy would have to be developed. Since that time, the United States has limited the number of immigrants and refugees who are admitted annually.

America has been true to its heritage of offering protection to individuals suffering from persecution through the political asylum process, as well. Anyone who is physically present in the United States and can show that he or she is a victim of persecution, or has a well-founded fear of persecution, may be granted asylum. It is important to note the distinct difference between asylum and immigration. Asylum is neither an extension of, nor an addition to, the immigration program; it is a special and narrow provision that the law makes for individuals in exceptional instances.

A great number of people who apply for asylum in the United States each year are not refugees—that is, not people who are seeking to escape persecution. Rather, they are economic migrants, people who are hoping to make a better life in America than they can in their country of origin. Many applicants, when they ask for asylum, indicate that they have no fear of persecution—they fail, in other words, even to claim the condition on which asylum must legally be based.

• • •

The United States offers a tempting prospect to people throughout the world—and, particularly, to people in our own hemisphere—whose nations are afflicted with poverty and civil unrest. They see in the United States a chance for a better life. In recent years, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people have tried to leapfrog over our immigration procedures and over their fellow countrymen who are attempting to conform to such procedures. The great majority of these people have crossed our borders illegally; many of these people, and some who entered legally, have tried to remain in the United States by claiming asylum.

A particularly troubling instance is that of the large numbers of people who have come here from El Salvador—one of the poorest nations in Central America, and the most densely populated nation in the hemisphere. It has also been torn apart by civil strife; sporadic violence and strife continue to this day. Since 1982, more Salva-

Controversy continues over U.S. asylum policy, particularly in regard to Central Americans, such as this Salvadoran youth.
Rick Reinhard

dorans have applied for asylum in the United States than have people of any other nationality.

Without question, many of the Salvadorans who have sought asylum in the United States have done so to escape the terrible conditions in their homeland. Relatively few have been able to demonstrate that they were, as individuals, a target of persecution—although, in 1984, approvals of Salvadoran asylum claims ranked fourth in the world in actual numbers by nationality group. In the same year, El Salvador ranked first among Central American countries in immigrant visas issued. Over 8,000 visas were issued, more than double the next highest Central American country. More than 20,000 visitor visas were issued to Salvadorans last year as well.

The migration of Salvadorans to the United States, however, predates the oubreak of civil strife in 1979. Before that year, an estimated 250,000 Salvadorans were living in the United States as illegal aliens. (That number is estimated to be at least half a million today.) They have come, overwhelmingly, for economic reasons. In fact, the preponderance of Salvadoran asylum applicants today have not claimed fear of persecution in their applications and state "no" to questions asking if they have ever been harassed, threatened, detained, or harmed in any way. In answer to the question, "Why did you come to the United States?," the vast majority simply say they came to the United States to work because "things are bad" in El Salvador. The historical pattern of migration between El Salvador and the United States is so well established that persons legally admitted to this country travel back and forth to visit relatives, even in the midst of the conflict in that country.

Many other indications confirm that Salvadorans are by and large economic migrants. An exit poll during last year's elections in El Salvador conducted by the Spanish International Television Network found that more than two-thirds of all Salvadorans respond "yes" to the question, "Would you move to the United States to work if given the chance to do so?" Salvadorans in the United States send home an estimated $30 million *every month*. What can that mean, but that many Salvadorans are working here to support their families at home? A recent profile of 794 Salvadorans returned from the United States found that 688 were male, 624 were single, and 716 were between the ages of 18-35. Without a doubt, they were mostly single young men trying to earn money in the United States.

The U.S. government is deeply concerned with the political and economic problems of El Salvador. The Reagan administration has done much to encourage the growth of democracy and stability in that country. Since the democratic elections in 1983—a process supported by the United States—civil violence has dwindled to a tiny fraction of what it had been a few years before (civilian deaths attributed to violence have declined from 9,000 in 1980 to 770 in 1984). The country has also experienced some modest economic growth. The United States will continue to have a constructive impact through political and aid programs in El Salvador itself; abandoning our asylum and immigration policies to allow any Salvadoran simply to stay in this country would create a special policy for one nationality group and would do considerable harm to the integrity of established admissions programs.

Even so, America's processing of asylum claims with respect to nationals of El Salvador and other countries is under fire from both Left and Right. In recent years, the "sanctuary" movement has sheltered illegal Salvadoran aliens, in churches and in private homes, on the grounds that the Salvadorans cannot receive fair treatment from American authorities and that—because the Salvadorans have already come to America—they would face certain persecution, and possibly death, if they returned to El Salvador. How reasonable are these arguments?

Every individual who applies for asylum, whether he entered legally or illegally, receives careful consideration and has extensive rights of appeal under the law. Each individual applies to a district director of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) or to an immigration judge or both. The State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs reviews virtually every application and renders a nonbinding advisory opinion to the INS in each case. The INS then acts on each application. INS actions can be raised to the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals, and then to a U.S. Court of Appeals. Any alien in the United States can apply for asylum, and there is no penalty for a frivolous application. The United States has received an unprecedentedly large number of asylum applications in recent years; because no applicant is required to leave the country while his or her application is being considered and because of multiple opportunities for administrative or judicial review, the simple act of applying can buy the individual a good deal of time in the United States—in some cases, two or more years.

The United States must grapple with the same problems of fraudulent and abusive applications that many other industrialized nations are dealing with. This trend has also been discussed at international meetings and is of great concern to all countries with long-established traditions of receiving refugees. In this country, entire batches of asylum applications are filed, word for word, exactly the same, with only the name changed. Aliens may file completely blank applications, knowing that under our laws, each will be examined on a case-by-case basis, an opinion will be rendered by the State Department, and full rights of subsequent review and appeal will be given.

In the Seattle region—one of the most active in the sanctuary movement harboring Salvadorans—no asylum applications were received by the INS district director from Salvadorans in 1983; in 1984, only one was received, which was granted. It would seem, then, that sanctuary organizers in Seattle have not gone the extra mile to obtain the full protection of law for the Salvadorans they are sheltering.

The sanctuary movement, it should be noted, is not the only group in America that has expressed unhappiness over U.S. asylum policy. Various conservative groups have criticized the United States for not approving more asylum applications from communist or communist-dominated countries, such as Nicaragua or the Soviet Union, itself. The sanctuary movement would like the United States to approve more Salvadorans because it disapproves of U.S. policy in El Salvador; conservatives want more approvals from communist countries because they think asylum should be granted as a group to anyone fleeing communism, and that neglecting to do so is inconsistent with our foreign policy. Nevertheless, our law does not say that asylum shall be granted on the basis of U.S. foreign policy, but on the basis of one standard applicable to all. In fact, former section 203(a)(7), which was removed from U.S. law on March 17, 1980, had stated that a refugee was a person with a well-founded fear of persecution fleeing "any communist or communist-dominated country. . . . " The United States applies its asylum laws fairly and impartially, and, so doing, is criticized by both Left and Right.

Regarding the Salvadorans in this country, some people argue that, even if the Salvadorans can't be given asylum, we should at least postpone their deportations until the situation in El Salvador stabilizes; in other words, that they should be granted the privilege of "extended voluntary departure," or EVD, an indefinite temporary suspension of deportation.

The administration believes EVD would not be appropriate for several reasons. Salvadorans who are deported back to their own country by the United States are not targeted for persecution, contrary to what is often claimed. Going to the United States is such a customary part of Salvadoran life that no stigma is attached to it. In the most recent U.S. embassy survey of about 500 Salvadoran deportees, there was not a single report of physical abuse or murder of a deportee because of his prior stay in the United States, nor did anyone interviewed suggest that he knew of such a practice. Many deportees could not be located because they had given fictitious or incomplete addresses, and 39 people had already returned illegally to the United States. Despite the problem in locating some deportees, the study simply does not suggest a pattern of targeted persecution of the deported Salvadorans. In February 1985, the Archbishop and the Tutela Legal, the human rights office of the Archdiocese of El Salvador, were asked whether they believed there was a pattern of persecution of deportees. They replied that they did not. Salvadorans have been interviewed at the airport in El Salvador, in the U.S. embassy, and after they have returned to their homes. U.S. government officials have never met anyone who thinks he or she is a target for having been in the United States.

• • •

A grant of EVD to Salvadoran aliens in the United States would have a severe undermining effect on our immigration laws, as well as on the asylum process. El Salvador is still a troubled country, but conditions are improving. If there were a pattern of persecution against those returning from the United States, we would have cause to be greatly concerned. But if the only reason we would allow them all to stay in the United States is that they would face the same conditions as the five million other citizens of El Salvador, then we have no grounds under our law for allowing them to stay. To allow all Salvadorans to stay here would misrepresent the United States respect for orderly admissions and the asylum process, and would surely invite even greater attempts at illegal settlement in this country, both by Salvadorans and by others. A grant of EVD now would make it much more difficult to send Salvadorans back home several years later, at a time when they would have established firm ties, than to enforce the law now, fairly and without delay.

United States policy toward the Salvadorans in this country, and toward all people who seek asylum here, is firmly in accord with U.S. law—and our international treaty obligations. Our law strikes a balance between generosity to people fleeing persecution, and our nation's own capacities and requirements. If everyone is a refugee, then no one is a refugee. The purpose of our law is not to exclude people, but to make it possible for the United States to protect those people who need protection the most: individuals who have a well-founded fear that they will suffer persecution. The United States cannot use its asylum policy as a means of solving problems elsewhere in the world. Our country's political and diplomatic responses, along with foreign aid, are a more appropriate means to effect positive changes and to improve conditions where they can be improved. A sensible, well-grounded asylum policy, such as the one we now have, is fully consistent with those goals.

Safe Haven for Central Americans

Dale S. de Haan

The family had always lived in Usulutan. Maria and her brother José were born there. But last year, the parents sent Maria, who was twenty, and José, who was sixteen, to the United States.

Their brother had been killed by government troops. Their aunt and uncle had been struck down in a highway ambush of unknown origin. And they, themselves, had been harassed twice by guerrilla forces when the bus they were riding was stopped on a road nearby. On one occasion, the guerrillas killed a couple of passengers to discourage the people of the area from travelling.

This story, often told by Senator Dennis DeConcini, of Arizona, underscores the struggle for protection and safety which people in El Salvador face today. It illustrates the plight of many thousands of families caught in the midst of political violence and a civil war which has been raging off and on for more than five years, engulfing more and more of the country and the people who live there. The story of Maria and José and similar testimonies I have heard from countless Salvadorans who have left their tortured homeland help us to understand why President José Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador has referred to a "culture of terror" when describing living conditions in his country. And it helps to explain why tens of thousands of frightened Salvadorans—families and individuals like Maria and José—have been uprooted from their homes and their lands, and often separated from relatives and friends.

• • •

The civil strife in El Salvador is taking a heavy toll in human life and suffering. It is tearing the fabric of Salvadoran society. Some 50,000 noncombatants have already lost their lives, often as a result of the infamous death squads that roam the country; and the killing continues. Countless other people are being maimed for life. Kidnappings continue, and some of the victims disappear. Members of the same family or community are pitted against each other. Others are caught in the middle of contending pressures to join sides. The number of widows and orphans grows; so does the number of uprooted people, now estimated at well more than a million—some 25 percent of El Salvador's population of 5 million. By this measure, alone, the situation in El Salvador is grim, indeed. As noted in a recent United States Senate report, during the Vietnam War the number of uprooted people never exceeded eight percent of the population of South Vietnam.

Among the uprooted Salvadorans, more than 500,000 are displaced persons within their homeland. Most survive in marginal communities, some in government-run camps, others in church facilities for the displaced. These "internal refugees" are often targets of suspicion and hostility. Church people working among them are sometimes harassed or receive death threats. Some have even been tortured and killed by death squads. Last year, for example, David Ernest Fernandez, of San Miguel, a Lutheran pastor working among displaced persons, was found dead. A doctor's report said that Pastor Fernandez had been tortured before being shot in the head.

Given the "culture of terror" which wracks Salvadoran society and body politic, it is little wonder that many Salvadorans have been fleeing to other countries. Estimates compiled by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) indicate that some 250,000 Salvadoran refugees are scattered throughout northern Latin America, mainly in Mexico, but also in Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Additionally, several thousand Salvadorans have been admitted as refugees for resettlement to Canada, Sweden, other countries in Europe, and Australia; and, according to both governmental and other observers, up to 500,000 are presently in the United States.

Over time, the countries of refuge in northern Latin America have adjusted to the presence of Salvadorans and have pursued humanitarian policies towards them. In fact, at the request of the individual governments involved and with the financial support of the United States and the international community at large, UNHCR assists at least a portion of the refugees in all of the countries in the area. Efforts to promote voluntary repatriation among the refugees have met with little, if any, success; and efforts to promote self-sufficiency among the refugees have met with mixed results. New efforts to promote the latter are underway in Costa Rica, however, and, in Nicaragua, UNHCR and the government have successfully utilized a system of cooperatives involving Salvadoran refugees and Nicaraguan citizens. As noted in the Department of State's (DOS) 1985 *World Refugee Report*:

> In general, the Nicaraguan government takes its responsibilities toward refugees seriously and deals on a humanitarian basis with those arriving in Nicaragua.... These cooperatives have enabled the Salvadoran refugees to become at least self sufficient, and several of the cooperatives have shown profits while contributing to Nicaragua's production of foodstuffs.

The UNHCR presence in northern Latin American countries should not suggest, however, that there are no problems. Adequate protection has been a problem from the beginning. A good example is the Honduran army's attack on UNHCR-assisted refugees in the Colomoncagua area of that country earlier this year. This incident, which follows many others involving Salvadorans, is still a matter of concern to many people. Moreover, as the DOS 1985 *Report* correctly observes: "One of the most difficult aspects of the refugee situation in Central America is the large number of refugees who have decided not to identify themselves to the UNHCR and are living without offi-

---

Mr. de Haan served as United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees from 1978 to 1981. He is the director of the Church World Service Immigration and Refugee Program.

These Salvadoran refugee children are orphans, living in La Guarita, Honduras.
Rick Reinhard

cial refugee status." (Inevitably, this complicates protection and assistance efforts on behalf of the refugees, and often causes economic and political problems for national governments in the countries of refuge.) The situation in Costa Rica, a generous country which has experienced a heavy influx of unregistered refugees, is a case in point. Again, as the DOS 1985 *Report* notes, "the increasing influx of refugees has clearly strained the country's resources and called into question its longstanding policy of accepting, without restriction, its oppressed and homeless neighbors."

But whatever the problems in coping with the growing flow of refugees in northern Latin America, the countries affected have not closed their borders to new arrivals, nor have the governments pursued policies of deliberate deportation. This is in sharp contrast to the treatment of Salvadorans in the United States.

• • •

Our government's policy is rather straightforward. Salvadorans without bonafide visas are presumed to be economic migrants in search of jobs or would-be immigrants who want to live here. In the eyes of our government, they are common illegal aliens and therefore subject to apprehension, detention, and deportation. President Reagan's administration has been both consistent and persistent in pursuing its policy and practice. This is clearly seen in the government's actions toward the sanctuary movement, in the continuing apprehension of Salvadorans at the border, in the heavy presence of Salvadorans in immigration detention cen-

This Salvadoran refugee in Honduras receives medical treatment in a Médecins sans Frontières clinic.
UNHCR/M. Vanappelghem

ters, and, most dramatically, in the deportation of thousands of safe-haven seekers back to their homeland to face uncertain futures and possible injury or death. The record is clear, that the United States is the only country in the hemisphere which pursues a policy of regularly deporting Salvadoran safe-haven seekers.

There is, however, at least a modicum of official recognition that some Salvadorans may be at risk if they remain in their homeland or are returned if they have fled elsewhere, including the United States. In 1983, for example, our government admitted to the country some ninety political detainees and others at risk in El Salvador. They entered the United States under the regular refugee admissions program and, like all refugee admissions, were resettled in various communities by private voluntary agencies. Secondly, our government has tolerated, if not encouraged, other countries' acceptance of Salvadorans as refugees for resettlement. As noted earlier, Canada has been especially active, admitting several thousand Salvadorans in recent years. Some of these admissions have been processed by Canadian consulates in the United States from among Salvadorans targeted for deportation by our government.

Thirdly, since late 1984, the United States has funded reception and counseling services in San Salvador for the deportees from the United States. These services, operated by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), involve the greeting of deportees upon arrival at the airport and facilitating their inland movement and reintegration. Most importantly, ICM has also been charged, as was the U.S. embassy in the past, with monitoring the fate of the people returned. Predictably, both ICM and the Department of State have reported extreme difficulty in monitoring returnees, and this function of ICM has apparently produced little tangible information regarding the fate of those deported.

And finally, in response to the advocates of protection for Salvadorans and other Central Americans, the administration is quick to point out that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will consider any application for asylum. Again and again, administration spokespersons stress this route for those in need of protection. But the record encourages few Salvadorans to apply; some 97 percent of the applications are denied by the INS. Moreover, the administration's focus on asylum misses the real point at issue and distorts the main intent of those advocating protection. According to U.S. and international law, the granting of asylum is generally reserved for persons who have fled a country "because of persecution or well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion." Clearly, many Salvadorans qualify for asylum, undoubtedly many more than our government is prepared to recognize. Those granted asylum under the current interpretation of the law may remain in the United States, because they are bonafide refugees fleeing persecution on one or more of the grounds cited above. But all Salvadorans, like Maria and José, whether or not they meet the refugee criteria, are fleeing from the violence and dislocation of a frightening and spreading civil war. And by any international humanitarian standard, let alone our nation's historic national practice and the common rules of human decency, they are all entitled to protection.

• • •

The administration's treatment of Salvadorans, and other Central Americans who share their need for protection and safe haven, has shocked the moral sensibility and conscience of many Americans. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the plight of these refugees has prompted a considerable public outcry on their behalf, initially within the religious community. Protestants, Catholics, and Jews—across the country and the broad spectra of both theological and political views—have repeatedly called into question the administration's policy and have advocated safe haven for Salvadorans. In the early stages of the problem, in 1980 and 1981, religious leaders and organizations, especially, called upon the administration to grant "extended voluntary departure" (EVD) to Salvadorans present in the United States. The National Council of Churches and the United States Catholic Conference were outspoken in this regard. Some members of Congress joined the appeal.

While the statutory language of this administrative authority is less than exhaustive and specific, EVD's intent and its use over many years to provide relief for certain aliens are not. The validity and purpose of EVD are stated succinctly in a 1982 INS report:

> From time to time, unexpected crises—war, political upheaval, etc.,—occur in the home country which could jeopardize the lives of visitors in the U.S. if they returned during the crises. In such situations, acting on a specific State Department recommendation, the Attorney General has permitted foreign nationals in the United States to remain until conditions in their home country stabilize. Usually the State Department cites civil war, invasion by foreign

> nationals, etc., as precipitating factors in this recommendation to the Justice Department. . . . Extended voluntary departure is an administratively clean and effective response for our government to make to what are generally temporary but unsafe circumstances in other countries that are likely to improve with time.

• • •

EVD is currently and justifiably providing relief for certain Afghani, Ethiopian, Polish, and Ugandan nationals in the United States; and over the last twenty-five years, EVD has been exercised at least fifteen times to help many others as well, including certain refugees from the civil war in Lebanon and others from the violence and turmoil which accompanied the overthrow of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979. Why Salvadorans and other Central Americans are not provided some relief today defies understanding.

"While debate may continue over our national policy toward Central America, there can be no debate over the simple fact that people in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America are being victimized daily by political violence and spreading civil war."

Fortunately, the Congress has stepped into the breach. Many members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate have long advocated EVD for Salvadorans. Others have expressed a strong concern and have suggested finding some other reasonable formula under the law to meet protection needs among Salvadorans and other Central Americans. A measure of Congressional concern was seen initially in 1983, when a nonbinding "sense of Congress" resolution was enacted. The resolution recognized the plight of Salvadorans in the United States and called upon the executive branch to grant EVD. Regrettably, the resolution was ignored by the administration. Following this, Representative John Joseph Moakley, of Massachusetts, and Senator Dennis DeConcini, with bipartisan support, introduced legislation to halt the deportation of Salvadoran nationals. This legislation did not come to a vote in the last Congress; but, with some modification, it was reintroduced into the current Congress early in 1985. The identical companion bills, H.R. 822 in the House and S. 377 in the Senate, again have bipartisan support, and, as of early winter, had garnered some two hundred co-sponsors in the Congress.

Specifically, the Moakley-DeConcini bill provides "for the temporary stay of detention and deportation" of Salvadoran nationals present in the United States on the date of enactment. Additionally, the bill provides that the General Accounting Office (GAO), an investigative arm of the Congress, will study thoroughly the situation of Salvadoran refugees in northern Latin American countries, of displaced persons within El Salvador, and of Salvadoran deportees from the United States. The GAO will also study, among other things, "the policies and procedures of the United States respecting the treatment of aliens (other than Salvadorans) in the United States in similar circumstances." And finally, the GAO will submit a report of its findings and recommendations to the Congress, which in turn will consider, among other things, "whether it is appropriate to extend, remove, or alter" the temporary stay of detention and deportation of Salvadorans provided in the bill. The determination process outlined here would take approximately two years.

With the stroke of a pen by the secretary of state and the attorney general, EVD could be granted to Salvadoran safe-haven seekers immediately. However, in light of the administration's continuing refusal to exercise this administrative authority, the Moakley-DeConcini bill offers a reasonable humanitarian alternative. That is why the bill has the strong and active support of so many Americans. At the national level, the National Council of Churches, the United States Catholic Conference, the National Association of Evangelicals, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations have all given supportive testimony before congressional committees. So has the American Civil Liberties Union. And many other groups also support the humanitarian intent of the bill, including the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the AFL-CIO Executive Council, and the Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs of InterAction.

Additionally, major newspapers and local committees across the country support Moakley-DeConcini, state and local governments have passed resolutions of support, and nearly three hundred churches and synagogues have declared themselves sanctuaries for Central American refugees. But Americans have gone beyond advocacy. They are gathering foodstuffs and clothing, providing shelter and friendship, and, usually through their religious affiliation, they are also a primary source of support for legal, social, and health services offered to refugees in dozens of community projects across the country.

Protecting Salvadorans and other Central American safe-haven seekers is truly a grass roots concern, from our largest metropolitan areas to the smallest towns in our heartland. While debate may continue over our national policy toward Central America, there can be no debate over the simple fact that people in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America are being victimized daily by political violence and spreading civil war. Thousands of frightened people continue to flee their homes. Like Maria and José, some find their way to the United States. Today's concerned Americans, like generations before them, want to help their oppressed and homeless neighbors. One of the most enduring themes in our nation's history is providing refuge for those in distress. Maria and José need it today. This can be accomplished by a humanitarian act of the Congress, or better yet by the stroke of a pen.

Rewriting the Refugee Story

Reverend Nicholas DiMarzio

Each year, the *World Refugee Survey* presents a comprehensive description of "the status and fate of refugees around the world." The story it tells is one of emerging, continuing, and recurring refugee crises to which the international community constantly struggles to respond. But as these refugee crises endlessly emerge, continue, and recur, we must question the success of our responses.

We at the United State Catholic Conference (USCC) believe that our responses year after year fall short of our vision: a world where people don't have to flee persecution. We also believe our responses will continue to fall short, forcing us year after year to retell an unchanging refugee story, until we educate those who will either inherit or resolve tomorrow's refugee crises: our children.

Most refugee resettlement agencies engage in public education efforts to inspire adult participation in refugee resettlement and global refugee crisis solving. But if we are ever to realize a hopeful ending to the refugee story, we must teach our children how to help. If we don't, they will merely inherit current refugee crises. And they will be no better equipped than we to confront the global issues that create refugees or to assist people fleeing persecution.

• • •

Fortified by this belief and armed with the knowledge that children can be dynamic forces in solving adult problems, USCC is planning a special public education campaign. During the 1986 school year, we will produce a package of refugee-awareness educational materials for Catholic school children in grades seven through twelve. While some of our motivations and goals—and certainly our approach—for educating children are unique and specific to a young audience, our new educational focus shares the same basic theories that guide all USCC educational efforts.

In each of its educational programs and activities—from booklets designed for prospective volunteers to a national billboard campaign to be launched this year—USCC maintains one prevailing goal: to generate among Americans the warm, humanitarian interest and understanding that will increase their awareness of refugees and the social and political ills that create them.

Generating this receptivity is far more important than generating either volunteers or financial aid. Without the general public's willingness to welcome the world's homeless, this country would accept no refugees for volunteers to resettle or for donations to assist. In a democratic society, where public opinion forms public policy, it is crucial to create an informed public opinion on global refugee situations and on this country's moral responsibility to welcome and assist refugees. And the more we teach children about refugee needs, the more likely those children are to grow into compassionate, caring adults—the people who will be forming public policy for tomorrow's refugees.

• • •

Teaching children about welcoming the stranger must certainly include teaching them that, as the National Council of Catholic Bishops has said, a nation "built by immigrants can celebrate its position in the world only by continuing to work for liberty and justice for all—including the voiceless immigrants of today, whose intelligence and labor in turn continue to build communities and us as a people." Our children must know that generation after generation of newcomers seeking refuge in this country have enriched our society beyond measure. "Remember always to welcome strangers, for by doing so, some have entertained angels without knowing it." (Hebrews 13:2.)

As the social action arm of the Catholic Church, USCC has additional compelling reasons to educate. Our mandate to form public opinion on and an understanding of refugee and immigration matters stems from the teachings of both the Old and New Testaments, which require the Church to promote and defend the human rights and dignity of people on the move and to advocate social remedies for their problems. The Church's educational responsibility, then, is to a large extent religious—making sure the community of believers understands its responsibility to serve strangers as Christ did. Refugee resettlement work is one of the most concrete ways that Americans can follow Christ's teachings by carrying out the corporal and spiritual works of mercy—feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, sheltering the homeless.

Our religious education obligation to children is particularly strong. We need not only to prepare them for their responsibilities as adult Christians but also to provide avenues along which they can actively pursue their religious and humanitarian commitments now.

• • •

We believe children in grades seven through twelve are already looking for those avenues. This age group is in a particularly dynamic stage of psychological development, ready for exposure to social justice issues. The adolescent is the thinker, the reasoner, the questioner. Contemporary psychologists mark the mental age of eleven and a half as the point when a child is for the first time able to understand abstract ideas. Learning to think abstractly—to understand such concepts as altruism—opens the doors to feelings of empathy, which lead directly to reaching out to others. Adolescence, then, is a time when focus broadens from "self" to include "others." Unless adults encourage this stage of questioning and reasoning and reward consideration of such abstract ideas as altruism, morality, generosity and brotherhood—unless adults give adolescents problems and ideas worth their investigation—children will not grow into adults who care about "abstract" humanitarian concepts. Unfortunately, society today does not consistently encourage adolescents to think, to question, nor to formulate ideas about abstract humanitarian concepts.

Reverend DiMarzio is executive director of the Office of Migration and Refugee Services for the United States Catholic Conference.

These Albany, New York, high school students participated in a weekend retreat to study refugee issues. Here, they prepare for a refugee-camp "simulation".

The Evangelist/ Maryrose Robilatto

Whether from a desire to protect our children from the world's suffering, or from an unfamiliarity with their capacity to respond, adults have in large part failed to challenge and tap children's energy. Whatever the cause, this failure deprives our children of the personal growth possible when one has the opportunity to look beyond oneself and reach out to help others. In addition, it deprives those people who could benefit from children's involvement in social justice issues and activities.

Despite this general failure to challenge our children, they are responding of their own accord to the adult world's problems. All around us we see proof that once children understand a problem, their willingness and capacity to respond selflessly, joyously, and without hesitation is nearly limitless.

This last year has seen children—many themselves poor by Western standards—responding generously to the plight of Africa's drought victims. ABC recently devoted a special edition of "Twenty-Twenty" to the story of New York inner city school children—many with parents out of work, some living in condemned tenement buildings—who not only raised, in less than two weeks, more than $150,000 for Ethiopian relief, but who also purchased grain and arranged for its distribution in Ethiopia.

Within the USCC refugee resettlement community, we have witnessed young people's interest in the plights and needs of refugees.

In Albany, New York, twenty-eight high school students participated in a fundraising refugee-camp simulation called "Twenty-Four Hours of Nothing." Through games, exercises and discussions with real refugees, the students spent a weekend learning about the harsh realities refugees face. Rationed water, scanty meals and a 3:00 a.m. air raid brought home the refugee experience. According to students who participated, the weekend taught them not only about what refugees have lost but also about the obligations free nations should feel towards refugees. This handful of students, who raised $1,000 for refugee resettlement, are destined to become adults who remember and care about refugees.

A high school senior in Charlotte, North Carolina, devoted his Eagle Scout project to refugees. The playground equipment he built for Cambodian refugee children is not only providing hours of entertainment for them, but it is also standing as a monument to what young people can do, with adult encouragment, to help refugees.

Such interest and generous concern confirm our suspicions: we need only to educate children about what is happening to refugees, and they will respond.

To begin that education, we will offer Catholic school teachers a package of classroom materials adaptable to a variety of classroom situations, subject areas, and grade levels. A package of refugee awareness materials has already been tested and well-received in several areas. In Green Bay, Wisconsin, USCC staff has actively pursued convincing the Catholic schools of the value of refugee awareness. The Green Bay Department of Religious Education, as well as individual high school teachers, have been receptive and enthusiastic, encouraging resettlement staff to make classroom visits to introduce students to the refugee story.

• • •

When our refugee education package is distributed nationally, it will represent USCC's first step toward building a firm foundation of refugee and migration studies within the Catholic school curriculum. As our materials become accepted for their solid educational value, we will expand our audience to include grade school students, perhaps even as young as kindergarteners. Our ideal would be eventually to see collaborative efforts towards educating children, perhaps beginning with other religious resettlement organizations. Through such combined efforts, we might someday see the refugee story spring to life before a whole generation of children's eyes. And wouldn't it be wonderful if captivating our children's imaginations now could lead to the creative and innovative global policy-making necessary to eliminate the world's refugee crisis?

Not long ago, Pope John Paul II remarked, "On this earth, we are all somewhat refugees." At USCC, we believe that this abstract concept, which has to do with brother and sisterhood, the family of humankind, and our relationship with God, is an important one for children to grasp. Since the best way to teach an abstract idea is to tell a story, we will tell Catholic school children the story of refugees. And if we are careful and compassionate storytellers, perhaps when our children are old enough to take pen in hand, they will be better authors than we . . . rewriting the refugee story to give it an ending filled with hope.

Refugees and the Black Community

Norman Hill

Last year's poll by the U.S. Committee for Refugees shows that when refugee issues are presented in a concrete way, black Americans, like most Americans, have a generous attitude toward people fleeing from persecution who look for safety and acceptance in the United States. However, black American leaders play a special role in educating the black community about the needs of refugees and about the important contributions that refugees make to our society.

Of particular interest to black Americans in recent years have been the boat people who fled from Haiti from 1979 on—especially during the time of the Mariel boat lift from Cuba. It became clear then that special attention was needed to help the Haitians—more than a thousand of whom were detained for up to two years as "illegal aliens." The distinctions being made between Cuban and Haitian refugees lacked morality and gave rise to the realization that special efforts were needed to help the Haitians obtain a fair opportunity to receive asylum.

At that time, many civil rights organizations, such as the A. Philip Randolph Institute, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Urban League, and other member organizations of the National Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, joined together to form the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, to help gain equal treatment and due process for the Haitians. Their purpose was to advocate appropriate legislation and pursue lawsuits on behalf of the Haitians under existing immigration law. At the same time, a number of black lawyers became involved in bringing lawsuits on the refugees' behalf. The lawyers and the black organizations combined their expertise and political clout to create a support network for the Haitians. This, in turn, brought the issues of Haitian refugees to the attention of black Americans on the community level.

In general, the Haitian refugee experience has brought about a greater sensitivity and concern about refugees on the part of the black community. In Brooklyn, New York, for example, where large numbers of Haitians are concentrated, growing contacts between American black and Haitian leaders have given rise to increased mutual understanding about each community's problems. In other parts of the country—for example, in West Virginia, where Haitians have become migrant workers—some black churches have reached out to learn more about the Haitians and ways of helping them.

An awakening interest in refugee issues on the part of black leaders can be seen not only in the national and local civil rights organizations but also in the Congressional Black Caucus, where, for example, Representative Walter Fauntroy has taken the lead in educating his constituency about the need to support the rights of refugees—Haitians as well as others. In 1982, black leaders sought to extend the voluntary departure visas of Ethiopians who had taken refuge in the United States, particularly people who had opposed the military regime in Ethiopia and who feared persecution if they returned.

An example of a national black leader who has been involved in aiding refugees of all colors and nationalities for decades is Bayard Rustin. Starting with his work in the 1930s for International Rescue Committee, which brought to the United State Jews fleeing the Holocaust, he has continued to play an active role in organizations that help refugees, including Vietnamese and Cambodians, Ethiopians and South Africans, Salvadorans and Nicaraguans, Poles, and Afghans.

It is crucial that all Americans, black Americans included, understand that human rights and civil rights do not end at our water's edge. In part, this is merely a question of self-interest. It is a mistake to think that refugees cause unemployment, and it is important to educate our constituencies about the contributions refugees make to our society. Black leaders have long recognized that a nation that is not compassionate enough to open its doors to those fleeing tyranny, war, and repression will not be compassionate enough to solve the pressing problems of poverty and joblessness at home.

Therefore, the role of the A. Philip Randolph Institute and of the civil rights and trade union movements must be to better educate our members about the human dimension of refugee and immigration issues. Our role must be to speak forthrightly about the contributions that immigrants and refugees make to our nation.

If we do our job, if we make the issue of refugees and immigrants concrete, if our communities can see the flesh-and-blood human beings affected by refugee and immigration policies, then, as last year's poll suggests, the American people will strongly support the compassionate policy of reunifying families and of providing a haven for those fleeing death and repression.

Maintaining a generous refugee policy is a litmus test of our national compassion. The opening of our borders to those fleeing death or repression is a measure of our commitment to social justice and human rights. Therefore, it is most appropriate for black Americans, who have been victims of oppression, in this nation of immigrants, to take the lead in fighting for human rights everywhere.

Norman Hill is president of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, a national black trade union and civil rights organization. He is also national vice president of the National Immigration and Refugee Citizenship Forum.

Land Vietnamese in Thailand—An Inadequate Response

Congressman Bill McCollum

When the Republic of South Vietnam fell to the military of the North and its allies in April 1975, many people were engulfed who were or who once had been employed by the U.S. government, businesses, or private agencies; still others trapped were those identified with U.S. policy in Vietnam because they had been somehow connected with the military or the government of South Vietnam. Each year during the decade since then, such people, in varying numbers, have found the means to escape, seeking the freedoms which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam does not offer. They have been joined by compatriots whose characteristics, such as being ethnic Chinese, Amerasian, or relatives of U.S. residents, have made them targets of harassment or worse in Vietnam.

In the past ten years, a great many Vietnamese who fled and became refugees have been resettled in the West. Most escaped by boat, an exodus that continues today, although it is credibly estimated that less than half survive the journey. A few have fled to the West from Vietnam by land. Since the late 1970s, these 12-14,000 "land Vietnamese" have become trapped in several different camps on the border between Thailand and Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia. To tell their story is to describe a maze that begins and ends in entrapment and danger. And yet, there is a solution for these people, based on simple generosity and a sense of fairness. Presenting this predicament and the possibility for response is the purpose of this article.

• • •

In the early 1980s, it was generally recognized that resettlement of land Vietnamese in a country in the West was the most feasible solution to their dilemma. Thailand could not accept them; their ability to return safely to Vietnam was nil; they were surrounded by hostile Cambodians who saw little difference between Vietnamese refugees and the Vietnamese troops that occupied Cambodia; and they were always within striking range of those Vietnamese troops.

To respond to the unique situation of the land Vietnamese, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reached an agreement to set up a special border encampment. Known as NW-9, it opened on April 18, 1980. Establishment of the camp increased both the security of the 5,552 refugees it ultimately housed and the amount of supplies which could reach them. By the fall of 1980, resettlement had begun; by the camp's first anniversary, its population had been reduced to 2,000; by June 1981, the camp was closed. The State Department estimates that virtually all of the NW-9 refugees were resettled, with the United States accepting more than 45 percent.

Within three months of closing NW-9, another small group of land Vietnamese had arrived. Highly vulnerable and terrified, at first they were housed in specific buildings in Cambodian refugee camps. In December 1981, RTG and ICRC agreed to establish a new, temporary camp, NW-82, which became terribly crowded and unsanitary. Security in the camp was inadequate. It took RTG, ICRC, the United States, and other interested governments a year to negotiate a resettlement program for these people; movement did not occur until camp conditions became critical and received attention as an international scandal. In all, NW-82 housed 1,804 refugees, for whom the resettlement process began in December 1982. Virtually all had been resettled by February 1983. Of those, the United States accepted 58 percent.

• • •

Additional refugees continued to arrive overland. Once again, the search for a permanent solution to the issue of land Vietnamese was frustrated by the reality of the differing circumstances of individual refugees or their families. The opportunity to escape does not present itself to all refugees at the same time; people's courage to attempt an escape matures at various times; some families chose to wait for family members to be released or escape from Vietnam's infamous reeducation camps. For these and many more reasons, the closing of NW-82 did not end the trickle of new refugees.

New arrivals were collected at Nong Samet, a Cambodian evacuation site near the Thai-Cambodian border. In September 1983, the RTG decided, despite ICRC opposition, to move the land Vietnamese two and a half miles into Cambodia, to a site known as Dong Rek. Despite repeated requests by ICRC to move the land Vietnamese to a safer location, the RTG refused to do so, and the resettlement countries offered little effective support for ICRC's protection efforts. Thailand, knowing of the reduced resettlement ceilings being established by many Western nations, believed that if it permitted all the land Vietnamese to enter the safety of Thailand, it would be "stuck" with many whom the resettlement countries would not accept.

Partly because the U.S. State Department showed little interest and less leadership in resolving the matter, a full year passed before an agreement was reached to allow for some resettlement of the land Vietnamese. U.S. resettlement processing began in late 1984. By January 1985, Dong Rek became a target in the offensive being conducted by the Vietnamese troops occupying Cambodia. When the shelling began, the entire population was hurriedly evacuated into Thailand. During its existence, Dong Rek housed 4,525 land Vietnamese. Of that number, only 1,363 were ultimately resettled, with the United States accepting 76 percent of those taken.

Those Dong Rek residents who were not resettled, along with new arrivals, are now located in a huge Cambodian evacuation camp in Thailand known as Site 2, where the 4,100 land Vietnamese are often forgotten among the 130,000 Cambodians living there. Antagonism among the Cambodians toward the Vietnamese runs high, at times precipitating violence. On October 17,

---

Congressman Bill McCollum serves on the House Judiciary Immigration, Refugees, and International Law Subcommittee.

These two Vietnamese children are among more than 4,000 "land" Vietnamese who have crossed Cambodia to reach Thailand. They remain, with 135,000 Cambodians, in "Site 2" encampment, just two kms from the border. USCR/Roger Winter

1985, for example, a grenade was thrown into the Vietnamese section of Site 2, killing two and wounding seventeen. Khmer Rouge guerrillas were allegedly responsible for the incident.

Thailand's worst fears regarding this group have been realized. More than 2,200 of the Dong Rek residents were considered and then left behind by the resettlement countries, the victims of lessened interest in their plight and of resettlement countries' tightened policies.

I serve on the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the United States House of Representatives. In this capacity I have had the opportunity to examine most of the world's principal refugee situations and to follow their development. Based on this perspective, I believe that the land Vietnamese on the Thai-Cambodian border are of unique and special interest to the United States.

Last August, I again had the opportunity to visit the land Vietnamese encampment. The camp was physically overcrowded and suffered from poor drainage. Nevertheless, the animation of the people and their confidence that the United States and the Western world will rescue them gave me hope for them.

These land Vietnamese should be moved off the Thai-Cambodian border. The policy of maintaining them there is intended to keep their lives difficult and dangerous in order to deter additional arrivals. The truth is, however, that numbers of land Vietnamese have always been, by far, the smallest of any refugee population entering Thailand. In 1985, for example, new arrivals averaged only a little more than 100 per month.

The United States and other resettlement countries, while encouraging the movement of the land Vietnamese to a less vulnerable location, have been reluctant to continue to remain committed to their resettlement, primarily because of a fear of drawing additional refugees. There are, however, adequate deterrents to flight across Cambodia for land Vietnamese who would attempt the journey for flimsy reasons. These include the risks involved in crossing military lines, checkpoints, and minefields, the rough treatment provided to newly arriving land-Vietnamese men by the Cambodian resistance; the likelihood that the women will be assaulted en route to the border, the poor living conditions in the camp itself; the continuing vulnerability of living among 130,000 antagonistic Cambodians; and the ever present chances of incursion into Thailand by Vietnamese troops which could lead to the refugees' capture.

Among the land Vietnamese are a significant number of people who had a close relationship with the United States prior to 1975, including individuals who served many years in reeducation in Vietnam. Many others have families in the United States. All are unable to return to Vietnam. All are truly vulnerable where they are. Out of loyalty and responsibility, the United States should resettle those of special concern. Out of humanitarian reality, the United States should lead the international community in organizing a method for resettling them all. Arguments against resettlement of the land Vietnamese based on a desire not to slide toward resettling Cambodians from the border simply are inadequate.

During April 1985 congressional hearings on the Refugee Assistance Extension Act of 1985, I referred to delays in processing the land Vietnamese for resettlement as "reprehensible." Their situation remains unresolved.

I am among those who think that the United States should always be cautious in pursuing the resettlement solution for refugees anywhere in the world. Other solutions—returning home or remaining in the country of first asylum—are preferable. However, for the land Vietnamese, those options simply do not exist. These people must be moved away from danger and into a resettlement process now.

Sudan Emergency—A Personal Account

Nicholas van Praag

It was a dull, cold morning in late March 1985 as I cycled to my office at the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Washington bureau. Getting out of the elevator, a colleague told me rather gravely that the personnel staff in Geneva had called and that I should prepare myself for a three-month stint as a member of UNHCR's emergency team in the Sudan.

My mind flashed back to an orientation session I had attended just after joining UNHCR in 1981 at which Zia Rizvi, UNHCR chief for Southeast Asia, wished a full-blown emergency on all the rather green-looking recruits! There was nothing quite like it, he said, to bring out those reserves of initiative and energy that few people realize they possess.

Now, perhaps my chance had come. I spent the next week searching out mosquito repellent, a snake-bite kit, camp bed, water filter, and all the other gear that earnest friends and concerned family suggested I might need.

At the end of a week's frantic preparations, I met with officials in charge of emergency operations in the State Department's refugee bureau. They regaled me with the department's view of what had gone wrong in the relief operation, and some of what was beginning to go right since the autumn of 1984 when tens of thousands of Ethiopians from the northern provinces of Eritrea and Tigre began to stream across the Sudanese border into ill-prepared and unsuitable sites.

I left the State Department a little shaken by the enormity of the problems and, in particular, by a conversation with a doctor from the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta recently returned from the Sudan who told me that the refugee camps in the east were probably "among the least healthy places anywhere in the world at this time."

Most of my short stop-over at UNHCR's Geneva headquarters was spent ingesting all the products of modern pharmaceutical science that the World Health Organization recommends for travelers in sub-Saharan Africa. Then, after a final and rather sobering briefing from the overworked UNHCR desk officers in charge of the Sudan, I boarded my plane for the flight south.

It was another seven hours before I felt I had really left Switzerland. As the crew opened the door of the DC-10, the unmistakable smell of Africa drifted into the familiar cocoon in which SWISSAIR transports its passengers around the world.

• • •

After a few days in Khartoum, a city still basking in the glow of expectation that followed the overthrow of President Nimeiry, I was designated "roving field officer," based in Gedaref. I set off at the end of April on the 400-km drive across the relentless and arid eastern plains of the Sudan. The monotony of the landscape is interrupted at the halfway point by strips of cultivated land on either side of the Blue Nile as it flows from the mountains of central Ethiopia—the same source as that of a great many of the refugees.

In a country the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River, the highway to Gedaref is a stretch of the Sudan's only "made-up" road. It was built in the 1970s to link Khartoum with Port Sudan; the work of Chinese and Yugoslav as well as Sudanese crews, it proved a logistical god-send to the relief operation in the east. In the dry season, the 15 reception centers set up for the 340,000 refugees who had arrived since the middle of 1984 were within half a day's drive of the paved surface. The same was true for most of the further 24 settlements set up to accommodate previous waves of refugees. The 130,000 inhabitants of these settlements had been put back on full rations in March 1985 when their own stored supplies ran out.

I arrived at UNHCR's sub-office late in the afternoon. The sun was fading over the horizon, but the temperature was still well over 100° F, where it remained for most of my time in the Sudan. After meeting some colleagues, I was directed across the strip of inner-city wasteland that separates the one-story office from the rather grandiosely titled "government guest house" where I was to stay. It was a desolate scene with vultures picking over the carcasses of dead dogs under the hot sun, while a group of townspeople in long white jellabiahs scavenged among the wreckage of vehicles and discarded pieces of rusting machinery.

I was about to spend the next three months based in a town which, since my first visit four years earlier, I had cited as the most grindingly wretched place on earth. I realized now that this had not been exaggerated, as I ladled grimy water over myself in an attempt to clean up after the long drive.

My first assignment was to investigate an incident at Wad el Hillew, a remote reception center close to the border that had been extended in mid-1984 to cope with the influx of refugees arriving mainly from Eritrea.

Word had reached UNHCR from the staff of Llamba, a U.S. voluntary agency with a long track-record in the Sudan, that more than 6,000 refugees had been expelled from the camp by police and soldiers armed with guns and camel whips. Rumor had it that some of the refugees had been sent back to Ethiopia.

That rumor had proved untrue, but the expulsion had certainly taken place after a demonstration by refugees protesting what they alleged was unfair distribution of food and other relief items.

By the time I arrived, 2,000 of the refugees, recent arrivals from villages just across the Ethiopian border, had been allowed to return to the camp. Several hundred others had been trucked to Kassala, the capital of the eastern region. The rest were squatting in a ramshackle zone outside the camp, trying to find some shelter from a relentless sun under triangular shelters of sticks and grass. They had no food and only what water they could beg. Inside the shelters lay hundreds more, growing increasingly weaker, many of them children wearing colored plastic arm bands indicating their nutritional needs

---

Nicholas van Praag is the public information officer in UNHCR's Washington D.C. office. The views expressed here are not necessarily, however, those of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

in the feeding centers from which they had been evicted.

It was terrible to see their pleading faces as they crowded around and to sense the hope they placed in a representative of a bewilderingly named international agency from the other end of the world.

After a firm protest, action was swift. The refugees from the rag-zone were allowed back into the camp, and their ration cards were returned. UNHCR immediately placed a permanent field officer in the camp, and the office of the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees (COR) ordered an investigation into the incident. CARE, the agency responsible for the logistics of supplying all food and non-food items to refugees in the eastern region, undertook a new census to establish just how many people were in the camp as a first step towards making sure that everyone received their share of assistance. During the following weeks, we managed to track down some of the people who had been dumped in Kassala and arranged to have them admitted to another camp.

The expulsion at Wad el Hillew was an isolated incident and certainly not typical of the generous response by the Sudanese to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who have entered their country over the past quarter century. Nevertheless, it pointed to the growing strains on the relationship between the refugees and the local population in a part of the world where the common denominator of misery has slipped well below the bare minimum of subsistence that UNHCR tries to provide to refugees.

It was not just the newcomers that created a sense of resentment. As the effects of the drought in the Sudan became more severe, Eritrean refugees who had lived unassisted among the local population for many years began to abandon their villages and head for the new emergency relief centers where assistance was available. No comparable help was available to the Sudanese. By June 1985, the bare bones of a feeding program were underway, run by USAID and implemented by CARE, but it was too limited and too late to stem the growing feeling of hostility towards the refugees, which occasionally flared into ugly incidents.

• • •

By the end of May, the increasing humidity heralded the start of the rainy season, fervently prayed for by the drought-affected population, but anticipated with some trepidation by those running the relief operation. Their job would be enormously complicated in the short run by the very rains that offered long-term hope.

Most of the eastern region of the Sudan is covered by impervious black soil. The result is that the water drains very slowly, and the rutted tracks, which provide the only access to the camps, quickly turn into a quagmire of churned mud. With many of the camps at some distance from the hard road and most of the refugees living in tents or flimsy grass shelters, the prospect of the rainy season seemed grim.

But by this time, the hard work and planning of past months was beginning to pay off. The rains, though certainly a complicating factor, were not a surprise. UNHCR's field establishment in the east was now more than thirty strong. Fred Cuny, well known for his handling of international disasters, had been brought in with his team to advise the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees and his staff. Twenty-four voluntary agencies were involved in providing a broad range of services, from supplementary feeding to sanitation. Wells had been sunk in some camps, and alternative water systems were being installed in others. Crews and heavy equipment were at work shoring up the most damaged stretches of access roads in and around the camps. Food and other relief items were being regularly delivered and stockpiles built up.

It had not always been so. The first response to the emergency, as thousands of people flooded into the Sudan from Eritrea and Tigre in the last quarter of 1984, was slow. It takes time for the international community to gird up its resources for a massive relief operation and then bring them to a distant, undeveloped part of the world.

Some time lag is inevitable before relief services can be made available in the field. But much has been learned in the Sudan about how to accelerate the relief agencies' efforts to prevent a refugee crisis from becoming a catastrophe. As a result, UNHCR has put renewed emphasis on training its staff in emergency preparedness. However, the pooling and analysis of information to provide more reliable advance warning of refugee flows, as well as contingency planning, must also be improved. Greater coordination with the voluntary agencies, whose staff work at the coal-face of most international refugee emergencies, is critical to this approach.

• • •

With the onset of the rains fast approaching, we pushed ahead with plans to move as many refugees as possible away from the rain-vulnerable border sites to the new and more accessible reception centers set up close to the artificial lake created by the Girba Dam. Twenty-thousand Tigreans were moved from Wad Kowli in late April and early May.

At the end of May, I went up to Kassala to assist the field staff there with the relocation of 20,000 Eritreans from Wad Sherife, which, with a registered population of more than 100,000, was then the largest refugee camp in the world.

Kassala, with the precipitous, granite Jebel rising behind the town and the Eritrean mountains to the east, creates a heightened sense of perspective after the flatness of the desert. In spite of the drought, the surroundings looked green, thanks to the underground rivers that sustain rich fruit groves and provide delicious drinking water.

UNHCR's field office for Wad Sherife is a squat white villa behind high walls close to the center of Kassala. After a good meal prepared by a French colleague fresh from relief work in Lebanon, I slept on the verandah. There was a stiff breeze, and the peace of the night was disturbed only by the interminable cracking sound of the UN flag flying over the entrance to the house.

The rhythm of activity during the moves was exhausting. We rose at 4:30 a.m. and headed out to the camp, 12 kms east of the town. The plan was to truck about 500 refugees each day to the new site, about 100 kms to the south. It was our task to count heads and to help the medical staff see that the children had been immunized against measles and that no one too sick to travel boarded the vehicles.

This job was not made any easier by the truck drivers, who were keen to start the journey and avoid just the kind of monitoring we were trying to carry out. Occasionally, lorries would bolt from behind a row of shacks and head off across the plain at high speed with one of our people in hot pursuit. This game of cat and mouse lasted until around 7:30 a.m., when the sun was blazing, and leaping up and down onto trucks became a little too much. Then, with the refugees on their way, I headed to the camp's market for an excruciatingly sweet cup of tea before going to talk with the Sudanese camp officials about the next day's move.

Relocation was abruptly halted at the beginning of June when a number of cases of suspected cholera were diagnosed first at Wad Kowli and subsequently in a number of Sudanese villages and refugee camps throughout the eastern region. The killer virus, characterized by severe watery diarrhea, vomiting, and collapse, is spread through fecal material and is transmitted by contaminated water or by direct contact. A catastrophe was widely predicted in the overcrowded and unsanitary camps.

Refugees from Ethiopia complete their long trek to the Sudan.
UNHCR/N. van Praag

That this did not occur is due in large part to the extraordinary hard work of the medical teams in caring for the patients, setting up isolation wards, digging and liming pits for the contaminated effluent, cutting holes in beds, and administering intravenous fluids. Within six weeks, they had managed to contain the outbreak with a relatively low level of mortality. Their success owed much to the advance preparations that had been made. Guidelines for treatment were drawn up and outreach workers trained in early diagnosis and management of the disease. Of equal importance was the foresight with which the medical coordinators and the donors ensured sufficient stocks of the special rehydration fluids which are the only effective treatment for cholera.

• • •

Just before cholera struck, the tide of refugees, which had been running at around 1,000 arrivals a day when I arrived in April, suddenly turned. During May and June, more than 55,000 Tigreans from the camps at Wad Kowli, Sefawa, and Fau packed their belongings and began the long walk back to their villages across the border in Tigre—a journey that averages about twenty days.

REST, the Tigrean relief agency, tried to encourage only the heads of family to return, with the idea that they would go back to prepare and plant their fields, leaving the less robust members of their families in the camps until harvest time. But many families who had suffered so much in the first months of their exile refused to be separated, and set off together despite advice to the contrary.

As the refugees began the trek home, concern was voiced in diplomatic circles in Khartoum about their returning at a time when stories continued of heavy fighting and persistent famine in Tigre. In no position to stop them from leaving, UNHCR's major preoccupation was to ensure that all those going back were doing so voluntarily, and I was asked to visit the main Tigrean camps to make sure this was the case.

It was soon clear that it was. The Tigreans are a rugged and independent people with little taste for camp life. They had always intended to go back to their villages when conditions permitted. With the advent of the planting season and reports from newcomers of plentiful rains, that was what they were now doing.

There was certainly no evidence, as some suggested, that the provision of rations for the journey home, or a truck ride to the border from the inland camps, was driving the Tigreans out of Sudan. Nevertheless, it was a disturbing spectacle to see undernourished children being removed from supplementary feeding centers and walking off with their parents across the border into what, for the relief workers, was the unknown.

• • •

The metaphorical dark cloud of the rainy season that had been hanging over the relief program for so long finally burst in June when I was acting as field officer at the Wad Kowli camp. The humidity gradually increased, culminating in a massive downpour. It wreaked havoc. The *Médecins Sans Frontières* hospital was destroyed, and the in-patients (mainly cholera victims) had to be evacuated to a nearby canvas warehouse where they were temporarily accommodated, sometimes as many as three to a bed.

At the same time, the Atbara River, which separates the camp on its eastern side from the supply routes to the west, dry for months, rose in a matter of hours. Communication across the river was restricted to a raft, a rubber boat, and a few specially-equipped vehicles. More serious, however, was the damage to the system of infiltration pipes being installed in the river bed by Oxfam engineers. The camp's future water supply depended on this system. The main section was washed away by the first powerful surge of the river.

Such situations tend to bring out those reserves that Zia Rizvi had mentioned back in 1981.

Within a few hours, the hospital was again functioning in temporary shelters, and Oxfam had rigged up an alternative water system. Meanwhile, a Swiss disaster relief team working on a cableway and a suspended foot bridge across the river was filled with a new sense of mission in its efforts to build what had previously looked like a couple of rather incongruous structures across the dry river bed. Perhaps by way of celebration, they invited me over the next evening to their large thatched shelter from my adjoining mud-walled tukul. As the rain fell, we ate a meal of *rösti mit spek und ei* (hash browns with eggs and bacon)—a speciality more appropriate to Alpine ski resorts than the torrid climes of the Horn of Africa.

• • •

UNHCR's base in the eastern region had, by this time, been shifted to Showak, 80 km north of Gedaref. The new location has the dual advantages of its proximity to the headquarters of the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees' general project manager, who has overall responsibilities for the refugee program in the east, as well as being centrally placed for communication with the settlements and camps administered by UNHCR.

Showak is a typical small African town with a pleasant souk through which to wander in the cool of the evening. But with the arrival of UNHCR, and a number of voluntary agencies in its wake, the town was soon marked by the foreign presence. Showak's only hostelry, "A Green Valley Restaurant," lost little time in translating its menu into pidgin English, and rents for already scarce property tripled overnight.

At the end of June, with the end of my assignment fast approaching, I was summoned to Khartoum with the intriguing task of accompanying a delegation from *USA for Africa* around the Sudan. The pace was frenetic. The tour began in Wad Sherife in the east and progressed across the vast country from one famine-ravaged center to the next before reaching the geographic center of the African continent at El Geneina, an oasis town close to the Sudan's western border with Chad.

The delegation was accompanied by a large following of media people, and I felt a little irritated at first by the hype that surrounded the entourage. By the end, however, I was impressed by the sensitivity and eloquence of Harry Belafonte, the spokesman for the group, and by the vision and determination of Ken Kragen, president of *USA for Africa*.

Ethiopian refugees establish their camp lives in the desert conditions of the Sudan's Gadam-Gefried camp.
UNHCR/M. Vanappelghem

The delegation certainly learned as much as is possible from a brief whistle-stop tour. Despite some initial mutual misunderstanding, the trip gave both the representatives of *USA for Africa* and the people directly involved in the relief effort a better sense of what the other was about.

It certainly affected the way in which *USA for Africa* finally committed its resources. The delegation came to the Sudan with a plane load of supplies and some $46 million in the bank. Relief workers close to the problems welcomed the initial delivery, but made a forceful pitch for a substantial infusion of quickly disbursed funds to, as they saw it, "save lives now." The delegation, meanwhile, emphasized its desire to respond to immediate needs, but

also to make a difference in the longer term. If *USA for Africa* was to be more than a temporary fund-raising phenomenon, argued Kragen, it must be especially judicious in the allocation of its limited funds, and pay close attention to its constituency, the press, and public opinion, which remained skeptical of the international relief establishment. Although it left without making any commitments, shortly after its return to the U.S., *USA for Africa's* executive director announced contributions of $17 million for emergency assistance, of which one-half million is for UNHCR's program in the Sudan.

• • •

My last few weeks in the Sudan were spent looking to the future. How many of the 340,000 refugees who had crossed into the Sudan from Eritrea and Tigre would go home? This was a question increasingly being asked by UNHCR officials in Khartoum as the hectic pace of the emergency operation slowed somewhat.

More than 55,000 Tigreans had already returned, and refugee organizers were predicting that plentiful rains and a good harvest, particularly in the more populated central highlands of Tigre, would see the majority of the 100,000 Tigreans still living in the Sudan's refugee camps head home in October or November. According to REST officials, only the destruction of the harvest in the fields through renewed fighting was likely to reverse this trend.

The intentions of the Eritreans were less clear. Only a handful of the 190,000 who had arrived since the beginning of 1984 had gone back, and few of those I spoke to in the camps scattered along the Sudan's northeastern border with Ethiopia indicated any impatience to retrace their steps. The continuing effects of the drought and deep-seated political divisions within the Eritrean population were a significant brake on their desire to return. Meanwhile, the rumbling of a major new government offensive, audible on the other side of the border from Kassala, seemed likely to lead to a significant increase in arrivals over the months ahead.

• • •

As the aircraft headed north, Khartoum's shabby suburbs looked extraordinarily neat and ordered. Even the relentless desert seemed to have a warm, enticing glow. After three months in the Sudan, I was on my way home. With my tour over, I was able to pack my bags and leave. For the refugees in the miserable camps below, there was no such easy way out.

Chadian Refugees: Coming and Going

Joseph C. Kennedy, Ph.D.

"Chadians are spilling into Sudan," say the headlines. "A new wave of Chadian refugees is being created."

Once again, as if part of a tragic ritual which must be regularly played out, thousands of Chadians are on the move, coming and going, going and coming, uprooted by fighting, by drought, and by famine. Since mid-1984, at least 175,000 Chadians have fled to other countries, and countless thousands have been displaced at home.

Over the years, the African continent has been beset by internal conflicts, territorial disputes, uprisings, civil war, and racial oppression which have forced millions to flee and become refugees in other lands.

Africa also has known droughts which have claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands and threatened the lives of millions. At present, the entire continent is caught in the grip of its worst drought in a hundred years.

• • •

Few countries in Africa, however, have been buffeted so long and so severely by the twin calamities of internal discord and drought as has Chad. Nowhere in Africa have the whims of nature and the whims of man so contrived to test the will of a people to survive. Landlocked, almost in the heart of Africa, Chad ranks as the third or fourth poorest country in the world, with an annual per capita income of $110. Chad needs every advantage it can muster to develop its resources, which, though limited, have the potential to improve the conditions of its people's lives.

But this has not been the case. For most of its 25-year history of independence from the French, this nation of nearly five million people has known the ebb and flow of internal political discord and war. With independence came innumerable unresolved political issues, as various factions vied for power. The government headed by President Felix Tombalbaye prevailed, albeit with constant unrest and frequent outbursts of violence, for fifteen years until the military coup of 1975. The aftermath of the coup brought no surcease—only increasing unrest, discontent, shifting factions, foreign interventions, and civil war.

While many Chadians were kept in a constant state of fear and flux, and many development programs which could have benefited people foundered or never got off the ground, it wasn't until the intensified fighting between 1979 and 1982 that thousands of people were forced to flee the country, creating the first great wave of Chadian refugees. At the height of the civil war in 1980, at least 260,000 people fled into the neighboring countries: the Sudan, Cameroon, Nigeria, and the Central African Republic.

When the forces of President Hissein Habre claimed victory and the war ended in 1982, most of those refugees voluntarily returned to Chad. In 1983, fighting broke out again with an incursion from the north by Chadian rebels supported by Libyan forces; they were headed off by Chadian government and French forces. Few Chadians left the country at the time, but about 60,000 fled southward. Once again now, as fighting has flared up in southern Chad, the people are crossing the border into Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the Sudan.

Two devastating droughts have complicated this incessant internal conflict. The great Sahelian drought of 1969-75—called the longest extended African drought in modern times—struck across seven West African countries of the Sahel—Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, The Gambia, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Niger, and Chad. The lives and culture of the entire Sahel population of 25 million were threatened. Within Chad, thousands of people died and hundreds of thousands were uprooted. Hundreds of thousands of livestock died. Efforts by the Chadian people to recover from this drought, with tremendous support from the international community, collided with the internal political disruptions.

Following the comings and goings brought on by the events between 1979 and 1983, just as the relief and rehabilitation programs for the repatriated refugees and for the country became effective, further political unrest in the south again impeded restoration. Together, the current drought, which threatens the lives of hundreds of thousands of Chadians, and political unrest have created the present travail.

So, once again, the ritual of refugee flight is being played out. Once again, those countries which border Chad are being asked to demonstrate that—in spite of their own meager resources—the tradition of the African extended family, which welcomes distant relatives as well as strangers, still prevails.

• • •

From mid-1984 to the present, it is estimated that nearly 175,000 Chadians have fled the country: 121,000 have crossed into the Sudan, 42,000 into the Central African Republic, and 13,500 into Cameroon. Undoubtedly, several thousand have gone into other countries—3,600 are reported to have entered Benin in mid-1985.

Among the three countries—the Central African Republic, the Sudan, and Cameroon—only Cameroon, with a per capita income of about $900 per year, could be called, within the African context, "well off." Both the Central African Republic and the Sudan, with per capita income of $320 and $380 respectively, rank among the twenty poorest countries in the world. Their inadequate food production places them among the hungriest nations, as well. Even in the best of times, they do not grow enough food to feed their own people and must depend upon food supplements from the international community. Yet, they have opened their borders to their Chadian neighbors in need.

Over the years, as refugees have fled from Ethiopia, Zaire, Uganda, and Chad, the government of the Sudan has accepted them and set up camps where the refugees are given land, seeds, tools, and food until the first or second harvest. In addition, it has provided support designed to help them become self-sufficient in food production. This has been the case with the Chadian refugees. The Sudanese, with the assistance of many

---

Dr. Kennedy is the director of international development for Africare.

international organizations, including the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the Islamic African Relief Agency, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Sudanese Commission for Refugees, are establishing camps for the newly arrived refugees.

Approximately 60,000 Chadians are being cared for in three organized camps in the Sudan's Darfur province, with additional reception centers and sites being planned. In addition, water programs and supplementary feeding centers for the severely malnourished children are being created. The other 60,000 refugees have settled along the border between Chad and the Sudan, where the people share the same ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and, historically, there has been a back-and-forth movement to graze cattle. If and when they will be moved to resettlement sites will depend upon conditions in Chad.

Supplying food to these 121,000 Chadian refugees in western Sudan represents a major challenge to the Sudanese government and the international community. The Sudan has been severely hit by the drought, and several hundred-thousand Sudanese have fled from northern Darfur to southern Darfur in the same areas as the Chadian refugee. There are estimates that at least 40 percent of the nearly 20 million population of the Sudan is facing starvation. Although adequate amounts of food have been received (1.1 million tons), lack of transportation, inadequate roads, a rail link in need of repairs, and the rains which have started have made distribution of food nearly impossible. Additionally, following the military coup of April 1985, the Sudan has a new government attempting to sort out its own economic conditions and political relationships.

Chadian refugee children in the Sudan's El Geneina camp retrieve precious grain.
UNHCR/M. Vanappelghem

• • •

The second largest number of Chadian refugees is in the Central African Republic. Since late 1984, 40,000 Chadians have crossed into the country—raising the number of Chadian refugees in the Central African Republic to 47,000 (About 7,000 Chadians had remained in the country living in and around Bangui, the capital).

These new arrivals in the Central African Republic have been settling in existing border villages such as Chari, Moyenne-Sido, and Kabo, or in remote uninhabited areas also near the border. For internal political reasons as well as for the protection of the refugees, the Central African Re~~public~~ government is urgently attempting to move them to camps away from the border. Early in 1985, when violence broke out along the border, the government of the Central African Republic declared a state of alert, closed official frontier crossings, and halted registration of the refugees.

Accordingly, four settlement sites have been selected at Fa, Bouboue, Daya, and Boya, approximately 150 miles from the border, where reception centers and settlements or refugee villages will be established. In these camps, refugees will be taught how to grow adequate food supplies for themselves. As of mid-1985, about 8,500 refugees had been resettled, and the efforts continue to move the others from the borders. Whether in the border village of Moyenne Sido, which saw its population increase from 2,000 to 17,000 in a matter of a few months, or in the new resettlement sites, this landlocked country of 2.5 million people, with limited resources, limited development, and weak infrastructure, will need considerable outside assistance to help both these newcomers and its own people, who are also severely affected by the drought.

• • •

In November 1984, Cameroon, which borders Chad on the southwest, witnessed an influx of 8,000 to 9,000 Chadians fleeing from the fighting in southern Chad. This brings the number of Chadian refugees in Cameroon to 13,500. (After the massive repatriations in 1982, 3,500 Chadian stayed. This number rose to 4,000 in 1983.)

While the Cameroon government has willingly accepted refugees and provides free entry for Chadians, it has established a special program for Chadian refugees. In 1982, it authorized UNHCR to establish a permanent refugee camp for Chadians at Poli near the Nigerian border in north-central Cameroon. All Chadian refugees are expected to go to this settlement. The program there, run by Dutch Volunteers with food shipments coordinated by the World Food Program, helps them become self-sufficient in food production. Many have already built homes and started farms. While Poli was planned to support 15,000 refugees, the limited capability of the water system allows no more than 6,000 to be accommodated. Thus, half of the refugees are still located along the border in the east of the country, in Kousseri town and on cotton plantations, where they manage to support themselves within the Cameroon economy.

While the situation in Cameroon seems fairly stable, continuing drought in the extreme north of the country and transportation and food distribution problems have led the government to ask UNHCR for emergency assistance for the refugees and its own displaced citizens.

• • •

The conditions faced by Chadian refugees in these three countries vary, but a common approach to solving their dilemma exists. Without concern for when the refugees will return—or even if they will return—to Chad, each country has responded to their immediate food, water, and health needs; as quickly as possible, each has placed them in camps offering the agricultural support which leads toward self-sufficient food production. As a result, if these refugees remain in the respective countries, they become less of a drain on the host country's resources; indeed, they can make a contribution to its overall development. If they return to Chad, they may have acquired additional skills which will enable them to put their lives back together more easily.

If recent history is an indicator, most of these 175,000 Chadian refugees will return to Chad when conditions permit. History would also indicate they will return to an uncertain future. In 1980, at the height of the fighting in Chad, about 260,000 Chadians fled into neighboring countries. Within one year after the war ended in 1982, nearly all had spontaneously returned. For example, by December 1983, only 1,000 Chadians remained in the Sudan, down from 20,000; 4,200 remained in Cameroon, down from 110,000.

They returned to a country devastated by the war. Livestock had died, fields lay idle, and agricultural production had come to a standstill. Homes in urban and rural areas had been looted and burned. Schools had been damaged. Much of Ndjamena, the capital city, which had become the final battleground, had been demolished. Water and electrical systems had been knocked out. Hundreds of civilians, including many top civil servants, had been killed or had fled. An already fragile infrastructure was virtually destroyed.

As the refugees returned to attempt to restore their own lives and land, they joined a country trying to recover. Many of the repatriated refugees who had come from rural areas resettled in areas around Ndjamena and in Abeche, the capital of the province of Ouaddai, some 500 miles northeast of Ndjamena. These two areas were also the most affected by the war.

Following a special conference on Chad convened in Geneva by the UN Development Program (UNDP) in November 1982, the international community began to respond to Chad's recovery needs, as well as to the needs of the returned refugees. UNHCR in 1981 had established a program to assist the returning refugees, and CARE, an American private voluntary organization (PVO), had begun a UNHCR-funded program of emergency relief support for refugees returning from Cameroon—distribution of food, supplies, equipment for house repairs, etc. The health portion of the program was supported by *Médecins Sans Frontières* (Doctors without Borders), a Franco-Belgian PVO. UNDP itself established a three-year, $52-million economic recovery program which included food self-sufficiency and reforestation projects.

Although there were initial programs to help the repatriated refugees specifically, some still functioning today, priorities shifted very quickly toward recovery and restoration of the country as a whole. Illustrative of this shift in priorities are the programs and levels of funding provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

In 1983, through an African Resettlement Services and Facilities program, $4 million of a total of $14 million was specifically budgeted for two programs of assistance

Chadian refugees, arriving at El Geneina camp in the Sudan.
UNHCR/A. Billard

to help integrate these repatriated refugees back into Chadian society.

Volunteers in Technical Assistance (VITA), an American PVO, initiated a two-year private-enterprise project in and around Ndjamena where 30,000 of the returned refugees began to settle. This project, scheduled to end in late 1985 or early 1986, is providing revolving credit funds to help small enterpreneurs start new businesses or rebuild those interrupted by war. It is also creating jobs for many of the returned refugees and is increasing the output of consumer and production goods.

Africare, another PVO, initiated a program in 1983 under the USAID Refugee Resettlement Program to assist the nearly 30,000 returned refugees who settled in the rural areas around Abeche, a city of 150,000. To enable the returnees to plant crops before the rainy season in July 1984, 500 metric tons of sorghum and millet were purchased from local grain merchants in Chad, then tested, transported, and distributed. The distribution was carried out with the cooperation of the World Food Program, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and local Chadian officials. The second phase of the program includes restoring small dams and retention walls, agricultural activities including reforestation, creating jobs for the refugees through a Food-for-Work program, and stimulating local businesses through the purchase of supplies and equipment.

• • •

By 1984, UNHCR had ended its direct support within Chad (having turned its final phase over to UNDP), and USAID shifted its emphasis from refugee assistance to infrastructure support for the country as a whole. During this same time, much of the work of the international agencies in Chad also shifted from efforts to integrate the repatriated refugees back into the society to larger-scale support for rehabilitation and recovery programs for the country.

Once again, however, these programs of reintegration, recovery, and rehabilitation were sidetracked. As the world began to focus on drought and starvation in Ethiopia in October 1984, similar reports were coming out of Chad. In November 1984, the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordination Program called the drought in Chad "the worst recorded in the last century." Lakes have receded, water wells and rivers have dried up. The encroachment of the desert has accelerated, and a fragile ecological and economic system is being sorely tested. Nearly 200,000 nomadic cattle herders, joined by sedentary farmers who have abandoned their villages, have drifted southward and eastward where camps are being set up. Thousands of people, along with thousands of head of livestock, have died.

In the region of Ouaddai in the Abeche area, the drought caused hundreds of people to move south and east, looking for food or work. Those going east ended up in the border town of Adre, where the population quickly grew to 12,000. The Red Cross, already working in the area, could not provide food for these increased numbers or deal with the resulting sanitation problems.

In the fall of 1984, a program was designed to resettle those people who had come into the Adre area further south—to the Wadi Bitiha area—where water can be found less than three meters below the surface. More than 500 hectares of land were set aside, with the World Food Program providing food in return for work; the new arrivals—along with those people from Wadi Bitiha now remaining in the area—have dug 500 wells. Eight sites have been developed for others who have deserted their villages and entered the area. As of July 1985, the displaced people who have settled on these lands have produced enough vegetables to meet the needs of the 10,000 to 15,000 people directly involved and to have a surplus to sell. When the drought ends, undoubtedly, some of these people will decide to stay in the area rather than return to their former villages.

By late 1984, too, more than 15,000 people had converged on Ndjamena, where camps were being set up. Quickly, a resettlement program was established at Karal, 80 kms north of Ndjamena near Lake Chad. By July 1985, nearly 12,000 persons had been settled in this area. To slow down this convergence on Ndjamena, resettlement programs were set up in the Kanem prefecture and at Ati, nearly 200 miles north. More than 10,000 drought victims are being assisted with seeds, tools, and small-scale, irrigated agriculture programs. Many other activities to assist the drought victims also exist—with more than 14 PVOs, international organizations, and governments involved. Thirteen countries, including the United States, are donating food.

• • •

Now the rains have come to Chad. Land that was barren and dry has turned green. Livestock herders and farmers are returning. However, while some of the best harvests in several years are being projected, the yields will have little immediate impact on the 1.5 million people in dire need. Chad will need technical and financial assistance from the international community for years to come if the hundreds of thousands of uprooted people and the country as a whole are to recover. Further, the response to Chad's needs must be placed in the context of the needs of Africa and the willingness of the international community to respond.

Across the African continent, the lives of 150 million people are being affected by the drought, and the lives of at least 30 million people in twenty countries are at risk. Chad's emergency food needs for the year 1984-5 were estimated to be 280,000 metric tons, while the needs for the continent were set at 7 million metric tons. During this same period, it was estimated that a total of $3.6 billion in emergency assistance would be needed to respond just to the emergency needs of victims of the drought, including nearly $300 million for Chad.

Assistance must be provided to Chad, and during that process, the boundaries between refugee, relief, and development assistance may have to be reexamined and redrawn. Awareness of that fact already exists. In recognition of the overlap between refugee and returnee support and the stress placed on the receiving countries, proposals for "infrastructure" projects totaling $362 million were prepared and presented for funding at the Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II), held in Geneva in July 1984.

Chadians—those who fled, those who returned, those internally displaced by war and famine, and those who remained and suffered famine and war—share similar needs. The boundaries between them blur. For example, many who fled into the Sudan may not qualify as refugees because they fled from drought and not from fighting. Yet it could be argued they are just as much victims of fighting as of hunger. If agricultural opportunities had not been denied by the constant unrest, if certain agricultural support systems had been in place, famine would not have come to many of those who fled. They could have grown enough food to remain in their villages.

Wherever they are—whether refugees, displaced persons, or farmers in their own villages—the people must be given the kind of assistance which will move them toward self-sufficiency in food production. Ninety percent of the people in Chad live in rural areas and are engaged in some form of agriculture. Any hope the people have of improving their standard of living is directly related to their ability to increase their agricultural production. In refugee and displaced persons camps, development programs designed to provide the skills which will lead to increased agricultural production must be incorporated into emergency assistance programs. Encouragingly, this is the approach now being taken for the Chadian refugees in the Central African Republic, Cameroon, and the Sudan, and for the drought victims in Chad itself.

• • •

Although Chad is extremely poor, with limited resources to draw on, it has the potential to become self-sufficient in food production. There are the people, who have demonstrated their will to survive. There is the land. Ironically, in spite of the drought, there are many untapped water sources along the banks of rivers and lakes, in the oases and wadis, under the sand itself. Through the development of these water resources—hand-dug and drilled wells, catchment basins, small dams, water retention walls, pumping and gravity flow system—irrigated agricultural programs can enable the people to grow enough to feed themselves. Livestock herds can be reconstituted and, with water management and controlled grazing, expanded. Production of cotton can be increased as a foreign-exchange earner. Reforestation programs can help reclaim the desert. While drought cannot be prevented, its most catastrophic consequence—famine—can be dramatically reduced through the development of these water sources and the concomitant lessened dependency upon rainfall for agricultural production.

As in past tragedies, the international donor community has responded magnificently to the plight of the drought victims. Representatives of 125 nations participated in an African emergency conference convened by the UN secretary general in Geneva in March 1985, and the UN launched what it called "the biggest single rescue and relief operation ever mounted in its 40 years history." In the United States and Europe, the efforts of the entertainment world have raised millions of dollars for the drought emergency. Dozens of private organizations and corporations and hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens have become involved.

Now the international community must look beyond short-term emergency assistance and make a commitment to long-term development programs which will enable Chad to recover and its people to restore their lives and their land. The task in Chad is to create the conditions which will give the people the opportunity to utilize the resources which exist in the country, to benefit from outside technical and financial assistance, and to develop and implement long-term programs which will help them improve the overall conditions of their lives. In Chad, the ritual of coming and going, going and coming, and being uprooted will end only when people, working together and with nature, join together in harmony to create those conditions.

Update

1985—Rumors, Realities, and Emigration from Russia

Jerry Goodman

In early 1985, after nearly six bleak years, Soviet Jews were beginning to hope that the gates of emigration would soon reopen. A series of reports in the Western media in March and April, consisting mainly of rumors stemming from Jewish activists and Soviet officials in Moscow, pointed to a possible change in Soviet emigration policy. The number of exit visas issued in 1985 turned out, in fact, to be little more than in 1984, a relatively modest total.

Fanning the rumors were a number of signs of an ostensible willingness on the part of Moscow to resume "bargaining" over Soviet Jews. In January, during one of several US-Soviet trade talks in Moscow, which took place throughout the year, V.S. Alkhimov, chairman of the board of the state bank of the USSR, remarked unofficially that "if good relations were restored with the United States, 50,000 Jewish emigres annually would be no problem." In April, in the first meeting of its kind in years, an official at the Soviet embassy in London promised demonstrators that he would provide names of Jewish families in Moscow who had been given permission to emigrate. The list was never received.

On the average, about 100 Jews per month actually were permitted to leave. In comparing 1985, when 1,140 Jews left, with 1984, when 896 received exit permits, it seemed clear that a restrictive Soviet policy continued to exist. Even those few allowed to leave did not, for the most part, include veteran "refuseniks" who have been waiting 10 to 15 years.

Emigration took place essentially on the basis of reunification of families and "repatriation" to Israel. Emigrants obtained exit visas for Israel, although an increasing number of them over the years preferred other destinations, primarily the United States. Between 1968 and the end of 1984, nearly 266,000 Soviet Jews left, with approximately 164,000 going to Israel. The number had risen steadily in the 1970s, peaking at 51,320 in 1979, with a monthly average of 4,200. Thus, Jewish emigration virtually has ceased, except for isolated cases.

It is estimated that more than 380,000 Jews already have indicated their desire to leave, by requesting those invitations from Israel required by Soviet authorities to initiate the process of applying for an exit visa. Nevertheless, Soviet spokesmen repeated claims to the Western media and official visitors, that all Jews who wished to leave the Soviet Union had already done so.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews permitted to leave was paralleled by a sharp rise in the number of refuseniks, who now number more than 15,000. Thousands have been waiting more than five years for an exit visa; more than 120 families have been waiting at least ten years.

The term "refusenik" employed in this context denotes a Jew who has submitted a formal application to leave the Soviet Union for Israel, has received an official refusal, and is willing to enter into a confrontation with the Soviet authorities over this issue. It does *not* include thousands of others unable to apply for exit permits, for a variety of reasons, or those who have never received a formal response.

• • •

Paralleling the low emigration, was a rise in the harassment of Jewish activists taking part in unofficial Jewish cultural activities, including a spurt in new trials, some based on trumped-up charges. Of the 26 Jewish prisoners of conscience in prison or labor camps, 12 were arrested or tried during 1985.

The major thrust of these activities was directed at the informal network of Hebrew teachers. Wide-ranging searches were conducted in scores of homes, and involved the seizure of Hebrew instructional material as well as religious articles and books. There was no diminution in the spate of articles and television broadcasts attacking individual Soviet Jews, as well as Israel, Zionism, and Judaism, in what seemed to be an attempt to stem the desire to emigrate. If there was a temporary abatement when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed control of the Communist party apparatus early in the year, their frequency and intensity has resumed. Zionists of today continue to be equated with the "Nazis" of the past.

The response of Soviet Jews was a renewal of public activities, manifested in petitions and protests to Soviet authorities, as well as to individuals and organizations abroad. These have focused on official abuses and on the renewed demand for repatriation. A parallel development has been a steep rise in requests for Israeli citizenship.

These events took place against the background of Soviet leadership changes, and within the framework of negotiations between the superpowers. Mikhail Gorbachev rapidly and steadily consolidated his position, and changes to his advantage in the Party Politbureau and Central Committee Secretariat reflected this consolidation. Virtually all of Gorbachev's supporters, like himself, are proteges of former Party chief and head of government Yuri Andropov, who was also the former head of the KGB. It is striking that more than 25 percent of the Politbureau members have backgrounds in the police or the KGB. In the context of Gorbachev's new domestic policies, emphasizing strict discipline and the suppression of nonconformist behavior, the negative implications for Jewish activists and others are heightened.

• • •

The new Soviet leadership distinguished itself by a talent for public relations, demonstrated in an apparent campaign designed to create the impression that the situation is improving and to defuse concern in the West. Soviet policy makers would love to remove the matter from the international agenda, while the United States and the USSR deal with other bilateral issues at a series of projected summits. Rumors which circulated before the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva summit meeting, of the impending issuance of large numbers of exit visas, proved false. The reality contradicted the moderate tone and the

---

Jerry Goodman is the executive director of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, New York.

occasional hints with which Soviet leaders chose to face the world. Similar rumors were spread by Soviet officials after the summit, and were then denied in Moscow in an apparent attempt to throw Western critics off balance.

Most observers agree that Jewish emigration has become a function of relations between the superpowers, as much as internal economic and social needs. Indeed, the great emigration of the 1970s occurred during a period of detente. Jewish emigration, a sensitive "barometer" of the state of Soviet-U.S. ties, plummeted as relations between the superpowers deteriorated from the end of the 1970s.

France took on a new, central role in public discussions concerning a possible shift in Soviet policy. In July, the Soviet ambassador to Paris, Yuli M. Voronstsov, and his Israeli counterpart, Ovadia Sofer, held a private, unofficial meeting (which was leaked to the press). The meeting set off the first of a series of rumors about Soviet-Israeli ties and Jewish emigration. In October, Paris was the setting for the first summit meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and a European head of state since he became Party general secretary. The meeting was seen as a prelude to a second summit meeting, this time in Geneva with President Ronald Reagan, on November 19 and 20.

It seemed clear that the issue of Jewish emigration definitely would be on the Paris agenda. Indeed, in an interview broadcast on French television, Gorbachev defended his nation's treatment of its Jewish citizens by insisting that "[nowhere] else, in any country, [do] Jews enjoy such political and other rights as in our country. . . . It is not to be found anywhere." Gorbachev also supported the concept of reunification of families and pledged that "when there is a problem connected with . . . state secrets," these cases could be given permission to leave, allegedly after "five to ten years," but, in any event, "eventually . . . they leave."

It is not clear whether this meant a real shift or a possible softening of some of the harsh restrictions which blocked emigration. The only actual sign was the release of a handful of long-term refuseniks and of several spouses, mostly non-Jewish, to the United States to join husbands and wives—approximately one-third of an anticipated three dozen cases.

• • •

Despite a new flurry of rumors, there were no real signs that the Soviet Union was preparing to restore diplomatic relations with Israel or open the gates to a rumored 15-20,000 Jews and permit direct flights to Israel. The rumors apparently developed out of a meeting between French President Francois Mitterand and Israel's Prime Minister Shimon Peres. The discussions followed closely upon the meeting between Mitterand and Gorbachev. Speculation was widespread that the Soviet leader had signaled a possible shift concerning Jewish emigration. That hope was unfounded, and in the weeks to follow no increase was forthcoming.

By the end of 1985, as speculation continued, Israel's Foreign Ministry admitted there was "no evidence" that Moscow was going to increase the number of visas granted to Jews wanting to leave. U.S. and Israeli officials were reported to have indicated that Moscow would resume diplomatic relations with Israel or permit a related major outflow of Jews, as part of a larger package with the United States, including a Soviet role in any international peace conference for the Middle East.

Notwithstanding the important breakthrough of a Geneva summit between the United States and the Soviet Union, after six tense years, there was little evidence of a significant improvement in the plight of Soviet Jews. In fact, as the year ended, the Soviet Union issued a press statement labeling all rumors of any imminent large-scale Jewish emigration as "a vicious lie."

Would-be emigrants searched desperately for any sign that their fate had been restored to the superpower agenda. Yet, no matter how Soviet-American relations develop, it is unclear whether in the immediate future the USSR would return to the large-scale emigration of the late 1970s. Rather, it seemed to be prepared to raise its quota of Jewish emigration by a token amount, as a gesture of goodwill to the United States.

Refugee Women: In 1985, No Longer "The Forgotten Majority"

Nancy Iris

Aided by its designation as the final year of the UN Decade for Women, 1985 saw the special needs of refugee women recognized by policymakers. It remains to be seen how this recognition will translate into programming and the inclusion of refugee women in the policymaking process.

The problems refugee women face, be they in camps of first asylum or resettled in third countries, are slowly being named. These include female health problems, vulnerability to sexual coercion and abuse, a higher level of illiteracy than that of male refugees, domestic violence, and domestic duties which leave little time for the vital language training which is a prerequisite to successful resettlement. These female-specific problems are an added layer to the traumas faced by all refugees—leaving one's homeland, job, friends, family members, and the witnessing of death and violence against loved ones.

Beginning in January, with the publication of "In America and In Need: Refugee, Entrant and Immigrant Women," a study by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, the focus on refugee women, who make up the majority of today's refugees, began to intensify. The study looks at three groups of women: Southeast Asian refugees, Cuban and Haitian entrants, and Hispanic immigrants. It is as significant for the gaps in data collection it identified as for the information presented. The AACJC study pointed to isolated programs for female refugees, but it was the spotlight provided by the end of the UN Decade for Women which illuminated exactly how serious their situation is.

In preparation for the decade's end, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) convened an April "Roundtable on Refugee Women." Maureen Reagan and Jeanne Kirkpatrick represented the United States. The participants emphasized "that the pivotal social and economic role of refugee

---

Nancy R. Iris is the Policy/Information Coordinator for the U.S. Committee for Refugees.

women must be a determinant factor in the formulation of refugee aid policy." Both the problems and strengths of refugee women were discussed.

After acknowledging that UNHCR must operate in the cultural context of populations, Kirkpatrick stated, "... in gathering statistical data and in planning programs and implementing programs, UNHCR must treat women as persons, and not as persons for whom any other person, namely any man, can speak or act in the camps." The Roundtable was a precursor for the international conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, in July, to mark the end of the women's decade.

Also leading up to Nairobi was a May seminar organized by *Vluchtelingenwerk*, the Dutch Refugee Association, under the auspices of the European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles. Thirty-seven representatives, including refugee women from Vietnam, Turkey, Chile, and Ethiopia, to name a few, met for three days in Soesterberg, Netherlands, to discuss refugee women's issues. The seminar was led by Marijke Meijer, a leading thinker on the subject; most of the presenters were themselves refugee women. The seminar participants formulated ten recommendations which were presented to a member of the European Parliament. The most significant of these was the first: "Governments should recognize as forms of persecution, leading to the granting of refugee status, social and institutionalized forms of oppression of women which contravene international juridical standards and constitute a violation of human rights, and should take measures to bring this to public attention."



"Declarations will not help the refugee women left unprotected at night in the refugee camp . . . unless they are backed by both material resources and a commitment of personnel." UNHCR/M. Vanappelghem

• • •

Throughout the spring, the U.S. Committee for Refugees conducted a survey of more than 450 American voluntary agencies to determine what services were being offered refugee women. Participating in the survey were 123 local voluntary agencies. Of those, only three had a staff member specifically assigned to refugee women's issues, but sixty projects with refugee women as the primary clients were identified. USCR subsequently published and distributed an annotated directory of these programs.

July witnessed the conference held in Nairobi, Kenya, to mark the end of the UN Decade for Women. Refugee women were not only one of the nine subthemes of the conference but also one of four topics the U.S. delegation, again led by Maureen Reagan, chose to emphasize. The others were literacy, domestic violence, and women in development. Between official conference sessions, U.S. delegate Donna Alvarado, ACTION director, led several informal, internationally composed "conversation groups" in discussing the situation of refugee women.

Several countries, including the United States, offered resolutions concerning refugee women. Generally, they called for a recommitment by countries to the concept of international burden sharing, for attention to the special needs of female refugees, and for an increase in the number of women hired by UNHCR. Due to a lack of time, however, no resolutions put forth at the conference were voted upon.

The governmental conference was not the only place refugee women were discussed in Nairobi. More than forty specific workshops regarding refugee women were held at a Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Forum which ran from July 8-17, and was attended by several thousand people. Preparations for those workshops were organized by the Subcommittee on Refugee and Migrant Women. The subcommittee produced a report on the general situation of refugee women and made a number of recommendations directed toward NGOs.

One U.S.-based group, the Refugee Women in Development Project (Ref/Wid) of the Overseas Education Fund International, sent four refugee women to the Forum—one each from Afghanistan, Poland, Laos, and Vietnam. These refugee women found themselves under severe verbal attack from Forum participants representing the communist-controlled countries they had fled. The experience in Nairobi left Sima Wali, Ref/Wid director, "more determined than ever to speak out about refugee women's needs." Ms. Wali took to Nairobi a series of video tapes in which refugee women from Vietnam and Cambodia and undocumented Haitian, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan women in the United States speak about their lives.

In October, the UNHCR's Subcommittee of the Whole on International Protection considered a Note on the International Protection of Refugee Women, which states that women and young girls "now constitute most of the world's refugee population. This fact alone requires that their needs and special problems be considered a major factor when formulating international action in favor of refugees." The note delineates two areas of particular concern: the violation of female refugees' physical integrity and safety, and "the realization of their right to equal treatment." After noting that neither the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol, or the Statute of the Office of UNHCR "makes a distinction between male and female refugees," it acknowledges, "In practice, however, the effects of the international refugee instruments and of humanitarian principles may be vitiated for some refugee women because the social conditions of women in a particular society may not permit their full impact to be felt."

The note on refugee women also mentioned that there have been a number of cases in which women have sought asylum or refugee status pursuant to the 1951 Refugee Convention due to the social situation and treatment of women in their home country. On April 13, 1984, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on this issue, which called for States to recognize the right of women who face harsh or inhuman treatment because they are considered to have transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live, to be considered as belonging to a "particular social group" within the meaning of the 1951 Convention. The Note asked States to consider this interpretation. The subcommittee recommended that the UNHCR Executive Committee adopt their conclusions.

The momentum generated by the Nairobi conference persists; activities focusing on refugee women continue around the world. These range from a Task Force on Refugee Women within the U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement to a seminar planned for March 1986 in West Germany on "Refugee Women in the Federal Republic." The U.S. Catholic Conference has conducted its own survey about services for refugee women in its dioceses, and refugee women and their issues are appearing on the agendas of local groups, such as the D.C. Metro Coalition for Refugee Resettlement, and national organizations, such as the American Council for Nationalities Service.

With help, refugee women are discovering their voices. Finding the way to local, national, and international agendas is a huge step forward. But agenda items, news articles, studies, resolutions, panel discussions, conferences, and speeches are meaningless unless the ideas and ideals behind them are realized. Declarations will not help the refugee woman left unprotected at night in the refugee camp or the one homebound by her lack of language training unless they are backed by both material resources and a commitment of personnel. Indeed, 1985, the end of the UN Decade for Women, saw policymakers become aware of refugee women's concerns. Hopefully, 1986 will begin to see that awareness transformed into action.

League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

Richard W. Bergstrom

The seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross—humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, voluntary service, unity, and universality—form the basis upon which members of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies have acted to alleviate the suffering of an increasingly large number of uprooted people.

Resolutions passed during the last two international conferences have formalized our commitment and our methods for response. Participants in the 1981 International Red Cross Conference in Manila unanimously passed a resolution which serves as a broad mandate for Red Cross involvement on behalf of the uprooted. It stated that the Red Cross should "at all times be ready to assist and protect refugees, displaced persons, and returnees . . . especially when they cannot, in fact, benefit from any other protection or assistance. . . ." Unremitting support to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) within the framework of the policy was also pledged.

For decades, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, acting as an auxiliary to governments, have made substantial contributions to meeting refugee needs, drawing upon the wide measure of public and volunteer support they have at their disposal.

The League, as the international federation of the 136 recognized Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, provides direct support to the National Societies to meet the emergency needs of specific groups of refugees: experienced staff from various National Red Cross Societies are made available, and funds and supplies donated by sister Societies are channelled to the Society involved with providing help in a given emergency. At the same time, the League works to develop National Societies' potential for self-reliance and effectiveness, qualities at the core of its philosophy for building successful response to people in crisis. Less frequently, the League acts directly as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' operational partner in assisting refugees or returnees.

Many National Red Cross Societies—members of the League—often assist refugees without requiring League support. For example, societies in Europe share responsibility with other agencies for the reception, care and maintenance, language training, and eventual integration of refugees accepted under various government programs for an ever-increasing number of asylum-seekers.

• • •

As refugee situations have escalated, so has Red Cross involvement. A number of concrete examples illustrate the diverse ways in which the League and its member Societies, working together, provide help to those who have been robbed of anything like a normal way of life.

The League and the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) have for several years cooperated with the government of Somalia and UNHCR to assist several hundred thousand Ethiopian refugees. Their first involvement was in responding to the emergency during 1980 and 1981, and later in developing long-term health and agricultural programs in camps. In March 1985, UNHCR assembled a survey team to report on the relief needs of 45,000 newly arrived refugees, and the SRCS and League were invited to take part. While the survey was underway, cholera broke out in epidemic proportions. Intravenous fluid supplies were quickly exhausted, and at the height of the emergency, between eight and ten people were dying every hour. In response to an SRCS appeal to the League for medical personnel and supplies, three charter flights were rapidly sent, with German and Norwegian Red Cross stand-by teams aboard the first relief flight.

Richard Bergstrom is Under Secretary General of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Within days, medical personnel and supplies from the Finnish and the British Red Cross had also arrived.

During the emergency phase of the operation, SRCS and League medical teams manned hospital isolation wards, while SRCS provided supplementary feeding to the sick and supplied drinking water to the camp. Once adequate intravenous fluids reached the region, the death rate from cholera was reduced to one person every four hours, though refugees continued to die of measles or malnutrition-related illnesses.

Once the emergency phase was over, SRCS and League medical teams continued to assist in isolation hospitals and in a newly established health center to evaluate and isolate new arrivals to prevent the spread of infectious diseases. SRCS teams continued with the limited means available to run food programs, despite alarmingly insufficient quantities of basic rations from intergovernmental sources. Refugees were receiving only 800 calories per day compared with a planned 2,000. As a result, the death rate among malnourished children reached twenty per day in June 1985. After rapid consultations with UNHCR, the World Food Program, and other concerned agencies, the League launched what proved to be a successful emergency appeal for foodstuffs and cash to mount an intensive supplementary feeding program for the 4,000 most seriously affected children.

• • •

In the Sudan, League involvement was confined until just over a year ago to running a vehicle workshop to assist UNHCR in aiding Ugandan refugees, and supporting Swiss Red Cross teams working among the heavy concentrations of Ethiopian refugees in the east of the country. However, the dramatic new influx from Ethiopia combined with the acute needs of the populations in the country's western, drought-ridden region required a forty-fold increase in League staff there.

The Swiss teams in eastern Sudan have been assisting 50,000 of the refugees in Wad Sherife, while the League teams have concentrated on 25,000 people in Kilo 26 and Girba North camps. Unconfirmed reports of cholera led the League to send in supplies to treat serious diarrhea, a precaution soon justified, as by June, an around-the-clock emergency service became necessary in the Girba North camp to save hundreds of cholera-stricken people. Said a nurse reporting on the mission, "We have had incredible results. In January 1985, people were dying all around. We had to make the painful decision to turn away hopelessly malnourished children in order to save others. But now, with food reaching the people, the situation is so much better."

In 1985, the League and the National Society in the Central African Republic (CAR) created a medical assistance program for refugees from Chad recently arrived in the Republic's border region. The program has strengthened existing health services for the local and refugee populations alike, by providing equipment, medicines, and personnel for three dispensaries, by opening first-aid posts, and by operating mobile teams to cover the more remote districts. Furthermore, the League, under an agreement with UNHCR, is helping the CAR Red Cross to renovate a dispensary in the capital, Bangui, to provide care for the refugee population as well as nationals.

The mass exodus of boat people from Vietnam in the late 1970s became the concern of Red Cross Societies of the Southeast Asia region. The Malaysian Red Crescent Society (MRCS), became UNHCR's partner in responding to the large numbers reaching Malaysian shores, before the major crisis of 1979. Expanding considerably to meet its obligations, MRCS offers health, welfare, and educational programs on Pulau Bidong Island and in Kuala Lumpur. Services include medical attention and counselling for victims of pirate attacks at sea. In support of the MRCS, the League has provided medical personnel on Pulau Bidong for several years and has helped to provide medical services in the transit camps in Kuala Lumpur.

> **". . . refugees are a resource for the future—not a burden of the present, without any future."**

The Indonesian Red Cross program to assist boat people includes the provision of a hospital and other medical and public health services. The Macau Red Cross similarly continues its program for the seven hundred boat people remaining in the colony. The Philippines Red Cross gives immediate relief assistance, temporary shelter, and appropriate medical care to newly arrived boat people before they are taken to the official first-asylum center in Palawan. At the Refugee Processing Center in Bataan, the Philippines, the Society offers health and training programs and provides blood for the camp hospital. Keeping in mind the needs of the nationals living near the RPC, the Society gives craft training courses for mothers and a supplementary feeding program for the depressed community of Bataan.

Year by year, the League appeals for assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan to be administered by the Pakistan Red Crescent Society. With League technical support, relief supplies were provided to 100,000 of the most needy refugees, along with an expanded eye care program for the many refugees requiring eye surgery.

In the Pacific region, groups of indigenous Melanesians from the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya who began crossing into Papua New Guinea have been receiving assistance from the Red Cross. A workboat is used for communication where thick rainforests make overland travel difficult.

A final example of League/National Society assistance to refugees in developing countries is the operation in Honduras to aid some 4,600 refugees from Nicaragua. The Honduran Red Cross has been helping the refugees to build housing to relieve pressure in border villages.

The League's plans, as well as its current activities, are based on a belief that refugees are a resource for the future—not a burden of the present, without any future. We are concerned not simply for their material needs, but for their dignity and self-esteem as human beings.

1985 World Refugee Statistics and Country Reports

Published documents and other sources often vary in the numbers of refugees reported in a particular situation. Such variation can be disconcerting and may bring into question the sources' credibility. One obvious reason for discrepancies is the unpredictability and fluidity of refugee situations—a country quiet in February may be overwhelmed by June, and equally correct reports might be available for both periods. Counts obtained in relatively stable or contained situations may be more reliable than those from large or rapidly changing ones; statistics about populations in camps from which refugees are processed for resettlement, as in Southeast Asia, for example, appear regularly and are quite reliable. But even here, updated or revised censuses or estimates can lead to some discrepancies.

Media reports—although providing prompt, continuing information—may be inconsistent about whom they term a refugee or may not cite sources.

More subtle differences in refugee counts arise because those collecting data—while most often drawing on figures provided by the governments of asylum countries—do so according to definitions, criteria, and purposes which may differ significantly. For example, numbers provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees include all refugees reported by asylum-country governments (of whom UNHCR assists some), while reports such as that of the U.S. State Department classify refugees as "requiring protection and assistance" or "refugees resettled and persons granted asylum."

Politics and nations' administrative procedures affect counts of refugees. Some sources, for example, report certain aliens in a country as meriting international recognition as refugees, while others term them illegal or overstayed migrant workers seeking economic opportunity. It may be in the political interest of a government to understate its refugee population or, in other instances, to report large numbers. Because countries may admit individuals under classifications other than refugee, some who might fit this description by virtue of their circumstances may not be counted as such; in countries of resettlement, these might include family reunification and special humanitarian admissions. Asylum seekers whose applications have been denied but who nevertheless are permitted to stay in a country may also not be reflected in refugee counts.

Some clarity in reporting is feasible: for example, agencies can report with some confidence the numbers for whom aid is provided or planned. Ideally, assistance and protection would be provided to all those who require it, and thus, counts of actual recipients of aid or "registered" refugees would represent all who are in need. In reality, of course, this is not always the case. Also, international assistance is sometimes provided to individuals who do not meet the international refugee definition per se, but who are deemed to be "in refugee-like situations"; these may appear in refugee counts. In Africa, for example, UNHCR operates in accordance with the mandate of the Organization of African Unity, whose refugee definition is broader than that of the UN's own convention and protocol, and its count of refugees of concern there is of broader scope than its count for Central America.

In some instances, accuracy may be detrimental, even dangerous. Figures following rigid definitions may jeopardize agencies' ability to provide adequate services to those quite obviously in need. Also, individuals may rightfully fear to draw attention to themselves, even in countries of asylum, for fear of retribution.

Suggestions for numerous refinements in the types of statistics available have been made to USCR—how many refugees are women and children, how many are aged, how many have some level of education, how many require immediate "emergency" assistance, how many need to be maintained and cared for beyond initial assistance, and how many might profit from longer-term development aid allowing prospects for durable solutions. Such detail is not generally retrievable from existing reports.

In view of the many deficiencies in the available data, questions may arise about the usefulness of collecting and reporting refugee statistics at all.

When used carefully and with a good understanding of their flaws, statistics provide one means to grasp the magnitude of "the refugee problem." Credible, clear, comparable data disallow flagrant exaggeration as well as understatement. For assistance to be provided and programs to be planned, reasonably reliable numbers are vital; data also allow one measure of success of efforts on behalf of refugees. Numbers are useful, too, to establish clearly that the burden of caring for refugees is shared, and that nowadays it is often the least well-off nations which support refugee populations.

In collecting data for the statistics and country reports, we rely largely on other sources which we judge to be responsible. The main sources used are listed at the end of the country reports. Instances where key sources differ significantly (for reasons we could identify as other than time period of reports) are indicated in the statistical tables with an asterisk (*). We have used the most current figures available. All numbers have been rounded, and we stress that none should be interpreted as absolute. For further detail or clarification of numbers in the tables, see the country reports.

TABLE 1
REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

Asylum Country Source Country/Area	By Source Country	Total
AFRICA		
Algeria		**167,000 ***
W. Sahara	165,000*	
Other	2,000	
Angola		**92,200**
Namibia	70,000	
Zaire	13,200	
S. Africa	9,000	
Benin		**800**
Chad		
Botswana		**5,100**
Zimbabwe	3,800	
S. Africa	500	
Other	800	
Burundi		**60,700***
Rwanda	58,000*	
Zaire	2,300	
Uganda	400	
Cameroon		**13,700**
Chad	13,500	
Other	200	
Central African Rep.		**37,000**
Chad		
Congo		**1,000†**
Various		
Djibouti		**16,700**
Ethiopia		
Egypt		**5,500***
Ethiopia		
Other		
Ethiopia		**72,500**
Sudan	72,000	
Other	500	
Ivory Coast		**600†**
Ghana	200	
Southeast Asia	200	
Other	200	
Kenya		**8,500**
Uganda	4,200	
Ethiopia	1,800	
Rwanda	1,800	
Mozambique	200	
Other	500	
Lesotho		**11,500***
S. Africa		
Other		
Morocco		**800†**
Various		
Mozambique		**800**
S. Africa	400	
Latin America	300	
Other	100	

Namibia		**40,000†**
Angola		
Nigeria		**7,400**
Chad	4,000	
Namibia	1,000	
S. Africa	1,000	
Ghana	400	
Other	1,000	
Rwanda		**20,500***
Burundi	18,000*	
Uganda	2,500	
Undetermined	20,500	
Senegal		**5,200**
Guinea Bissau	5,000	
Other	200	
Somalia		**550,000***
Ethiopia		
Sudan		**1,094,000***
Ethiopia	718,000*	
Uganda	250,000*	
Chad	121,000	
Zaire	5,000	
S. Africa		**160,000***
Mozambique		
Swaziland		**10,800**
S. Africa	6,900	
Mozambique	3,600	
Other	300	
Tanzania		**179,000**
Burundi	153,500	
Zaire	15,500	
S. Africa	6,000	
Uganda	2,500	
Other	1,500	
Togo		**1,800†**
Ghana	1,500	
Other	300	
Uganda		**151,000***
Rwanda	115,300	
Zaire	31,400*	
Undetermined	4,300	
Zaire		**328,000**
Angola	282,000	
Uganda	22,500	
Rwanda	12,000	
Burundi	10,000	
Zambia and other	1,500	
Zambia		**102,000**
Angola	76,000	
Zaire	9,500	
Namibia	7,300	
Mozambique	4,500	
S. Africa	3,000	
Other	1,700	
Zimbabwe		**51,500**
Mozambique	51,000	
S. Africa	500	
TOTAL AFRICA		**3,195,600**

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Burma		**1,000**
Various		
China		**11,500***
Vietnam		
Hong Kong		**9,400**
Vietnam		
Indonesia		**8,300**
(First Asylum)		
Vietnam	6,600	
(Refugee Processing Center)		
Vietnam & Cambodia	1,700	
Japan		**900**
Vietnam		
Macau		**700**
Vietnam		
Malaysia		**98,500***
Philippines	90,000*	
Vietnam	8,500	
Papua New Guinea		**11,000***
Indonesia		
Philippines		**16,700**
(First Asylum)		
Vietnam	2,800	
(Refugee Processing Center)		
Vietnam	10,500	
Laos	2,100	
Cambodia	1,300	
Singapore		**200**
Vietnam		
Thailand		**381,200**
(First Asylum)		
Laos	90,300	
Cambodia	23,000	
Burma	17,000	
Vietnam	5,400	
(In Training)		
Laos	2,900	
Cambodia	1,500	
(Border Camps)		
Cambodia	237,000‡	
Vietnam	4,100	
Vietnam		**21,000**
Cambodia		
TOTAL EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC		**560,400**

EUROPE

Austria		**20,500**
Eastern Europe		
Greece		**4,200**
Near East		
Italy		**15,000**
Poland		
Iran		
Other		
Turkey		**4,500**
Iran		
Other		
Yugoslavia		**1,900**
Eastern Europe		
TOTAL EUROPE		**46,100**

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina		**11,500***
Latin America	5,000	
Europe	4,700	
Southeast Asia	1,800	
Belize		**9,000**
El Salvador	7,000	
Guatemala	2,000	
Brazil		**5,300***
Europe	4,500	
Other	800	
Chile		**2,500**
Europe		
Colombia		**400**
Various		
Costa Rica		**18,800**
Nicaragua	11,000	
El Salvador	6,000	
Guatemala	200	
Other L. America	1,600	
Cuba		**2,000***
L. America		
Dominican Republic		**6,000***
Haiti		
Ecuador		**900**
Various		
Guatemala		**70,000***
El Salvador		
Honduras		**62,500***
Nicaragua	32,000*	
El Salvador	30,000	
Guatemala	500	
Mexico		**175,000***
El Salvador	120,000*	
Guatemala	45,000	
Other L. America	10,000	
Nicaragua		**18,500**
El Salvador	17,500	
Guatemala	500	
Other L. America	500	
Panama		**4,700**
Cuba (in transit)	2,500	
El Salvador	1,200	
Other L. America	1,000	
Peru		**600**
Various		
Venezuela		**1,400**
L. America	1,300	
Europe	100	
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA/ CARIBBEAN		**389,100**

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

India		**142,100**
China (Tibet)	85,000†	
Sri Lanka	50,000	
Afghanistan	5,800	
Iran	1,200	
Other	100	
Iran		**840,000***
Afghanistan	780,000*	
Iraq	60,000*	
Iraq		**75,000***
Iran		
Jordan		**799,700**
Palestinians		
Lebanon		**266,500**
Palestinians	263,600	
Other	2,900	
Pakistan		**2,725,000**
Afghanistan		2,700,000
Iran		25,000
Syria		**244,600**
Palestinians		
West Bank		**357,700**
Palestinians		
Gaza Strip		**427,900**
Palestinians		
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST/ SOUTH ASIA		**5,878,500**
GRAND TOTAL		**10,069,700**

* Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

† These refugees have been in the asylum country for some time, but were not listed in the 1984 *Survey* table.

‡ While neither UNHCR nor the Thai, U.S., or other involved governments consider them refugees, the Cambodians on the Thai border are outside their country, under the protection of ICRC, and receiving UNBRO assistance.

NOTE ON TABLE 1: Refugees who require international protection and/or assistance may be new populations, or they may have been in a country for several years. In some cases, they may no longer require assistance, but still need international protection. For others, the situation is the reverse.

In many countries of asylum, there are large numbers of undocumented aliens and asylum seekers. While significant portions of them fear persecution in their home countries and should be considered refugees, there is simply no reliable way to document their numbers. For example, in Western Europe and the United States, substantial numbers fall into this category, and throughout the Middle East, there are Palestinians not registered with UNRWA. However, we have not included figures for such refugees, as any attempt to estimate them would be arbitrary.

TABLE 2
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

AFRICA

Angola	358,000
Burundi	163,500*
Chad	176,300
Ethiopia	1,286,500*
Ghana	2,100
Guinea Bissau	5,000
Mozambique	219,100*
Namibia	78,300
Rwanda	187,100*
South Africa	27,900
Sudan	72,000
Uganda	282,100*
Western Sahara	165,000
Zaire	76,900*
Zambia	600
Zimbabwe	3,800

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Burma	17,000
Cambodia	283,800†
China (Tibet)	85,000†
Indonesia	11,000*
Laos	95,300
Philippines	90,000*
Vietnam	62,300*

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan	3,485,800*
Iran	121,200*
Iraq	60,000*
Palestinians	2,093,500
Sri Lanka	50,000

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina	10,000
Bolivia	1,800
Chile	30,000
El Salvador	251,700*
Guatemala	48,200
Haiti	6,000*
Nicaragua	43,000*
Uruguay	2,100

* Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

† See Table 1 footnotes.

NOTE ON TABLE 2: These counts may significantly understate the number of refugees from a given country, as reports used as sources often did not specify the origin of some refugees in countries of asylum. See Table 1 note for further explanation.

TABLE 3
INTERNALLY DISPLACED

Angola	500,000
Chad	150,000-500,0000
Ethiopia	700,000-1,500,000‡
Mozambique	700,000-1,800,000
South Africa	3,500,000†
Uganda	500,000
El Salvador	500,000-525,000
Guatemala	250,000
Nicaragua	120,000-170,000
Afghanistan	1,000,000
Iran	1,200,000
Lebanon	400,000-800,000

‡ Includes approximately 600,000 moved in Ethiopian government resettlement program (see country report).

† Blacks, "coloreds", and Asians forcibly relocated since 1961.

NOTE ON TABLE 3: People are displaced internally within their homelands as a result of civil strife, persecution, or drought and other natural disasters. Although they share many characteristics with refugees who cross international borders, they are generally not eligible for international refugee assistance (though, often, distribution of aid to the displaced uses the same or similar channels). No agency has the capacity or responsibility for keeping track of all displaced people. Therefore, Table 3 presents reported estimates or ranges. Because the figures are not comprehensive, no total is provided.

TABLE 4
SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY REPATRIATIONS JANUARY 1984-MARCH 1985

From Angola	to Zaire	840
From Djibouti	to Ethiopia	7,475
From Sudan	to Uganda	5,833
	to Ethiopia	275
From Zaire	to Uganda	23,054
From Zambia	to Angola	860
	to Zaire	99
From Costa Rica	to El Salvador	148
	to South America	107
From Honduras	to mainly El Salvador	2,300
	to Nicaragua	106
From Mexico	to mainly Argentina, Chile, Uruguay	1,860
From Nicaragua	to Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Uruguay	196
From Belgium	to Latin America	115
From France	to Latin America	350
From Italy	to Latin America	240
From Spain	to Argentina	935
	to Uruguay	136
	to Chile	109

NOTE ON TABLE 4: Voluntary repatriation numbers reflect those people who participated in formal programs administered by UNHCR. The table covers repatriations during 1984 and the first three months of 1985, though the exact period reported for each varies. There are instances of informal or spontaneous voluntary returns to homelands, but reliable data on them are rarely available. Because Table 4 is not a comprehensive list, no totals are given.

TABLE 5
REFUGEES ENTERED AND RESETTLED 1975-1984

Resettlement Country	Source Country/Area	
AFRICA		
Algeria		700†
Egypt	Ethiopia, Iran, Poland, Romania, S. Africa, other	1,500†
Ethiopia	Sudan	5,500†
Kenya	Afghanistan, Ethiopia, S. Africa, other	15,700†
Mozambique	Zimbabwe	1,000†
Rwanda	Uganda	1,000†
Somalia	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda	61,200†
Swaziland	Lesotho, Mozambique, S. Africa, other	6,200†
Zambia	Angola, Zaire	8,800†
TOTAL AFRICA		**101,600**
EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC		
Australia	Africa, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East, Southeast Asia, other	114,100
China	Cambodia, Laos, Mongolia, Vietnam	275,700†
Hong Kong	Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam	4,600†
Japan	Southeast Asia	4,100
Korea (South)	N. Korea, Vietnam	800†
Malaysia	Cambodia, Philippines	13,000†
New Zealand	E. Europe, Southeast Asia	6,900
Papua New Guinea	Indonesia	3,100†
Philippines	Vietnam	2,000†
Taiwan	Southeast Asia	13,500†
Thailand	Cambodia	8,500†
TOTAL EAST ASIA/ PACIFIC		**446,300**
EUROPE		
Austria	E. Europe, Vietnam	14,000
Belgium	Various	3,200‡
Denmark	E. Europe, L. America, Vietnam, other	5,500
Finland	Southeast Asia, Chile, other	500
France	Africa, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East, Southeast Asia	132,700
Germany (FRG)	E. Europe, Southeast Asia, other	53,100
Italy	E. Europe	4,000†
Netherlands	Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East	9,800
Norway	Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East, other	6,500‡
Portugal	Angola, other African countries, other	3,600‡
Spain	Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East, other	25,500
Sweden	Chile, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Poland, Vietnam, other	30,500
Switzerland	Poland, Southeast Asia, other	17,400
Turkey	Afghanistan	4,200†
United Kingdom	Africa, E. Asia, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East	7,000‡
TOTAL EUROPE		**317,500**
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN		
Argentina	Southeast Asia	1,200†
Bolivia	Guatemala, nearby countries	200†
Costa Rica	Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua	3,600†
Ecuador	Nearby countries	200†
Guatemala	Nicaragua	100†
Honduras	El Salvador, Nicaragua, other	20,600†
Nicaragua	El Salvador, Guatemala	25,500†
Panama	Nearby countries	1,000†
TOTAL L. AMERICA/ CARIBBEAN		**51,900**
NORTH AMERICA		
Canada	Africa, Asia, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East, other	157,700
United States	Africa, E. Europe, L. America, Middle East, Southeast Asia, other	949,500
TOTAL N. AMERICA		**1,107,200**
GRAND TOTAL		**2,024,500**

NOTE ON TABLE 5: The primary source for numbers of refugees resettled was the U.S. State Department. Countries which have established resettlement programs provide particularly precise data. The figures in the table include refugees resettled from 1975 through 1984; however, data were not available for all countries for all years. A double dagger (‡) denotes that statistics were unavailable for 1975-1981. Those countries' totals reflect 1982-1984 entries. A dagger (†) denotes that statistics were not published by the State Department for 1984. While the grand total is a rough estimate, the vast majority of resettled refugees which it reflects are in the countries for which reliable data have been available.

TABLE 6
REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/ OR ASSISTANCE IN RELATION TO NATIVE POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GNP

Top 25 Countries
(in order of refugees-to-population ratio)

Asylum Country	Ratio (Refugees/ Population)	Population (in millions)	Number of Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Jordan	1/5	3.6	799,700	$1,710
Lebanon	1/10	2.6	266,500	N/A
Somalia	1/12	6.5	550,000*	250
Djibouti	1/18	.3	16,700	N/A
Sudan	1/20	21.8	1,094,000*	400
Belize	1/22	.2	9,000	1,140
Pakistan	1/36	99.2	2,725,000	390
Syria	1/43	10.6	244,600	1,680
Iran	1/54	45.1	840,000*	N/A
Swaziland	1/56	.6	10,800	890
Zambia	1/67	6.8	10,200	580
Honduras	1/70	4.4	62,500*	670
C. African Rep.	1/73	2.7	37,000	280
Burundi	1/76	4.6	60,700*	240
Angola	1/86	7.9	92,200	N/A
Uganda	1/97	14.7	151,000*	220
Zaire	1/101	33.1	328,000	160
Guatemala	1/114	8.0	70,000*	1,120
Tanzania	1/121	21.7	179,000	240
Lesotho	1/130	1.5	11,500*	470
Algeria	1/133	22.2	167,000*	2,400
Thailand	1/138	52.7	381,200	810
Costa Rica	1/138	2.6	18,800	1,020
Malaysia	1/159	15.7	98,500*	1,870
Nicaragua	1/162	3.0	18,500	900
Gaza	1/1.2	.5	427,900	N/A
West Bank	1/2.2	.8	357,700	N/A

* Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

NOTE ON TABLE 6: Sheer refugee populations should not be considered the only indication of the gravity of a situation. Table 6, which presents refugee populations in relation to size of receiving countries' native populations and gross national products, introduces some of the other factors which should be taken into account.

TABLE 7
REFUGEES RESETTLED 1975-1984 IN RELATION TO NATIVE POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GNP

Top 15 Countries
(In order of refugees-to-population ratio)

Resettlement Country	Ratio (Refugees/ Population)	Population (in millions)	Number of Resettled Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Swaziland	1/97	.6	6,200	$ 890
Somalia	1/106	6.5	61,200	250
Nicaragua	1/120	3.0	25,000	900
Australia	1/138	15.8	114,100	10,780
Canada	1/161	25.4	157,700	12,000
Honduras	1/214	4.4	20,600	670
United States	1/252	238.9	949,500	14,090
Sweden	1/272	8.3	30,500	12,400
Switzerland	1/374	6.5	17,400	16,390
France	1/414	55.0	132,700	10,390
New Zealand	1/478	3.3	6,900	7,410
Austria	1/536	7.5	14,000	9,210
Norway	1/646	4.2	6,500	13,820
Costa Rica	1/722	2.6	3,600	1,020
Zambia	1/773	6.8	8,800	580

NOTE ON TABLE 7: This table presents refugee populations in relation to size of receiving countries' populations and gross national products. For explanation of numbers resettled, see notes to Table 5.

TABLE 8
1985 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES

Top 20 Countries
(in order of contribution per capita)

Country	Contribution Per Capita	Population (in millions)	Contribution (in millions of $)	GNP Per Capita
Norway	$4.43	4.2	$ 18.6	$13,820
Denmark	2.98	5.1	15.2	11,490
Sweden	2.37	8.3	19.7	12,400
Switzerland	2.09	6.5	13.6	16,390
United States	0.80	238.9	193.4	14,090
Netherlands	0.76	14.5	11.1	9,910
Canada	0.73	25.4	18.7	12,000
Saudi Arabia	0.65	11.2	7.3	12,180
Kuwait	0.57	1.9	1.1	18,180
Finland	0.54	4.9	2.7	10,440
Germany	0.54	61.0	32.9	11,420
Japan	0.47	120.8	56.9	10,100
Australia	0.43	15.8	6.8	10,780
United Kingdom	0.42	56.4	23.9	9,050
Belgium	0.40	9.9	4.0	9,160
Luxembourg	0.35	.4	.1	12,190
Libya	0.22	4.0	.9	7,500
Iceland	0.15	.2	.03	10,270
Ireland	0.14	3.6	.5	4,810
Italy	0.13	57.4	7.5	6,350

1985 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES

Top 20 Countries
(In millions of $)



NOTE ON TABLE 8 & GRAPH: Table 8 and the graph report the amounts of financial assistance provided to international agencies by countries. The relative significance of contributions should be considered not only in terms of absolute size, but also in relation to population and gross national product. Included are estimated 1985 contributions to UNHCR, ICM, and UNRWA.

Individual countries' contributions to the European Economic Community are not reflected. Contributions to the World Food Program, by countries, specifically for refugee assistance, included in last year's table, were unavailable for 1985. Bilateral aid, some forms of aid which are not exclusively or even primarily designated for refugees, and aid through such agencies as the World Bank, which may benefit refugees, are also not reflected.

AFRICA

Angola

While Angola continued to provide refuge for some 92,200 refugees from Namibia, Zaire, and South Africa, fighting between Angolan government and opposition forces, who are supported by South African Defense Forces, drove more Angolans from their homes during 1984. Despite a 1984 agreement between Angola and South Africa, South African forces crossed the border into Angola in December 1985 to attack forces of the Namibian independence movement, the Southwest Africa People's Organization (SWAPO).

Approximately 500,000 Angolans are displaced within Angola. Estimates of the number of Angolan refugees in Zaire and Zambia have reached 357,000. In the first months of 1985, some 20,000 Angolans fleeing civil war conditions sought refuge in southern Zaire's Shaba Province. Some reportedly returned in the early summer. UNHCR continues to provide assistance toward the reintegration of Angolan refugees who have returned. Of the 400,000 who have left the country since independence in 1975, the government reports that 180,000 have returned. One resistance group, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), has claimed that the government has arrested and harassed former FNLA sympathizers who returned to Angola in response to a government amnesty offer. The government participated in the forced repatriation of several planeloads of Angolans from Zambia in early 1984.

Continued drought and fighting have begun to threaten large parts of the Angolan population with food shortages, particularly in the central region of the country. That and the difficulty of delivering relief and services to widely scattered groups of refugees and displaced persons exacerbate the conditions facing refugees in Angola.

Despite increased programs to develop the self-sufficiency of 70,000 Namibians, UNHCR assistance to them, administered by SWAPO, provides largely for care and maintenance pending return to Namibia. The number of refugees from Zaire is estimated to be 13,200, down from 20,000 largely because of spontaneous repatriation. Those who remain had been relocated by the end of 1983 to more viable permanent rural settlements where they continue to receive UNHCR assistance. But five of the six major rural sites where they had been resettled with expectations of reaching self-sufficiency had to be vacated in 1984 because of security problems. In early 1984, some 2,800 South Africans arrived in Angola, bringing their number to 9,000. Much of UNHCR's assistance to the South Africans is directed toward the development of agricultural production on land provided by the government in Malange province where most of the South African refugees live. The African National Congress (ANC) administers relief for South African refugees in Angola.

Botswana

South Africa claims that African National Congress (ANC) members stage attacks on South African targets from Botswana. Increasing threats of reprisal materialized in June 1985, as South African commandos attacked homes in Gabarone, Botswana's capital, killing 12 people, including 9 South Africans, and injuring 6 local residents. The government of Botswana, strongly rejecting South Africa's claim that the attack was directed at ANC terrorists, said that no arms were found in the attacked homes and that the victims were innocent persons. There are 500 South African refugees in Botswana.

Botswana has affirmed its commitment to granting temporary asylum to refugees from apartheid. But South Africa's mounting pressure has apparently had some effect. The government has declared that any refugee found outside Dukwe settlement in northern Botswana—where most refugees in Botswana are required to live—without government permission will be assumed to have forfeited refugee status and will be repatriated. In late June, the government denied reports that it had ordered ANC refugees to move from Gabarone to Dukwe refugee camp on the Zimbabwe border. In late July, reports that 24 ANC refugees had been asked to leave Botswana as soon as possible were also denied. Officials acknowledged, though, that some refugees had been asked to leave the country for their own safety.

The presence of refugees from Zimbabwe has also created problems for Botswana. Most of the approximately 3,800 Zimbabwean refugees at Dukwe refugee settlement are from Matabeleland. Political violence there, including crackdowns by Zimbabwe government security forces on the local population, many of whom are supporters of the opposition party and suspected by the government to be active dissidents, has claimed many lives. Two hundred refugees from Matabeleland reportedly arrived in Botswana during the two weeks following Zimbabwe's July general election.

The assistance and opportunities available to the refugees at Dukwe have created resentment among the people of Botswana. At the same time, Zimbabwe accuses Botswana of harboring dissidents and has threatened to raid Dukwe. Botswana has maintained a policy of forbidding refugees to use the country as a base for attacking their home countries, but Zimbabwe's protests have apparently contributed to a tightening of the rules for granting temporary asylum status. The government has reportedly deported as illegal aliens Zimbabweans not recognized as temporary asylees. Botswana says there are no Zimbabwean dissidents at Dukwe.

At the end of 1983, after a disturbance at Dukwe, the government repatriated 39 refugees without following UNHCR procedures. Botswana has since agreed that repatriations will be delayed until UNHCR has had three months to seek a new country of asylum for the refugees. There have been reports of documented refugees being returned to their country of origin, but these apparently have been isolated incidents.

There are several hundred refugees, mostly at Dukwe, from countries other than South Africa and Zimbabwe, including Angola, Lesotho, and Namibia. Drought continued to limit the results of UNHCR-assisted self-sufficiency projects at Dukwe, but rainfall beginning at the end of 1984 brought hopes for a modest harvest in 1985. Both the presence of small refugee populations from various countries among the largely Zimbabwean population and the unusual fact that three-fourths of the refugees are men and boys have compounded Dukwe's problems.

Burundi

The Burundi government reports more than 256,000 refugees, most of them ethnic Tutsis from Hutu-dominated Rwanda. UNHCR estimates 61,000 refugees in need of assistance—51,000 rural Rwandans and some of the 30,000 urban refugees in and around the capital, Bujumbura. Most of the Rwandan refugees have been in Burundi since the 1960s and have settled permanently, though they are not often granted citizenship. The government decided in February 1985 to transfer 10,000 refugees from Bujumbura to new settlements because of the limited employment possibilities in urban areas. UNHCR has proposed to support such a move during 1986. Concern has been expressed about forced repatriations of refugees and of some Zairian asylum seekers in 1983.

There are 165,000 Burundese refugees in neighboring countries. Most fled after the minority, but politically dominant, Tutsis killed thousands of majority Hutus in 1972. These refugees have continued to return in increasing numbers, with full rights as citizens. The government of Col. Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, in power since 1976, has pursued a policy of ethnic reconciliation. But Tutsis still hold most power in Burundi. The country has begun to suffer the effects of the drought, with a poor harvest in 1984, and the strained economy has raised concerns about renewed ethnic tensions.

Significant Refugee Flows in Africa


Tunisia
Mediterranean Sea
Morocco
Algeria
Libya
Egypt
Red Sea
Western Sahara
Mauritania
Mali
Niger
Atlantic Ocean
Chad
Sudan
Senegal
Djibouti
Gambia
Guinea
Burkina Faso
Guinea-Bissau
Ivory Coast
Ghana
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Sierra Leone
Cameroon
Central African Republic
Liberia
Togo
Benin
Uganda
Somalia
Kenya
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
Congo
Zaire
Rwanda
Burundi
Indian Ocean
Tanzania
Angola
Malawi
Zambia
Mozambique
Zimbabwe
Namibia
Botswana
South Africa
Swaziland
Lesotho

Note: Arrows indicate refugee movements over the past several years that have contributed to Africa's current refugee populations. They do not show all movements. Nor do they show return flows of refugees back to their countries of origin.

Cameroon

All but 3,500 Chadian refugees in Cameroon were repatriated during 1982. Then drought and renewed factional fighting began to push Chadians back into Cameroon and other neighboring countries at an accelerating rate, especially during the second half of 1984. Some 13,500 refugees from Chad remain in Cameroon. The 4,500 refugees at the Poli settlement, away from the border area, have established farms with UNHCR assistance. Another 1,500 were to be moved there from the border area during the second half of 1985.

Central African Republic

The number of refugees in the Central African Republic fleeing civil war in the south of Chad mounted rapidly throughout late 1984 and early 1985. So did concern about their protection. By April 1985, some 47,000 Chadians were in the Central African Republic. Fighting in southern Chad between government and rival forces led to the increased refugee flow. Refugees reported that government troops had killed civilians, burned villages and crops, and poisoned wells during its efforts to defeat rebel forces.

But threats to the Chadians' safety apparently continued after they fled their country. Troops from Chad allegedly attacked refugee camps in the Central African Republic early in 1985, reportedly burning villages and capturing several refugees to return them to Chad. The government of the Central African Republic denied that Chadian incursions had taken place, citing the good relations between the two countries. In April, forces of the two countries reportedly cooperated in a joint campaign against the Chadian insurgents, raising the fears of the refugees living near the border. Early in 1985, the government of the Central African

Republic decided to move refugees away from the border area. The move to five sites was to be carried out under the auspices of UNHCR, which cited the refugees' vulnerability as the reason for the move. The government cited concerns that the refugees included a number of rebel supporters. By late April, only 1,300 Chadian refugees had been moved, and there were reports that many would refuse to go. Armed attacks in the border area in April forced many refugees to flee into the countryside and prompted UNHCR to attempt to speed up the process of transferring refugees away from the border. More than 12,000 were eventually moved to the new settlements.

In the fall, more than 10,000 Chadians, most of them from the 30,000 or so who remained along the border, reportedly returned home. The spontaneous return was attributed to some normalization of the situation in southern Chad and to food distribution projects being undertaken in that area. Officials anticipated that most of the refugees could be repatriated by late 1985.

In July, 40 Chadian refugees returning home from the Central African Republic were killed by "uncontrolled armed elements," according to UNHCR. In October 1984, the Central African Republic deported a Chadian as a threat to security because of subversive activities against the state.

Djibouti

Despite a repatriation program begun in September 1983 and carried out through 1984 in cooperation with Ethiopia and UNHCR, Djibouti continues to provide troubled refuge to some 16,700 Ethiopians. The presence of refugees is particularly burdensome for Djibouti, a small country with almost no natural resources and an unemployment rate of more than 50 percent. Food, health, and education programs for the refugees have caused the indigenous population to feel that the refugees are better off than they. Djibouti offers refugees only temporary asylum, attempts to restrict them to refugee camps, and does not permit them to work. Rare opportunities for third-country resettlement and the virtual impossibility of local integration in Djibouti have made repatriation a compelling option. Of some 35,000 Ethiopians in Djibouti at the beginning of 1983, more than 13,000 returned to Ethiopia by train under UNHCR auspices. Another 19,000 were registered in Ethiopia after having returned on their own. All the returnees receive UNHCR assistance.

But the repatriation program was frought with problems, and serious concerns were raised about the voluntary nature of the repatriations. Refugees reported forced repatriations and the killing by Ethiopian authorities of returnees. Officials of UNHCR and the two countries denied such allegations. Drought, famine, and continued fighting in Ethiopia contributed to the decision to end the repatriation program in December of 1984. By early 1985, deteriorating conditions in Ethiopia caused a new flow of drought victims into Djibouti. Within months, the government of Djibouti was assisting 10,000 at As Eyla. In April, however, the government closed the camp there, as its 10,000 residents had all reportedly left on their own for their home villages, carrying two months' rations provided by the World Food Program.

For the 16,700 refugees still in Djibouti, there is little reason for optimism. Opportunities for resettlement to third countries are very limited. Djibouti officially restricts refugees to camps at Dikhil and Ali Sabieh. The latter was scheduled to close late in 1985, and the 3,000 refugees there were to be moved to Dikhil. Many refugees have left the camp illegally to fend for themselves in Djibouti town, where it is illegal for them to work. As many as 15,000 Ethiopians are estimated to be living in the town without refugee status. When the government deported several hundred to Ethiopia in April 1984, it said they were not registered refugees, but illegal aliens. In December 1984, Djibouti deported 5,000 Ethiopian drought victims for lack of proper refugee documentation.

Egypt

Egypt has traditionally been a country of asylum—a tradition reinforced by its accession to the UN convention and protocol on the status of refugees. Following the May 1985 coup in the Sudan, Egypt continued this tradition by granting asylum to former Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry. Despite persistent efforts by the new Sudanese regime to have Nimeiry extradited under an existing criminals exchange accord, Egypt maintained that its constitution precluded returning any political refugee to his country of origin. The Nimeiry affair caused strain in relations between Egypt and the new Sudanese regime.

An estimated 5,500 UNHCR-registered refugees were in Egypt at the end of 1984, of whom about 1,100 were assisted by UNHCR. Most of the registered refugees are Ethiopians, many of whom are students. Others include Europeans, most of Armenian descent. Indeterminate numbers of expatriates, some of them refugees, include about 20,000 Libyans, about 50,000 Palestinians, and about 10,000 of other nationalities; they do not receive international assistance.

Kenya

Several thousand Ugandans fled their country's July 1985 military coup and sought refuge in Kenya. UNHCR has officially registered more than 8,000 refugees, some 4,200 of them Ugandans; another 3,000 to 10,000 undocumented refugees, including many Ugandans, also may be in Kenya. The other registered refugees include some 1,800 Ethiopians, 1,800 Rwandese, 200 Mozambicans, and 500 from other African nations.

In February 1985, prior to the July coup in Uganda, Kenya had taken steps to secure its border and limit immigration by signing border agreements with Somalia and Uganda calling for increased policing of the borders and provisions for "settling nomads." The current status of these pacts is unclear.

Kenya's tolerance of refugees, particularly Ugandans, has at times been fragile. In 1983 and 1984, there were reports of Ugandan security agents kidnapping Ugandan refugees and returning them to prisons in Kampala where they faced indefinite detention without trial. There have been no such incidents reported since September 1984. As late as October 1985, the Kenyan government was warning Ugandans who had already obtained Kenyan citizenship that if they returned to Uganda, they would be barred from re-entering Kenya. Following Uganda's peace agreement with the rebel resistance movement in December, hundreds of Ugandan exiles left Kenya to return home. But continued violence in the region has limited repatriation. Prior to Uganda's December domestic peace agreement, only 22 voluntary repatriations had occurred during the year, 15 of them Ugandan refugees.

Kenya rarely grants official refugee status, although refugees are allowed to stay indefinitely. Those denied refugee status can apply as "aliens," a class of application customarily approved. The government has consistently opposed large-scale rural settlements, so most of UNHCR's resources have been targeted at urban projects. Eighty-five percent of all refugees in Kenya live in Nairobi, and UNHCR has assisted these persons with programs in vocational, elementary, and secondary education.

Lesotho

Despite intensified pressure from South Africa, Lesotho continued through 1985 to affirm its commitment to provide asylum to victims of apartheid. South Africa insists that members of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC)—South African liberation movements—have used Lesotho as a base to carry out attacks on South Africa. Lesotho, a nation completely surrounded by South Africa, insists there are no such bases in the country. Recognizing its economic dependence on South Africa and fearing its retaliatory power, Lesotho restricts the political activity of refugees as a clearly stated condition of their asylum. The fear is not unfounded; memories of a South African attack which killed 42 people in Lesotho's capital, Maseru, in December 1982 are still fresh. In December 1985, the Lesotho government alleged South African agents carried out a raid which killed nine people, five of them women, including six ANC members and three Lesotho nationals. The government said the attack followed communiques from South Africa reserving the right to defend its territory, but South Africa

Ethiopia: A Closer Look

For Ethiopia, where man and nature have combined with cruel effect in recent years, war, drought, famine, government policy, and the politics of assistance produced in 1985 nearly incomprehensible numbers of refugees, displaced people, and famine victims and made the distinctions between them seem meaningless. Yet flows of Sudanese seeking refuge in Ethiopia continued, and large numbers of refugees returned to Ethiopia from neighboring countries to try to reestablish their lives and homes.

It has been the famine that focused world attention on Ethiopia and prompted a massive international relief effort. But that effort has been marked by difficulty and controversy linked to the very circumstances that have caused refugees to flee Ethiopia. At the end of 1984, more than six million people, one million of them under four years old, were in serious distress because of the famine. While emergency relief food was reaching Ethiopia at that time, much of it was not reaching the people who needed it. The government of Ethiopia was criticized for giving relief food to military conscripts and construction project workers; for preventing relief from reaching Eritrea, Tigre, Wollo, and the Ogaden in order to weaken forces fighting the government; for profiting from the relief aid and using it to gain and maintain influence; and for bureaucratic inefficiency. The United States was criticized for placing strings on aid to Marxist Ethiopia which hindered the emergency effort. Fighting in the north, long distances, difficult terrain, and the lack of roads and trucks also contributed to the bottlenecks in food distribution, which, in turn, contributed to death rates of 100 per day at the feeding center at Korem and 120 at Bati in late 1984. Grain backed up in port rotted as long-awaited rains fell in May 1985.

In May, too, 52,000 people were forced from Ibnat feeding center, given provisions, and told to return home to plant their fields. Local authorities reportedly burned their huts. Private voluntary agency relief officials charged that many who left Ibnat were too weak to travel and would die in the difficult trek across rugged mountains. Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam blamed the evacuation on local officials and said the victims could return. Within days, 35,000 had reportedly registered at the camp, though reporters said there were less than 15,000, with many registering twice. While criticizing the forced evacuation of people threatened by starvation, international relief officials said it was time to prepare people to leave the camps where they had nothing to do but wait for food, water, and medical care. The coming of rain, which meant hopes of planting fields and rebuilding lives at home, meant the increased spread of deadly diseases in the camps.

By autumn 1985, though, food distribution had improved considerably, rains had come, and people were leaving camps. While relief had reached only ten percent of the 7.9 million people threatened with starvation at the end of 1984, by November, an estimated nine of ten were being fed. At the height of the emergency in March, one million people were being fed in and around camps; by November, less than 70,000. Ethiopian and voluntary organization officials warned, though, that the threat of starvation would continue into 1986, as the famine's effects would limit the ability to take advantage of the rain.

• • •

For parts of Ethiopia, however, the distribution of famine relief faced obstacles which were not overcome. Particularly in Eritrea and Tigre, where ethnic movements have been at war with the Ethiopian government and where half of the people facing starvation live, war and politics have prevented adequate food supplies from reaching those in need. While the United States and other donor nations pressured Ethiopia to provide safe passage into rebel-held areas for food trucks, controversy surrounded efforts to bring food into those areas through the denied responsibility for the attack. Reported incidents of violence earlier in the year, including the killing by Lesotho security forces of six PAC members, who were alleged to be on their way to attack South Africa, heightened the precariousness of South African refugees in Lesotho.

There are, according to the Lesotho government, 11,500 South African refugees in the country. Most live in Maseru or other towns. There are no refugee camps, and movement is not restricted. Many of the South African refugees have been there for some time and are fully integrated. During 1985, nearly 500 South African refugees entered Lesotho, most of them young males who said they escaped the threat of arrest or harassment. Many of them, for their own protection, move on within weeks of their arrival, mostly to Tanzania, where educational opportunities are found for them. Almost 500 refugees and ANC members moved to Zambia and Tanzania with UNHCR assistance during 1985. UNHCR provides assistance to some of the refugees, mostly in the form of income generation projects, education, and resettlement.

There are small numbers of refugees from Lesotho in neighboring countries. Despite a 1980 amnesty act and a policy of encouraging them to repatriate, few have returned.

[In January 1986, a coup in Lesotho overthrew the government. The new government was expected to seek better relations with South Africa. The implications for refugees were not yet clear.]

Mozambique

Mozambique, despite its frail economy, has long provided refuge and assistance to South African and other refugees. In 1984, it signed the UN convention on refugees. But drought and civil war displaced more than 1.5 million people and produced major flows of refugees out of Mozambique in 1984 and 1985. Mozambicans have crossed into Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Swaziland, and South Africa. They have fled the civil war; the brutal disregard for civilians attributed to government forces and, particularly, the opposition Renamo forces; and the effects of drought, which have been exacerbated by Renamo's attacks on food transport. Estimates of the total number of Mozambicans outside the country by late 1985

Sudan. Some voluntary organizations involved in relief work were charged with playing politics by not participating in such efforts, fearful they might offend the Ethiopian government and risk expulsion. Early in 1985, aid to opposition-held areas reportedly equalled only five percent of that provided to government feeding stations.

As the year went on, the situation worsened. Ethiopian air force attacks on food convoys from the Sudan increased, and in May, the new leader of the Sudan announced that his government would no longer allow food to be sent across the border into northern Ethiopia unless Ethiopia agreed. The new rains made the roads into those areas virtually impassable. An agreement with the Ethiopian government to allow distribution of food to rebel-held areas produced little result. Reports in late 1985 indicated that the supply lines from the Sudan were virtually closed and that only ten percent of the famine victims in Ethiopia and Tigre were receiving regular aid. The Eritrean Relief Association estimated it was able to get food to 85 percent of the people in areas controlled by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. The inability to get food into Eritrea and Tigre has contributed directly to the continuing flow of refugees from northern Ethiopia to the Sudan.

• • •

Refugee movement to the Sudan has also been triggered by a program which the Ethiopian government says is a response to the famine. Hundreds of thousands of people are being resettled from the northern regions hit worst by the drought to southern and western lowland regions. Plans were to resettle 1.5 million by the end of 1985. The government had moved about 600,000 by the end of November 1985. From the start, Western organizations and governments, particularly the United States, have criticized the program, saying that its real purpose is to remove the population from dissident areas. Authorities have reportedly forced people onto resettlement trucks at gunpoint or by withholding relief food. They are moved to places where food, sanitation, housing, and medical facilities are allegedly inadequate; many have died, either in transit because they were malnourished before departure or from malaria upon arrival in the lowland resettlement areas. Other Western relief officials say the program is the only long-term hope for feeding Ethiopia; they point out that the lowlands are fertile and much less densely populated than the drought-affected northern highlands, that half those resettled are not from contested areas in Tigre, and that none have been from Eritrea. The government says that resettlement is strictly voluntary and that families and ethnic groups are being kept together.

In November, Medecins Sans Frontiers (Doctors Without Borders), a French organization, said that as many as 100,000 had died in the resettlement program. The Ethiopian government quickly expelled the organization. Private Western agencies that rejected the stories of deaths due to resettlement as greatly exaggerated were, in turn, said to be covering up the program's problems in fear that they would lose the Ethiopian government's cooperation or even be expelled, and that the horror stories would deter donations from the West. In the north, famine victims have been increasingly reluctant to come to feeding centers for fear of being rounded up and forced to move. In late October, when armed forces entered Korem camp and rounded up 600 residents for resettlement, 10,000 others, including hospital patients, fled into the hills. Many others from the north, fearing resettlement, have made the long walk to the Sudan to join those already in the camps.

An estimated 130,000 people, mostly from Eritrea and Tigre, entered the Sudan between October and December 1984. Another 100,000, many evading the resettlement program, crossed over in January, walking for as long as 50 days to reach the Sudan and suffering casualranged from 100,000 to 200,000.

Most of the 45,000 to 50,000 Mozambicans in Zimbabwe were settled among local people, while up to 15,000 were in four UNHCR camps. The 100,000 to 160,000 who have fled to South Africa face serious protection problems as neither South Africa nor Mozambique recognizes them as refugees. In late 1985, South Africa was reportedly repatriating as many as 1,500 per month to Mozambique, where they faced a life-threatening situation. Fleeing to South Africa, they also risked their lives—to prevent departures, the government of Mozambique has apparently mined parts of the border with South Africa. There have also been reports of people killed by gunfire from unknown sources while trying to cross the border.

Some of the peasants who fled to Zimbabwe began returning after rains fell in the summer of 1985, but the continued civil war and attacks on the rural population limited the prospects of significant spontaneous repatriation. In the fall of 1985, some 7,000 Mozambicans returned from Malawi, but they faced continued food shortages. Between September and November, 4,000 to 5,000 Mozambicans crossed into Zambia where they received UNHCR assistance.

The Nkomati accords signed by South Africa and Mozambique in March 1984 have affected the situation between the two countries, particularly the status of South African refugees in Mozambique. Each agreed to prohibit hostile acts originating in its territory against the other. As a result, Mozambique warned South African refugees who were African National Congress members not to launch attacks from Mozambique. More than 1,000 South Africans left for other African countries after the accords were signed. But stepped up attacks in Mozambique by Renamo, thought to be supported by South Africa, have threatened the Nkomati accords.

Rwanda

The stalemated and uncertain situation of some 30,000 people who fled to Rwanda from ethnic violence in Uganda in October 1982 changed abruptly after a July coup brought a new government to Uganda. Uganda's failure to complete a review of the nationality of the 27,000 who claimed Ugandan citizenship had left their status and their future uncertain. Rwanda and Uganda had agreed upon the review of nationality and the subsequent resettlement of each country's own citizens early in 1983. Rwanda completed its review, recognized more than 1,000 Rwandese nationals, and began to resettle them. Some 14,000 of the 44,000 who had fled to Rwanda had returned to Uganda on their own, moved to Tan-

ties from Ethiopian air attacks along the way. Refugees continued to reach the Sudan through April 1985 when, encouraged by reports of rain in Ethiopia, thousands of Tigreans began to leave the camps and head home. More than 50,000 had left the camps by June. By October, though, there were reports that Eritreans were entering the Sudan at the rate of 400-500 per day to avoid both the Ethiopian military draft and a strong Ethiopian government offensive in the area. Between August and the beginning of October, 20,000 to 30,000 Eritreans crossed into the Sudan, leaving behind the first chance of a crop in many years. Between October 1984 and October 1985, as many as 300,000 refugees from Ethiopia arrived in the Sudan, bringing the total number of refugees from Ethiopia there to at least 800,000.

• • •

Somalia, too, continued to receive refugees from Ethiopia; a significant influx during the second half of 1984 brought the total in the North West and Gedo regions to over 100,000. By the end of 1984, more than 300,000 of the 700,000 estimated to be in Somalia had returned to Ethiopia, attracted by a UNHCR program agreed upon by the governments of Ethiopia and Somalia to provide food, tools, and cattle to help them rebuild their lives. The drought, however, killed half the cattle and destroyed the program's chances of success. In Ethiopia's Harerge province, one-third of the 900,000 famine sufferers at the end of 1984 were returnees. An estimated 50,000 had gone back to Somalia again by the end of 1984.

Between September 1983 and December 1984, 13,000 Ethiopians returned from Djibouti on trains under an agreement between the two countries and UNHCR. Another 19,000 were registered in Ethiopia after returning on their own. All returnees received UNHCR assistance. Reports of forced repatriation and the killing by Ethiopian officials of returnees were denied by UNHCR and the two governments. In an alleged incident in August 1984, Djibouti turned 175 refugees over to Ethiopian officials, and 25 were subsequently shot. Refugees who returned to Ethiopia faced the continuing effects of the drought and famine, and by the end of the program in December 1984, 10,000 had moved back into Djibouti. According to some of them, many of the camps for returnees and some of the resettlement villages are forced labor camps or guarded villages.

Distinct from other refugee movements was the evacuation of Ethiopian Jews, after their flight to the Sudan, to Israel between November 1984 and January 1985. Of a total of 25,000 Ethiopian Jews thought to remain in Ethiopia in recent years, as many as 10,000 emigrated to Israel in a secret airlift from the Sudan. They joined approximately 6,000 Ethiopian Jews who had already emigrated to Israel between 1979 and 1984. The flights, when made public, were cancelled by the Sudan, leaving some 3,000 Ethiopian Jews in camps there and 8,000 still in Ethiopia.

Despite Ethiopia's problems, the number of Sudanese refugees in the country doubled between March 1984 and April 1985, from 30,000 to 67,000. The refugees, mostly semi-nomadic pastoralists fleeing the armed conflict in southern Sudan, walked up to three months to reach Ethiopia. Eighty percent of the refugees are young males. After the April 1985 coup in the Sudan, many of the 11,000 Sudanese refugees—Ansar tribesmen who had been in Ethiopia since 1969—returned to the Sudan. But 72,000 Sudanese refugees, most of them recent arrivals, continue to receive UNHCR assistance in Ethiopia's Illubabor province.

zania, or settled in Rwanda. Of the 30,000 who remained in Rwandan camps receiving UNHCR and other assistance, 24,000 were agriculturalists in a camp at Kibondo since February 1983, and 6,000 were pastoralists who had been at a camp at Lake Nasho since March 1983. Rwanda did not allow any activity that suggested permanence as long as the possibility remained of their returning to Uganda; nevertheless, the camp was the focus of a UNHCR effort to integrate the refugees and help them attain self-sufficiency. Since Uganda's July coup, though, all but a few of those seeking refuge in Rwanda have returned to southwestern Uganda.

Another 18,000 refugees who have been in Rwanda for some time, most of them Hutus from Burundi, have been largely integrated into Hutu-controlled Rwanda. Although Rwanda is densely populated and its land overburdened, it has allowed the Hutu refugees to resettle and participate in the economy. But it does not allow them or their Rwanda-born children to become citizens and allows only temporary asylum to other refugees. A June 1985 confrontation, in which troops fired on a group of refugees, appears to have been an isolated incident.

Somalia

In addition to food shortages, poor sanitation facilities, and serious health problems, refugees in Somalia—most of them ethnic Somalis and Oromos from Ethiopia—are victims of a war of words among the governments of Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Western countries which contribute to the refugees' support. A longstanding controversy over the number of refugees in Somalia affected UNHCR and other agencies' assistance plans and led finally, late in 1985, to plans for a new census of refugees. A compromise figure of 700,000 has been used for program planning for some time. But 320,000 refugees have returned to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia during the last three years. While it is clear that refugees have continued to arrive in Somalia, up to 150,000 between mid-1984 and mid-1985, many Western government and private agency officials say that Somalia consistently inflates camp populations by at least 25 percent. Frustration among donor countries, particularly the United States, with these allegedly inflated numbers may become an obstacle to Western support for relief efforts in Somalia.

There is further concern that the 36 refugee camps in Somalia are becoming part of the culture of the region's nomadic Somali people, with reports that local people obtain food in the camps, where conditions are often better than in the surrounding desert, and that families from Ethiopia and Somalia have sent their women and children to the camps, while the men continue to tend their herds. Critics say that Somalia inflates the refugee numbers and keeps refugees in desolate areas where there is little hope for agricultural self-sufficiency in order to assure continued aid. Somalia denies that refugees have been leaving, calling such reports "Ethiopian propaganda," and says that better sites are not available for the refugees. A 1983 policy change allowing local settlement contingent upon international financial support has not been implemented because the continuing emergency hindered such projects for the more established refugees.

Regardless of the battle over numbers, at least 400,000 refugees remained in Somali camps in early 1985, with perhaps that many more outside. The influx of 150,000 Ethiopians by mid-1985 due to continued drought and war brought serious new problems to Somalia. In particular, there was an outbreak of cholera at Gannet, where some 35,000 new arrivals had gathered, with virtually no sanitation facilities, on the outskirts of Hargeisa town. Before the epidemic was diagnosed and actions taken, 1,262 had died, and cases were reported at other camps and among the local population. While the disease was under control by mid-April, action to contain it was criticized as too slow. Cholera is not the only health problem. At Gannet, an average of 19 people per day, most children under five, were dying, mostly of nutrition-related illnesses; at Bixin, a holding center for 36,000 refugees created to handle some of the late 1984 influx, up to 200 refugees per month, again mostly children, have been dying. Medical personnel attribute the death rate to inadequate nutrition, with the influx of new refugees depleting food supplies.

There have been reports of the military stopping large groups of refugees trying to return to Ethiopia and some cases of refugees being conscripted into the army. The Somali government does not permit the 500 Amharic refugees in Somalia, many of them Christian, to leave their camp or to settle locally; most will seek third-country resettlement. An organized voluntary repatriation program, the first that Ethiopia and Somalia have agreed upon, returned 554 people to Ethiopia in October and November of 1985.

South Africa

South Africa's apartheid policy and all its consequences—detention without charge or trial; forced resettlement of up to 3.5 million blacks to so-called independent homelands or designated urban areas; "pass" laws regulating blacks' residence and movement; banning of the two leading black political organizations; denial of citizenship to the black majority, which constitutes 72 percent of the population; and violent police repression of popular dissent—have prompted a steady flow of black South Africans out of the country. How many have sought refuge in African nations and abroad is difficult to estimate. The increased deployment of South African Defense Forces to black townships has made military service more unpopular among young white South Africans, and the number who have fled the country to avoid conscription has grown. There are thousands of displaced persons within South Africa, including those who flee the undeveloped, crowded homelands to live illegally in squatter camps in urban areas.

In recent years, South Africa has put increasing pressure on neighboring countries that provide refuge to South Africans. Pressure on Swaziland, Botswana, and Lesotho has included threatened military and economic retaliation if they allow members of the African National Congress (ANC), the black opposition group, to use their territory as a base for attacks on South Africa. Despite the Nkomati accords, a March 1984 agreement between Mozambique and South Africa to prohibit

In 1985, the Sudan provided refuge for more than a million refugees from Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad.
UNHCR/N. van Praag

hostile acts organized from each country's territory against the other, guerrilla activities have continued in both countries.

The fighting between Mozambican forces and the opposition Renamo forces and atrocities committed against civilians in the countryside, as well as the effects of drought in Mozambique, have forced as many as 160,000 Mozambicans to flee into South Africa. With no UNHCR presence in South Africa, there are concerns about their protection. Neither country recognizes them as refugees, but have agreed that they are illegal migrants and should be repatriated. During 1985, South Africa was returning some 1,500 a month to the danger they had fled. Most of the Mozambicans in South Africa have settled among the local population in the "homelands" near the border, particularly Gazankulu, where they have been harassed by homelands police. Many have reportedly gone into hiding, fearing they will be arrested and returned to Mozambique. Local residents and some voluntary agencies have been providing food and other necessities. South African police reportedly leave those in the homelands alone, but treat those outside as illegal migrants. South African troops are deployed along the border to stem their flow. There are reports that Mozambicans have been killed crossing the border, some by land mines apparently set by the Mozambican government to prevent departures and some by gunshots from unknown sources. South Africa says it is providing humanitarian assistance toward establishing resettlement camps on the Mozambique side of the border.

Sudan

Large numbers of refugees fleeing famine and conflict in Chad and Ethiopia began entering the Sudan in mid-1984, adding dramatically to the already established refugee population of nearly 700,000, mostly Ethiopians and Ugandans. By the end of 1985, the Sudan, which, despite its own poverty, has always maintained a policy of hospitality toward refugees and has cooperated with the international community in providing refugee assistance, was host to more than one million refugees. The problems of providing for them were exacerbated by drought and famine which threatened up to 9 million and displaced over 1.5 million of the Sudan's own people; an April 1985 coup which deposed Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry; and fighting between government and opposition forces in the country's southern region.

The drought destroyed the crops of the 130,000 Ethiopians in established refugee settlements, most of whom had nearly achieved self-sufficiency. The drought in Ethiopia; the Ethiopian government's program to resettle people from drought- and conflict-affected areas; and fighting between Ethiopian government forces and Eritrean and Tigrean resistance movements brought an unprecedented and steady flow of refugees from northern Ethiopia into eastern Sudan. By April 1985, more than 300,000 had arrived, joining the 130,000 in camps and more than 300,000 settled among the Sudanese population. They arrived, 3,000 to 4,000 a day, malnourished and in poor health, overwhelming the capacity to feed and care for them. By January 1985, most camps had critical shortages of food, water, shelter, and sanitation facilities. Some relief workers blamed the Sudanese government and the UN for not mobilizing early enough, but Sudanese officials said they could not have anticipated how many refugees would flood the country, and that to do so would have been criticized as creating a magnet for them. The food shortage improved as logistical problems of relief delivery were solved, but conditions remained critical. A measles epidemic at Wad Kowli camp, which held nearly 100,000 people and was running out of water by the spring, took 30 lives per day before it was brought under control.

In May, as the flow into the Sudan was slowing, the new military government announced that the Sudan would not allow food to be sent across the border into Eritrea and Tigre without Ethiopian government approval, raising fear that many more would die in those areas. At the same time, though, Tigreans began leaving the camps to return home, where normal rain had begun to fall, to plant their fields. Against the advice of relief workers who said they were not fit for the long trip, that there was no food awaiting them in Tigre, and that Ethiopia had started a military offensive there, 55,000 left, removing children from special feeding programs, no longer willing to live in the hot, crowded refugee camps. They were given as much food as they could carry, extra vitamins, and a physical exam before they left, but UNHCR could provide no aid to them as returnees in Tigre without Ethiopia's agreement. By the end of the summer, efforts by the international community and the Sudanese government, including an airlift of food by the United States and others, had stabilized the situation of the Ethiopian refugees, improving their nutrition and bringing disease under control. Some 100,000 refugees had been moved from the border to camps with better access to water and roads. But a government offensive in Eritrea, which began in August, forced at least 30,000 Eritreans to abandon their first promising crop in years and flee into the Sudan by the end of 1985, again straining delivery of food and health care.

A secret airlift flew nearly 10,000 Ethiopian Jews from the Sudan, via Europe, to Israel, mostly between November 1984 and January 1985. The Sudanese government stopped the flights in January when they became public, leaving some 3,000 Ethiopian Jews in camps in the Sudan and 8,000 still in Ethiopia. The Sudanese government denied a role in the airlift, but, after the coup in April, former officials were accused of involvement, jailed, and put on trial. In October, the new government ordered the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration and the International Catholic Migration Commission from the country for their alleged role in the airlift and suspended refugee resettlement to third countries under UNHCR auspices. While the moratorium continued into 1986, the government lifted the expulsions of the two agencies. In late 1985, 1,000 more Ethiopian Jews reportedly entered the Sudan, but were being strictly controlled to prevent another secret evacuation attempt.

After dropping to fewer than 1,000 early in 1984 because of voluntary repatriation, the number of Chadians in the Sudan climbed rapidly after mid-1984; by the end of the year, some 120,000 had fled drought and conflict in Chad and entered the Sudan. Most were in Darfur province, itself devastated by drought and so isolated that delivery of assistance was very difficult. By June 1985, after several months with almost no food or water left in Darfur for refugees or Sudanese nationals, and relief crippled by inadequate transport arrangements, the coming of rain only exacerbated matters, washing out roads and bridges and threatening to cut off the refugees from grain shipments. An airlift met only a fraction of the area's relief needs. As the rains ended, delivery of relief improved, but the condition of the Chadian refugees remained critical, and significant arrivals from Chad reportedly continued through October 1985.

Many relief workers criticized the international community for responding too slowly to the drought in the Sudan. In June, there were predictions that between a half million and two million would die before the November harvest. Some said many deaths could have been prevented but for the slowness of the response; early U.S. insistence that the relief program follow a private sector model; and mistakes by the Nimeiry government, UN agencies, and the European Economic Community. The United States, the UN, and European countries accused each other of contributing to the crisis. But as a promising November harvest approached, far fewer had died in the Sudan famine than had been feared; an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 died in western Sudan—horrible, but not as horrible as it might have been. The massive relief effort, despite its problems, and the desert skills of the people themselves had saved lives.

The Ugandan refugees in the southern Sudan, most of whom had been there since late 1982, were not affected by the drought. But fighting between Sudanese government and opposition forces interfered with refugee programs there, as security concerns led some agencies to remove staff. Some 250,000 Ugandans remained in the Sudan at the end of 1985, about 35,000 spontaneously settled among people of the same ethnicity and the rest in UNHCR camps, where they have achieved a high degree of self-sufficiency. Some 3,000 Ugandans returned to their country in early 1985; the July overthrow of the Obote government in Uganda caused some 2,000 more, mostly former soldiers, to return, but there appeared little chance for large repatriations. The Ugandans are well integrated in the Sudan; they have been provided land by the locals and have made contributions to the region's society, some of them taking Sudanese nationality. Most of these refugees are unwilling to return to the violence and uncertainty of Uganda.

In the two years preceding the overthrow of the Nimeiry regime, some 70,000 Sudanese had fled the turbulence in southern Sudan and sought refuge in Ethiopia, joining 11,000 who had been there for more than ten years. Many of this older group returned to the Sudan after the April coup, but the newer arrivals remained in Ethiopia. In late 1985, fighting in the South was reportedly heating up again after initial peace overtures between the new government and the opposition leader.

Swaziland

Swaziland provides asylum to about 6,900 South Africans, most of them rural ethnic Swazis who fled the black South African "homeland" of Kwazulu. They have achieved self-sufficiency at the Ndzevane settlement. Both internal events and increasingly successful pressure from South Africa have eroded Swaziland's hospitality to South Africans. Since the death of King Sobhuza in mid-1982 and the signing of a nonaggression pact with South Africa in 1984, the position of the African National Congress (ANC)—the black South African opposition movement—in Swaziland has deteriorated. ANC members who escaped from Mozambique fearing deportation after that country signed the Nkomati accords with South Africa in March 1984 added to tensions in Swaziland. There was fighting between ANC members and Swaziland troops and police in 1984, arrests of South Africans, and, in October 1984, a South African was deported to South Africa, where he was detained by police. South Africa denied reports that its forces entered Swaziland in December 1985, warning residents not to harbor guerrillas. Because of these circumstances, UNHCR has sought third-country resettlement for ANC members, and many South Africans have been transferred to Tanzania. Swaziland has affirmed its commitment to provide asylum for refugees while protecting itself by preventing attacks on South Africa from Swazi territory.

In August 1984, Mozambicans began entering Swaziland in large numbers, largely fleeing attacks by the Mozambican opposition, Renamo. By late 1985, 3,600 Mozambican refugees had arrived. They were all transferred to the settlement at Ndzevane, where they received UNHCR assistance. UNHCR reported late in 1985 that 300 Mozambicans had been detained as illegal immigrants. Half had valid documents and were released; the other half, the government said, were not asylum seekers and would be returned to Mozambique.

Tanzania

Despite economic problems, Tanzania continues successful efforts to integrate 179,000 refugees into its social and economic systems. Most of the 153,500 refugees from Burundi live in three agriculturally self-sufficient settlements on donated government land. By July 1985, UNHCR had turned over to the government administrative authority for all three rural settlements. Some 15,500 refugees from Zaire are spontaneously settled in the Kigoma region. Most of the 7,000 urban refugees, the majority from South Africa, are in the capital, Dar-es-Salaam. Though Tanzania offers refugees citizenship, and most remain, a 1985 UNHCR survey indicated that a third of the 15,000 Zairians wish to repatriate.

Tanzania's tradition of generosity toward refugees was called into question during the summer of 1984 when the government announced it would forcibly return to Uganda 10,000 Banyarwandan refugees who had reportedly entered Tanzania a few months earlier. Subsequently, the Tanzanian government learned that far fewer had arrived, and they were allowed to remain. A census later in 1984 established the number of Banyarwanda in the Kagera region at 2,500.

The government cooperates with the Pan African Congress, the African National Congress, and UNHCR in the operation of two vocational training farms for South African refugees at Dakawa and Kitange. South African members of OAU-recognized liberation movements are allowed to stay in Tanzania, but are not considered refugees. Some who have quit or been expelled from the liberation organizations have been denied work or jailed. UNHCR has helped former members of the South African liberation movements resettle elsewhere.

Uganda

A 1985 U.S. Committee for Refugees paper, *Human Rights in Uganda: The Reasons for Refugees*, states that military, tribal, and religious conflicts in Uganda during the last twenty years have resulted in between 150,000 and 500,000 deaths by murder, torture, mutilation, the withholding of supplies, and other causes; the exile of 300,000 Ugandans; and the displacement of 500,000 more. From 1980 to June of 1985, the excesses of the Obote government, which included state-sponsored looting and burning of businesses, farms, and schools, and the indiscriminate rape, torture, and beating of civilians by the army, continued patterns of practice typical of post-colonial Ugandan governments. In July 1985, Obote's successor by military coup, General Tito Okello, promised reforms, but by November was admitting having trouble controlling his troops' "indisciplines" in their battle with the National Resistance Army (NRA) in the decimated Luwero Triangle, where between 50,000 and 200,000 persons have died since 1981. A peace agreement concluded in mid-December between the government and the NRA had no effect.

Of the 300,000 Ugandans who have fled, 250,000 are in the Sudan, 23,500 in Zaire, 3,900 in Kenya, 2,500 in Tanzania, and a few hundred more in Burundi. At the beginning of 1985, there were also 31,000 in Rwanda, but most returned after the July coup. Since 1984, 34,000 Ugandans have repatriated from Zaire and the Sudan. Repatriation has consistently been interrupted by outbreaks of violence. Some who returned to the West Nile region were reportedly beaten and killed. In September, General Okello called for exiles to return, and as of December, hundreds of Ugandans were reported to be returning from Kenya.

The status of 200,000 Banyarwanda in Uganda remained unresolved as successive governments engaged in contradictory policies toward the ethnic group. In 1982, nearly 90,000 Banyarwanda were expelled from their homes, half fleeing to UNHCR camps in southwest Uganda and the other half to Rwanda and Tanzania. A 1983 agreement with Rwanda under UNHCR auspices established a census to determine the citizenship of the displaced Banyarwanda. As of May 1985, the government of Uganda had made no determination about the 39,000 who claimed Ugandan citizenship, 27,000 of them in Rwanda. More violent expulsions of Banyarwanda from their homes in 1985 caused some 2,500 to flee to Tanzania and another 10,000 to seek protection in UNHCR settlements in Uganda.

Approximately 151,000 people receive UNHCR assistance in Uganda. Some 31,400 Zairians and 120,000 ethnic Rwandans, including 35,000 Banyarwanda from the Luwero Triangle, are settled mainly in eight rural camps. The largest camp, Kyaka II, designed for 17,000 people and 22,000 cattle, has swollen to 29,000 people and 40,000 cattle. Health, veterinary, and education facilities are inadequate. Most refugees are forced to drink and bathe in mud holes and cattle dips.

[In January 1986, the NRA took the capital, Kampala; their leader, Yoweri Museveni, became the leader of a new Ugandan government.]

Zaire

A large country, bordering nine others, Zaire has provided refuge to people from many neighbor states. At the same time, ethnic conflict and a series of failed secession movements since independence have sent many Zairians into exile in the region. There are some 50,000 Zairian refugees in neighboring countries, particularly Angola, Uganda, and Zambia. But 333,500 refugees, most from Angola, Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, are in Zaire. The government has accepted refugees openly, and generally allows them to seek work or settle on farms. Most have become self-sufficient and integrated into Zairian society. But refugees, like Zairian citizens, have sometimes been harassed by the country's undisciplined soldiers, and some, Angolans in particular, have been detained for long periods as suspected subversives.

Of the 282,000 Angolan refugees in Zaire, 215,000 have lived for some time in the western part of the country. Most have achieved self-sufficiency and receive no assistance. But throughout 1984 and into 1985, Angolan refugees fleeing the civil war in their country flooded into a remote region of Shaba province in southwestern Zaire. By mid-1985, up to 70,000 had arrived. The government allowed them to cultivate undeveloped land there, but serious problems developed. Critical food shortages and the difficulty of delivering relief supplies and services to the region combined with concerns about the refugees' security—an armed attack from Angola took several refugees' lives—prompted a decision to move them to new settlements 50 kilometers into Zaire. By September 1985, 16,000 of a planned 30,000 had been moved under UNHCR auspices. Approximately 2,500 refugees reportedly returned to Angola from Shaba province in mid-1985.

Between July 1983 and June 1985, 32,000 of the Ugandan refugees in Haut Zaire province voluntarily repatriated to the West Nile province of Uganda. The 23,500 Ugandans who remained were self-sufficient. The voluntary repatriation program was suspended in the summer following the overthrow of the Obote government in Uganda.

In late 1984, more than 1,000 Zairians fled into Zambia from fighting in Shaba province, some saying they had been beaten and otherwise mistreated by Zairian troops. Late in December, 400 of them returned, but the rest, fearing further attacks, remained in Zambia, where they received UNHCR assistance. President Mobutu Sese Seko repeated his invitation to all Zairians to return to their country. Some have returned following amnesties in 1978 and 1983, but the continued detention of political prisoners and internal exile of opposition politicians have limited the numbers returning. There have been reports that some Zairians who sought asylum in Congo (Brazzaville) have been forcibly repatriated to Zaire. In November 1985, Switzerland forcibly returned 59 Zairians, some of whom stated they feared persecution in Zaire.

Zambia

Zambia's tradition of hospitality to refugees has been seriously tarnished in recent years, affected by a weakening economy and pressures from neighboring countries. While 85 percent of the refugees are spontaneously settled and integrated among the local population, mostly people of related ethnic groups with whom they have good relations, the government has shown increasing hostility toward them. Zambia's growing crime problems have been blamed on illegal aliens in speeches by government officials urging vigilance against border crossers. The presence of refugees, 60 percent of whom are in the drought-affected Western province, has caused problems for the area's health and education systems. City dwellers resent the 2,500 urban refugees of various nationalities who compete for increasingly scarce jobs.

Friendly neighboring countries say those who flee are not refugees, but people seeking to engage in political opposition from Zambian territory. As a result, Zambia grants asylum freely to those from South Africa and Namibia, and allows them to participate in political activity, but has forcibly repatriated Angolans, Zairians, Zimbabweans, Mozambicans, and Malawians in several incidents since 1982, most of them in 1983 and early 1984. From the fall of 1983, to the fall of 1984, 150 Zimbabweans, some of whom had been determined to be refugees by UNHCR, were reportedly returned forcibly to Zimbabwe. Most were supporters of the political opposition in Zimbabwe. When they requested refugee status in Zambia, they were denied as dissidents seeking to plan political activities from Zambia. They feared being tortured or executed if returned to Zimbabwe. Some reportedly were.

As a result of a registration program initiated by UNHCR late in 1983 to issue identity cards for refugees, establish their residency, and safeguard their rights, the number of refugees in Zambia was revised down to 96,500 in mid-1985. Of these, 75,000 were Angolans and 9,500, Zairians. The number of Namibians had increased to more than 7,000 due to continued conflict in their country. The number of South Africans remained about 3,000. Some 800 of a group of 1,200 Zairians who fled civil war and reported torture by Zairian troops in late 1984 remained in Zambia and received UNHCR assistance. An influx of refugees fleeing the civil war in Mozambique began in the summer of 1985; from September to mid-November of that year, between 4,000 and 5,000 entered and were receiving UNHCR assistance. In October, Milton Obote, the deposed president of Uganda, and more than 100 other Ugandans sought and received asylum in Zambia. In contrast to its policy toward less well-known refugees from neighboring countries, government officials said that asylum was granted because of Zambia's international obligation to accept refugees and that Uganda should not view this humanitarian action as an unfriendly act.

Zimbabwe

Though rains have come to southern Africa, most of the 50,000 or more Mozambicans who fled to Zimbabwe from drought and civil war late in 1983 and early in 1984 have remained there. Some returned to Mozambique in mid-1985 to tend their fields, but an increasing flow of refugees into Zimbabwe, as many as 400 a month, was reported in the fall. Food shortages, civil war, violence toward civilians, and attacks by the opposition Renamo forces on supply convoys continue. There has been much improvement in Zimbabwe's policy toward the Mozambican refugees. At first, they were sent back. But soon, the government recognized them as refugees and, during 1984, established with UNHCR four camps to accommodate them. About 15,000 of the refugees moved into the camps; the rest settled and were integrated among the local population. A good 1984-1985 crop, following three years of drought, helped them achieve self-sufficiency. The emergency which marked the first months of the Mozambican influx into Zimbabwe has apparently ended; adequate food supplies, rain, and the provision of health care and education to those in the camps, have improved the refugees' conditions. Malnutrition and disease have been largely eliminated. In January 1985, Renamo forces allegedly crossed into Zimbabwe and infiltrated the camps, planning to abduct refugees. They were arrested by Zimbabwean authorities and turned over to Mozambique; screening at the camps was tightened. As long as the violence in the Mozambique countryside continues, it is unlikely that many of the refugees will return.

The relatively small number of South African refugees who have been in Zimbabwe for some time increased to more than 500, mostly in Harare, the capital, by mid-1985. At the end of 1985, following a land mine explosion in South Africa near the Zimbabwe border, South Africa warned Zimbabwe to prevent terrorist incursions from its territory. Zimbabwe reaffirmed its policy not to allow South African liberation movement members to establish bases in or stage attacks from Zimbabwe.

Political and ethnic tension in Zimbabwe has also produced refugees, mostly from Matabeleland, where members of the opposition party ZAPU, largely minority Ndebele people, have been harassed, driven from their homes, beaten, and killed by supporters of ZANU, the party of President Robert Mugabe and the Shona majority. After July's general elections, won by ZANU, there was an upsurge in violence; an influx of some 200 refugees joined the 4,300 already in Botswana's Dukwe camp. Zimbabwe has increased its pressure on Botswana to prevent dissidents from staging raids from there. At times, Zimbabwe has successfully pressured both Botswana and Zambia to return Zimbabwean refugees who, it claimed, were wanted for criminal, not political, activities. In 1983 and 1984, Zambia forcibly returned an estimated 150. Some were allegedly detained, tortured, and, in several cases, killed.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Australia

In 1985, Australia's Indochinese refugee population reached more than 90,000. Their resettlement has represented a significant change in the history of Australian immigration policy, which, until the 1960s, generally favored European over Asian resettlement. The change has brought international praise to the nation for its humanitarianism, but domestic controversy over the impact the refugees have had on the nation's economy.

Australia resettled 14,000 refugees in its 1984-85 fiscal year. It also resettled persons from East Timor, Sri Lanka, and Latin America under a special humanitarian program established in 1984 to accept, for family reunification, persons not qualifying for refugee status, but in refugee-like situations or facing discrimination. The government reduced the number of refugees it planned to resettle during the 1985-86 fiscal year to 12,000 refugees, emphasizing that it would increase acceptance of family reunification cases directly from Vietnam through the Orderly Departure Program.

Australia has refused to accept for resettlement asylum seekers from Indonesia's troubled Irian Jaya province, though it has provided financial assistance for the 11,000 Irian Jayans in Papua New Guinea.

China

Since 1978, China has resettled more than 280,000 refugees—primarily ethnic Chinese fleeing overland from Vietnam in 1980. As numbers seeking asylum decline and local integration proceeds, phasedown of China's internationally respected resettlement program continues.

Most ethnic Chinese have been resettled on more than 200 state farms. Where integration has not been smooth, UNHCR continues its work. Those who have found integration most difficult are the urban refugees—about twenty percent of those resettled—for whom it is hard to adjust to communal farm life. Perhaps the most successful project has been the settlement of 11,000 refugees who were fishermen to a village on the Gulf of Tonkin, where they continue to use their skills.

One point of friction between the refugees and the Chinese government has been the large numbers of children born to refugee parents. In China, where strict birth control policies are in place, the government has not required refugees to limit family size, but it has stated it is troubled by the situation.

An estimated 1,300 refugee families have left China and joined relatives in third countries; a few hundred others remain in Fangcheng transit camp awaiting the few offers of resettlement which come from other countries.

In 1982, China became the second communist country, after Yugoslavia, to accede to the UN convention and protocol on the status of refugees.

Hong Kong

Densely populated Hong Kong continues its 1982 policy of strict detention to discourage asylum seekers. Half of the Vietnamese boat refugees in Hong Kong remain in closed camps, in cramped, poorly ventilated barracks. New arrivals are not allowed to work, creating a heavier financial burden on the government and UNHCR for food and social services.

Those refugees who arrived before July 1982—a population of nearly 5,000—live in two UNHCR-operated transit centers. Decreased opportunities for resettlement in other countries have kept camp populations high, ensuring long waiting periods, and have contributed to poor living conditions for many. Forty percent of the refugees in open camps have remained there for four to five years, waiting for resettlement opportunities. The prospects of Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong improved in mid-1985, when Canada and the United Kingdom agreed to accept additional Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong.

Since 1980, Chinese trying to cross

the Hong Kong border have been treated as illegal aliens. Hong Kong, no longer believing they will be persecuted, returns them to China. Vietnamese arriving by land are also returned to China, which Hong Kong considers their resettlement country.

Indonesia

Although Indonesia says its large population and heavy unemployment prevent it from accepting refugees for resettlement, it has provided temporary asylum to more than 88,000 Indochinese, mostly Vietnamese, since 1975. Most are resettled eventually in the United States or Australia. Vietnamese boat refugees continue to arrive at Indonesia's scattered outlying islands. All are granted first asylum, provided they depart for third-country resettlement within two years. Boat refugees spend a short quarantine period in KuKu camp on Jemaju Island, then are transferred to the first-asylum camp on Galang Island.

In late 1985, 6,600 Vietnamese remained in first asylum in Indonesia. Twenty percent of those had been there for more than two years. At the end of 1985, there were also 1,700 in a refugee processing center on Galang, all of whom had been accepted for resettlement, primarily in the United States. In the center, they receive six to eight months of cultural orientation and English-language training.

In September, Indonesia complained to the Vietnamese government about the continuing arrival of boat refugees on its shores. Indonesia also expressed concern during the year about decreased UNHCR financial allocations for the camps and declining third-country resettlement opportunities.

Indonesia is also a refugee-producing country. Approximately 11,000 West Papuan refugees have fled human rights abuses by Indonesian authorities and civil disturbances in Indonesia's Irian Jaya province. They remain in camps in Papua New Guinea. In December 1984, approximately 100 refugees were repatriated; in May 1985, 54 returned. Both repatriations were termed voluntary, though questions about the refugees' treatment once back in Indonesia remain unanswered. Twelve Irian Jayans were involuntarily repatriated in September 1985. Their status remains unknown.

Laos

A decade after the Pathet Lao took Vientiane, and established a socialist government, ethnically diverse Laos remains one of the world's poorest nations, dominated by neighboring Vietnam. During the decade since 1975, 350,000 have fled the nation—nearly ten percent of its people. Most of those have entered Thailand, where 94,000 remain in Thai holding centers. Another 50,000 Lao have crossed Thailand's northern border unofficially, joining other ethnic Lao communities there.

Refugee flows from Laos, which had risen sharply in 1984, declined sharply beginning in February 1985. Reasons for the decline include imposition of strict humane deterrence policies by the Thai government. A USCR fact-finding mission in spring 1985 reported that forcible "pushbacks" of asylum seekers at the border by Thai police and border guards were commonplace. In July 1985, Thailand initiated a screening program, with UNHCR observers, to determine which arrivals from Laos qualify for refugee status. Laos, to date, has refused to take back those rejected, saying that Thailand is not providing adequate biographical information on those it wishes to return.

In 1980, the Lao government and UNHCR agreed upon a voluntary repatriation plan for refugees wishing to return to that country. By August 1985, only 2,800 Lao had returned under the program. Returnees received government indoctrination, then were returned to the supervision of their local village authorities. It is estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 Lao have returned to the country outside the formal channels of the program. No reports of harassment of these spontaneous returnees have been received, according to UNHCR, which monitors their treatment and supports improvement of living conditions in villages having large repatriate populations. UNHCR is also responsible for aiding 1,300 Cambodian refugees living in Laos.

Malaysia

Although Malaysia permanently resettles only refugees compatible with its largely Muslim population, it has provided first asylum to more than 203,000 since 1975, all contingent upon third-country resettlement. To prevent possible friction, Vietnamese boat refugees are confined to Pulau Bidong island during their stay.

Of those resettled in Malaysia, the 5,000 Khmer Muslims appear to have overcome early resettlement difficulties, and 2,500 Burmese Muslims have integrated well with fellow ethnic Burmese. In September 1985, more than 1,000 Cambodian Muslims reportedly were moved in an unpublicized action from Khao I Dang camp, Thailand, for eventual resettlement in Malaysia.

Between 70,000 and 150,000 Filipino Muslims are settled in Malaysia's Sabah province, where employment opportunities are favorable. UNHCR, which sponsors programs to help resettle the Filipinos, estimates that as many as 90,000 of them should be considered refugees escaping violence in the Philippines.

Of the 8,500 Southeast Asian refugees remaining in the country, at least half live in uncertainty, having been rejected by third countries for resettlement because they do not have close enough family connections in receiving countries or because they do not meet those countries' resettlement standards. This is the case for the 5,600 confined to Pulau Bidong, a first asylum camp on an isolated island off the Malaysian coast. Some have remained there for more than four years. In April 1985, UNHCR set up schools in Pulau Bidong to provide the refugees with vocational and English-language training. Sungei Besi holding center, where refugees stay prior to departure for resettlement countries, housed 2,800 in late 1985.

Many boat arrivals have been victims of pirate attacks. In December 1985, pirates reportedly killed fifty boat refugees in one attack off the Malaysian coast. Thirty survivors told of males being thrown into the sea and women being raped. The government recently began a program of rewarding fishermen who help boat refugees in distress.

Thailand

Thailand continues to offer first asylum to Indochinese refugees, victims of the continuing political unrest in Southeast Asia. In late 1985, more than 130,000 recognized refugees from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam remained in Thai camps, while resettlement countries continued to decrease the numbers they are willing to accept.

There are 93,000 refugees from Laos, primarily Hmong, in Thailand. They live either in refugee camps or detention centers along the Mekong River. Before the 1980s, the Thai government accepted those fleeing Laos as refugees. Under Thai "humane deterrence" policy, however, those arriving now are placed in detention camps. After site visits in spring 1985, the U.S. Committee for Refugees reported that many others have been turned back forcibly—on occasion, violently—by border guards and police acting on government directives. Increased Thai deterrence measures contributed to a sharp decline in arrivals from Laos in 1985.

In July 1985, the Thai government set up a screening process with UNHCR observers present to determine which arrivals from Laos qualify for refugee status. It is difficult to determine the ultimate viability of the screening process. Laos, to date, has refused to take back those already rejected. In the interim, they remain in often-crowded Thai detention centers.

Cambodians in Thailand—both those trapped amidst fighting on the border with Cambodia and those still waiting in Khao I Dang camp—also face uncertainty. More than 230,000 Cambodians are living in Thailand at the border with Cambodia, having fled clashes between Vietnamese soldiers and Cambodian resistance forces in late 1984 and early 1985. The Thai government officially closed its border with Cambodia to new arrivals in 1980, but has allowed the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) to move the border refugees inside Thai territory when Vietnamese military offensives have threatened them. UNBRO administers the border encampments in Thailand, but cannot provide protection from fighting near the sites. Site 2, an encampment in Thailand only two kilometers from Vietnamese artillery installations across the border in Cambodia, holds 135,000 Cambodians. Humanitarian agencies have argued that the camp is prone to attack and that its inhabitants should be moved further into Thailand.

With the Cambodians at Site 2 are 4,100 "land" Vietnamese, many of whom survived years in reeducation camps and then escaped Vietnam overland through Cambodia. They are particularly at risk, partly because animosity between Cambodians and Vietnamese leaves them without allies in the border encampments. Interviewing of the land Vietnamese by the United States and other resettlement countries was expected to begin in 1986, although it was estimated that only about 800 would qualify for resettlement under current U.S. eligibility standards.

Within Khao I Dang, the last Cambodian refugee camp administered by UNHCR in Thailand, remains a population of 20,000. More than

NEWS

FROM
THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Isolated West Irian Refugees in Papua New Guinea Merit International Response

[In spring 1985, Dr. Allen Jones made a USCR site visit to refugee camps in Papua New Guinea for West Papuans from Indonesia's Irian Jaya province. The following is his analysis of their situation.]

Important humanitarian interests are at stake in decisions facing the recently installed government in Papua New Guinea, a small but strategically important nation in Southeast Asia. One decision involves the plight of more than 11,000 refugees who, since early 1984, have taken sanctuary there after fleeing their homes across the border in Irian Jaya, the Indonesian province that covers the western half of the island of New Guinea. This refugee problem is a major burden confronting the young nation, independent for just a decade; resolving the issue is Papua New Guinea's principal foreign policy concern and a major domestic priority as well.

Other nations in the region are involved in the dilemma. Indonesia, embarrassed by reports of the violence which caused the refugees to leave Irian Jaya, tries to downplay the issue and keep it out of the international press. It calls those who have fled "illegal border-crossers" rather than refugees. Neighboring Australia is also concerned, but placed in the awkward position of seeking to maintain close ties with both Indonesia, a regional giant, and Papua New Guinea, which was administered by Australia until 1975.

The United States, too, has a stake in the problem for historical as well as present-day reasons. Fourteen years ago, the United States mediated an agreement between the Dutch—the former colonial power—and Indonesia, a then recently independent nation, to make Irian Jaya part of Indonesian territory, following internationally accepted procedures monitored by the UN. But not all of the local West Papuan people—ethnic Melanesians—accepted the outcome (some UN members also asserted the agreed-upon procedures had not been properly followed), and an independence movement sprang up, led by the Free Papua Movement (OPM).

The refugees cited mistreatment and attacks by Indonesian civil and military authorities which resulted in West Papuan deaths and property destruction as the precipitating causes of their flight. Other causes include clashes between Indonesian authorities and the OPM and, probably, OPM coercion of locals to flee.

New Guinea, the world's second largest island, is abundant in natural resources—oil and copper are part of its considerable wealth—and resource exploitation has taken place on both halves of the island. In addition, the Indonesians view their half of the island as a sizable area in which to resettle citizens from overcrowded parts of the nation, particularly Java and Sumatra. Indonesia has sought and won financing for its resettlement, or "transmigration" policy, as it is known, from such international donors as the World Bank. Serious issues such as land and water availability and respect for traditional land, tribal, and cultural rights bring into question the implications of transmigration, particularly as a number of informed observers believe it is at least an indirect cause of refugee flight.

In mid-October, Papua New Guinea forcibly repatriated 12 refugees to Indonesia to an uncertain—probably fearful—fate. The incident sparked rioting by remaining refugees that required tear gas to put down. The situation of those who remain is uncertain, and there is fear that additional refugees may suffer a similar fate.

The United States should encourage the new government of Papua New Guinea to follow the lead of the former government in seeking to internationalize the refugee issue. Specifically, greater UN involvement in protecting the refugees and direct assistance from such countries as Australia, the United States, and the Netherlands are needed. This help should include accepting a few refugees—those unable to return safely to Irian Jaya or unable to be accommodated in Papua New Guinea—for resettlement.

15,000 of these are registered Cambodian refugees who have been rejected for resettlement. Others entered the camp after February 1983, the date after which Thai authorities refused to allow the UNHCR to interview new arrivals for refugee processing. These 4,300 persons, called "food card holders," have little immediate chance of being interviewed for resettlement.

A third group is made up of approximately 7,000 Cambodians who had entered the camp without documentation after an August 1984 census, but were issued temporary ration cards in October 1985. They have been moved from Khao I Dang proper to Site 7, or Bang Phu, separated from Khao I Dang by barbed wire and a ditch. Site 7 was emptied once in 1985 when some 55,000 Cambodians were moved to Site 2, at the border. The 7,000 now there, formerly referred to as "illegal" or "undocumented," are now being referred to as "ration card holders." They are currently ineligible for refugee status and resettlement, though sources there say as many as one-third of them have some U.S. connection.

Some 4,000 people remain at Sikhiu camp, a closed detention center for Vietnamese boat refugees who enter Thailand.

Thailand faces still another refugee dilemma on its border with Burma, where at least 17,000 Karen civilians have fled into Thailand since 1984, escaping violence between guerrillas and Burmese forces.

Vietnam

More than 983,000 refugees have fled Vietnam in the decade since the communist takeover in 1975. Several factors in the past three years have contributed to a decline in the annual flow of Vietnamese refugees: a government tightening of security has prevented boats from leaving the country; pirates continue to attack the boats which do leave; and chances for resettlement in third countries are narrowing, as Western nations decrease the numbers they are willing to accept.

Since 1975, more than 575,000 Vietnamese have reached first asylum countries by boat. Pirate attacks on boat refugees in the waters of Thailand and Malaysia continue, and it is estimated that half of those attempting boat escapes are lost at sea. New UNHCR programs were undertaken in mid-1985 to encourage merchant ships to assist boat refugees in distress. The Orderly Departure Program, instituted in 1979 to allow legal departure from Vietnam, has perhaps to some extent contributed to the decline in the refugee flow. As of June 1985, nearly 88,000 persons—to date, mostly ethnic Chinese and Amerasian children fathered by American servicemen—had been resettled in third countries under the program since its beginning, and monthly departures had reached 1,500-2,000. However, the United States has argued that ODP has been used to resettle mostly cases of interest to Vietnam, whereas comparatively few cases of interest to the United States—Amerasian children, reeducation camp prisoners, and persons with close ties to this country—have been resettled.

[In January 1986, the Vietnamese government announced it was temporarily suspending screening of applicants for the program because of backlogs which it said were a result of slow processing by receiving nations.]

According to the Vietnamese government, more than 8,000 persons are held in reeducation camps; most of them have never tried to escape Vietnam, but were associated with U.S. interests or the former South Vietnamese government before 1975. Although the Hanoi government had indicated that it would release these inmates if the United States would accept them, it has refused to do so, despite continued U.S. attempts at negotiating their release.

Between 8,000 and 15,000 Amerasian children—sons and daughters of Vietnamese mothers and U.S. servicemen—remain in Vietnam, outcasts because of their U.S. ties. A few have been able to leave, accompanied by close relatives, through ODP. But, despite negotiations between the United States and Vietnam concerning their dilemma, it remains unresolved.

Almost 21,000 Cambodian refugees live in Vietnam, most of them in UNHCR-supported centers. Since 1980, 6,195 have been resettled in third countries.

EUROPE

Austria

Because Austria is a neutral country bordering the communist bloc, it has long served as a transit center for asylum seekers—especially Poles, Romanians, Czechs, and Hungarians—hoping to resettle in the West. By mid-1985, 2,300 persons had requested asylum that year. The government estimates that 90 percent of those who apply each year will resettle in third countries. The country is also a stopover for Soviet Jews, though their numbers have dwindled in recent years, a result of Soviet tightening of emigration.

Usually Poles are the largest group seeking asylum; however, mid-1985 restrictions on issuance of visas to Poles at the Austrian Embassy in Poland were expected to result in a decline. There was also a significant increase in the number of Czech applicants, causing Czechoslovakia to criticize the Austrian government for violating its neutrality by protecting opponents of communism.

Persons awaiting decisions by resettlement countries are housed in four refugee camps. The largest, Traiskirchen, provides shelter to 1,500. Unemployment levels have prompted Austria to limit significantly the number of work permits granted to the foreign-born in 1984. The financial burden of resettlement and high unemployment has also affected traditional hospitality to refugees. Historically, some ten percent of asylum applicants have remained in the country because they were not accepted by third countries for resettlement. Recent declines in acceptance rates have created growing concern in Austria that its burden will become larger. Austria does not return asylum seekers even if they are denied resettlement in third countries.

Austria has also accepted 1,900 Southeast Asian refugees. Most have been resettled through the Austrian Catholic Church, which sponsors refugee families accepted for resettlement.

France

France's history of refugee resettlement has been among Europe's most liberal and humanitarian; the government sets no refugee ceilings, and nearly fifty percent of all asylum applicants were granted refugee status in 1985. However, public pressure because of unemployment, threats of terrorism, and a rising crime rate has resulted in enactment of a new, tighter immigration law in 1984 and, in May 1985, new restrictions on granting asylum. Aliens entering France without visas will have one month after entry to request asylum and receive temporary residence cards. Those denied asylum must leave the country within a month.

The majority of France's refugees are from northwest Africa. It has also accepted more than 120,000 Indochinese since 1975. In the past year, France has received increased asylum requests by persons from Sri Lanka, Zaire, Ghana, Haiti, and Pakistan.

SOS Racisme, a rapidly growing organization formed by college students to combat xenophobia in France, had a positive impact in 1985, with well-attended rallies around the country to promote understanding between French citizens and African and Asian immigrants and refugees.

Italy

Italy restricts its refugee resettlement to Eastern Europeans, acting primarily as a temporary transit center for asylum seekers awaiting resettlement in other countries—primarily, the U.S., Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Despite announcements that the restrictions will be dropped, a framework for asylum seekers of other nationalities has not yet been developed. Concern about high numbers of undocumented migrants and foreign workers has affected Italian attitudes toward refugee resettlement as well; the government is considering proposals to deter future migrant flows.

The number of asylum seekers increased in 1985, as did the number of refugee cases allowed to transfer from first-asylum countries to await final resettlement elsewhere, particularly the United States. This has created a heavy backlog dependent on government and UNHCR assistance. Poles make up the largest group of refugees, followed by Iranians and Ethiopians. Persons awaiting third-country resettlement remain in camps administered by the government, and, because of Italy's high unemployment, have no right to work. The increase in numbers of people in temporary asylum has crowded the camps, and the overflow is being housed in hotels and pensions. Exacerbating the problem are the decreasing numbers being accepted by resettlement countries.

Switzerland

Switzerland continues to have the highest ratio of refugees to population in Europe—one for each 150 citizens. In September alone, 1,073 requests for asylum were received—a new record. There are about 30,000 refugees in Switzerland. Also, twenty thousand applicants await asylum processing now, and delays have been as long as six years, with applicants often living in crowded dormitories. Unemployment, housing shortages, and increased asylum requests on the part of non-Europeans—primarily Turks, Zairians, Chileans, and Sri Lankan Tamils—have resulted in a major 1984 revision of Swiss refugee law. Tightened was a 1980 law considered to be one of the most humane in Europe. New provisions deter economic migrants by denying asylum seekers the right to work; they also speed clogged asylum procedures by limiting the right to appeal denied requests. The government is now considering further restrictions in the law, including provisions to deny asylum during a "mass influx."

The presence of 2,000 Sri Lankan Tamils seeking Swiss asylum has created community tensions—Swiss have said refugees from the third world find it difficult to integrate into the culture. The government has said it will not deport Tamils denied asylum, however, until conditions in Sri Lanka become calmer.

In November, the Swiss reportedly expelled 52 Chilean asylum seekers and 59 Zairians. The Zairians were reportedly returned to Zaire in handcuffs under heavy guard.

Turkey

Turkey's accession to the 1951 UN refugee convention carries a geographical limitation recognizing as refugees only those who flee from Europe. Thus, the 4,000-5,000 Iranian asylum seekers reported in the country at the end of 1984 were regarded as being in transit, awaiting visas for third country resettlement, and were denied access to Turkey's one refugee camp. Late in 1985, Turkish sources estimated that up to a million Iranians have fled to Turkey.

In October 1984, several persons were allegedly returned to Iran against their will. Concern over possible refoulement—forced repatriation— has been raised both for Iranians entering Turkey directly as well as for Iranians denied asylum by third countries and deported to Turkey. In October 1985, the Turkish government reportedly informed the Dutch government that it regarded Iranians sent back to Turkey as transit passengers who would be returned to Iran. Turkish news sources have reported instances of Iranian refugees executed upon their repatriation to Iran.

Turkey has accepted 4,000-5,000 Afghan refugees for permanent resettlement since 1982. New admissions in 1985 were limited to family reunification cases. UNHCR registered 2,600 refugees during 1984, mostly Iranians and smaller numbers of eastern Europeans.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom is home to more than 135,000 resettled refugees and asylum seekers. It is also a major contributor to refugee assistance through the European Economic Community, as well as independently. As in other European nations, high unemployment and housing shortages have created tensions between citizens and newcomers, which have been a factor in recent violence against ethnic groups, particularly Asians.

The House of Commons and other domestic groups have brought pressure on the UK to accept more Vietnamese refugees from closed detention centers in Hong Kong, many of whom have been there more than five years. The government agreed in 1985 to accept at least 550 from the Hong Kong camps who have relatives in the UK, but who normally would not have been approved for resettlement.

An influx of Tamils seeking refugee status because of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka caused the UK to restrict visas for Tamils entering the country.

West Germany

As a result of tightened restrictions, asylum seekers in Germany are not allowed to work for two years after they enter the country; they must live in state-run camps, and are not permitted to study German or visit relatives outside the camps. The number of asylum seekers rose sharply in 1985 to 70,000—double the 1984 requests. Recently, some thirty percent of asylum applicants in West Germany have been granted refugee status. Those denied are not required to leave the country if repatriation presents a danger to them. The result is that many remain indefinitely in an undetermined status.

Refugees resettled from first-asylum countries are limited to only those seeking family reunification; further, the federal government can only accept the number of refugees whom German states agree to support, as most refugee aid is handled at the state rather than the federal level.

In 1985, the German government received more than 16,000 asylum requests from Sri Lankan Tamils—more than twice the previous year and double the number of any other nationality. In July 1985, East Germany began to prevent all undocumented Tamils from entering West Berlin, in accordance with an earlier agreement between East and West Germany. Only Tamils with visas issued prior to arrival in East Berlin will be permitted to enter, presumably en route to Western countries.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina

Of the thousands of Argentinians who fled the country during the 1970s—some estimate as many as 80,000—perhaps as many as 40,000 remained in exile late in 1984: 15,000 in Mexico; 13,000 in Spain; 3,000 in France; and several thousand in the United States and elsewhere. Since the end of 1984, the government of President Raul Alfonsin has taken steps to encourage exiles to return, though Argentina, burdened by a huge foreign debt and 700 percent inflation in 1984, has little money to contribute toward assistance for returnees. During 1984, UNHCR assisted 2,274 of the 5,000 exiles who returned. Also, in November 1984, UNHCR announced that because of the return to constitutional rule and other developments, Argentinians outside the country, with some exceptions, were no longer considered refugees.

In November 1984, Alfonsin signed a law eliminating a geographical restriction on its acceptance of the UN convention and protocol on refugees. The change allowed Argentina to grant refugee status to non-Europeans. An increase in the number of refugees needing UNHCR assistance during 1984 was due mainly to the arrival of more Chileans. Eighty percent of some 2,300 Latin American refugees aided by UNHCR in Argentina during 1984 were Chileans fleeing increased social unrest in their country. In 1985, 100 Chileans per month entered Argentina.

During 1985, as the 1,800 Indochinese refugees resettled in Argentina since 1979 continued progress toward integration, UNHCR began phasing out its program of self-help housing, employment training, cultural orientation, and language education for them. Some 700 elderly Europeans and smaller numbers from other countries received UNHCR assistance. Altogether, an estimated 11,500 refugees are in Argentina.

Belize

Faced with rising numbers of refugees from Guatemala and El Salvador and growing public concern that refugees would change the country's ethnic makeup and bring with them disease and crime, the government announced a new policy on April 25, 1984, designed to control all immigration. The policy required all aliens to register with the government during a 90-day amnesty, then apply for one of three categories of alien status. The government assumes that those declaring themselves refugees will return eventually to their countries. This policy has been difficult to enforce because many refugees, especially Guatemalans, have refused to register and are difficult to locate since they are dispersed in the countryside.

The exact number of refugees in Belize is not known. It is estimated that of the 48,000 foreigners from neighboring countries in Belize, 9,000 may be refugees, mostly from Guatemala and El Salvador. As of mid-1985, UNHCR was assisting 1,750 Salvadorans and 1,250 Guatemalans with supplementary food, shelter, and language training. Despite UNHCR assistance, providing health and education services to a rapidly growing immigrant and refugee population continues to be a burden on the fragile Belize economy.

Chile

Public demonstrations against the military junta from the fall of 1983 to the summer of 1984, and the resulting declaration of a "state of siege" by the Chilean government on November 6, 1984, led to more than 20,000 arrests, 500 cases of internal exile, 800 persons injured, and 550 killed. Violence associated with the state of siege forced hundreds to flee the country, although the exact number is unknown. In July 1985, a church-sponsored refugee assistance agency in Argentina, the "Comite Ecumenia de Accion Social," reported being "overwhelmed" with new Chilean refugees requesting resettlement in Argentina. No Chileans were expelled in 1983, but there were eight expulsions in 1984. In addition, ICM assisted with the voluntary departures of 225 Chileans during the first quarter of 1984.

Also uncertain is the number of people who have repatriated to Chile. In September 1984, the government attempted to resolve the question of who was officially exiled by publishing a list of 4,900 who would not be allowed to return. Of an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 people who had left Chile for political reasons since 1973, 750 repatriated with UNHCR assistance during 1984 and the first quarter of 1985.

About 2,500 refugees, mainly elderly Europeans, live in Chile.

Costa Rica

Civil wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador were the main contributors to Costa Rica's burgeoning refugee population during 1985. There are about 19,000 refugees in Costa Rica: 11,000 from Nicaragua; 6,000 from El Salvador; 200 from Guatemala; and 1,600 others, mostly from the Caribbean and South America. Of these, 16,000 were receiving UNHCR assistance in mid-1985.

The government's view of refugees is complicated by the presence of 250,000 Nicaraguans the government says are living in Costa Rica, all but 20,000 of them illegally. "Illegals," who may constitute as much as eight to ten percent of the population, have increasingly strained the economy. With more than nine percent unemployment and one of the highest per capita foreign indebtedness rates in the world, Costa Rica's traditional acceptance of refugees has begun to be overshadowed by anxiety about their numbers.

Tension continues along the northern border, due largely to the presence of 20,000 to 30,000 Miskito Indians from Nicaragua, some of whom maintain their struggle with Nicaragua's Sandinista forces from their base camps in Costa Rica. With no regular army of its own, the fighting between Nicaraguan contra and Sandinista forces contributes to Costa Rica's concern about security. During 1984, ICM assisted with the move of 2,700 refugees from the border to camps inside Costa Rica. September meetings between Miskito and Nicaraguan leaders failed to resolve their conflict.

Dominican Republic

Of the 6,000 Haitians in the Dominican Republic recognized as refugees

Honduras: A Closer Look

By the end of 1985, the refugee population of Honduras was at least 60,000, most of them Nicaraguans and Salvadorans. Although not a party to the UN convention or protocol relating to the status of refugees and despite longstanding security concerns, Honduras has provided asylum, with assistance funded by the international community, to large numbers of refugees for several years. There has, though, been a marked difference between Honduran policies toward Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees. Nicaraguan refugees have, for the most part, enjoyed considerable freedom of movement within the country. Salvadorans have been restricted to camps under UNHCR auspices and guarded by Honduran military forces. This reflects historical Honduran animosity toward Salvadorans, as well as the different political sympathies of the two groups of refugees. Most Salvadoran refugees are sympathetic to the forces fighting against the U.S.-backed government of El Salvador. Most Nicaraguan refugees support the U.S.-backed contras or, at least, are opposed to Nicaragua's Sandinista government.

But during 1985, the security of all refugees in Honduras, including Nicaraguans, suffered. The sheer increase in the number of refugees in Honduras, a poor country with an unemployment rate over 25 percent, has perhaps contributed to the deterioration even in the hospitality extended to Nicaraguan refugees. Forced repatriations of Salvadoran and Nicaraguan refugees were reported in 1984 and 1985.

• • •

Of an estimated 30,000 Salvadoran refugees, about 20,000 are in two main camps near the Salvadoran border. During 1984, in addition to some forced repatriations, there were several security incidents, including killings of refugees, near the camps. A Honduran government decision to move the camp populations to Olanchito in northern Honduras, far from the border, was supported by UNHCR, which said it was consistent with the principle of locating refugee camps safely away from borders where there is conflict. The refugees and voluntary agency staff vehemently opposed the move. They pointed to the progress the refugees had made in establishing their lives in the camps and feared that the long move would make it more difficult for those fleeing continued civil war in El Salvador to gain protected asylum in Honduras. The plan was abandoned in September 1984, but Honduras asked UNHCR to begin negotiations with El Salvador to achieve a program of voluntary repatriation. While more than 2,000 Salvadorans requested voluntary repatriations and more than 2,000 others returned spontaneously during 1984, additional refugees have continued to arrive in western Honduras.

Tensions between the Honduran authorities and the Salvadorans continue largely because of the Hondurans' belief, shared by the U.S. embassy, that the refugee camps, especially Colomoncagua, provide support for Salvadoran guerrillas; Colomoncagua and its sister camp San Antonio are only several kilometers from the violence just over the border. Colomoncagua houses some 10,000 refugees, most of them women and children. In an August 1985 incident, Honduran soldiers entered Colomoncagua, according to the government's explanation, seeking Salvadoran guerrillas. In the violence that followed, two refugees were killed, one a two-month-old girl reportedly kicked to death, and thirteen were wounded. The United States supported the Honduran army account of the incident, that the troops defended themselves against camp residents who attacked the soldiers after the arrest of a Salvadoran. Private voluntary agency officials in the camp disputed this version of the account, and UNHCR officials denied they had been notified in advance that troops would enter the camp. In September, Honduras announced plans to move the resiby UNHCR, only 500 have received "political refugee" status from the government. UNHCR assists some 600 Haitian refugees with small-scale business assistance, placement in trades, vocational education, Spanish-language training, health care, and primary education for children.

Several social factors make adjustment for the Haitians particularly difficult in the Dominican Republic. They are part of a larger Haitian population of some 500,000, many of whom are viewed by the public as economic usurpers and who are routinely deported. Second, they have to overcome deep-seated racial animosity. The future for Haitian refugees seems somewhat uncertain in light of events reported in October 1985. Haitian secret police were allegedly operating within the Dominican Republic, kidnapping and returning to Haiti opponents of Jean Claude Duvalier, Haiti's "president for life." According to another report, UNHCR suspended a $20.00 monthly stipend it was providing to 350 Haitians in Santo Domingo, causing 13 of them to seek refuge in Italian and Venezuelan diplomatic offices. Six had been recognized as political refugees by the Dominican government. The Dominican government does not sanction refoulement of refugees, but it expells to third countries refugees who publicly demonstrate against the Haitian government.

[In February 1986, Duvalier fled Haiti and a military/civilian junta assumed power. The effect of the change, after 28 years of Duvalier family rule, on expatriate Haitians was unclear.]

El Salvador

The civil war in El Salvador continued through 1985. Twenty percent of the country's population has been uprooted by the fighting, repression, and political violence. More than 245,000 Salvadorans are estimated to be in neighboring countries; as many as 500,000 live without documentation in the United States; and close to half a million are displaced within El Salvador. Flows out of El Salvador have slowed in recent years, possibly because some of the conflict areas are virtually depopulated. The United States says that the human rights and security situation within the country has improved since the election of President Napoleon Duarte in 1984. While the number of political killings has declined, there were still an average of nearly 50 per month during

dents from Colomoncagua to Mesa Grande, 50 kilometers away from the border, where some 9,000 Salvadorans had been moved in 1982. The refugees opposed this move, and there was general concern that, regardless of the merit of the move from the border, it could not be accomplished without violence. Plans for the move have not been implemented.

• • •

To the east, along Honduras's border with Nicaragua, the situation of two groups of Nicaraguan refugees has been very different from the Salvadorans'. There are approximately 22,000 Nicaraguan Indians, mostly Miskito and Sumo, in the sparsely populated region near Honduras's Caribbean coast. Beginning in 1983, UNHCR initiated a program to resettle the Miskito and Sumo refugees to new, more permanent settlements along three rivers away from the border. Despite health problems and the difficulty of access to the remote area, the program implemented by World Relief enabled the 17,000 refugees in the settlements to make great strides toward self-sufficiency, including a bumper rice crop, in 1984.

But by mid-1985, more than 5,000 of the Nicaraguan Indians there had moved back to the border area. Most observers attribute the move to an infusion into the border area of U.S. government and private "humanitarian" assistance to the contras. While this U.S. nonlethal assistance reportedly does not aid the contras' military efforts directly, it clearly supports their efforts by attracting refugees away from the successful UNHCR camps to the border area where the contras are based and by building bridges and other projects which observers say have questionable nonmilitary value. In addition, several new private U.S. agencies, not linked to traditional relief organizations, have been sending humanitarian assistance to the contras. Representatives of established relief organizations have called the notion of "humanitarian assistance" to support combatants a contradiction in terms. Throughout 1984 and 1985, there was evidence that Miskito contra groups were forcibly recruiting refugees for combat. By mid-November, over 500 Miskito had returned to Nicaragua in 1985 through a UNHCR voluntary repatriation program, and another 500 had requested repatriation.

The number of non-Indian, or Ladino, Nicaraguans in Honduras may be more than 60,000, an undetermined number of them refugees. More than 5,000 live in two villages and receive UNHCR assistance. The rest live on their own, some with official residence permits, some without. Many are peasants fleeing fighting in the Nicaraguan countryside; others are young men fleeing conscription into the Sandinista military. The freedom of movement previously accorded the Nicaraguan refugees was sharply curtailed during 1985. Refugees in the two UN camps are not allowed to leave without permits that are difficult to obtain. Honduran military officials regularly round up those in the camps without valid refugee registration. Among the reasons for the change in Honduran practice regarding Nicaraguan refugees may be concern about the role of the contras within the country—they have been blamed for a number of political killings of Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Nicaraguans—and fear that if the United States ends support of the contras, they will lose their war, and Honduras will face the prospect of bands of armed guerrillas remaining. The Honduran position is complicated because it has maintained an official policy of not openly allowing the contras to operate within its territory, while quietly cooperating with U.S. efforts to supply them.

There are also some 500 Guatemalan refugees in Honduras, most of them at El Tesoro, near the Guatemalan border. More than 100 were resettled in Bolivia during 1984.

the second half of 1984. Also, reported incidents of indiscriminate killings of civilians by the armed forces have increased. Troops have forced hundreds of civilians who support the rebels from their homes, burned their fields, and ordered them into camps for displaced people. Human rights organizations acknowledge Duarte's efforts to improve human rights, but note that he lacks the power to curb the army's abuses. Increasingly, too, the guerrilla forces of the opposition have resorted to such practices as political assassination and the killing of civilians.

Because of all these factors, the number of Salvadorans outside the country and in camps for internally displaced remains high. El Salvador welcomes the voluntary repatriation of Salvadoran refugees and has established a commission to focus particularly on the eventual resettlement of those still in Honduras, but so far, few have returned. Some of the 1,800 who voluntarily repatriated from Honduras in 1984 were thought to be avoiding an announced plan, later cancelled, to relocate them to new settlements much further from the border. Despite U.S. government statements that there is no evidence that Salvadorans deported from the United States to El Salvador have been persecuted, concern about their safety continues. The United States routinely deports Salvadorans who have entered the country illegally, arguing that most of them are part of a traditional flow of economic migrants, in spite of evidence that Salvadoran migration to the United States is related to political violence. The State Department's country reports on refugees for fiscal year 1985 note that "no Salvadoran is totally immune from political violence."

Guatemala

Combat between government and insurgent forces in the highlands of Chuchumatan in early 1981 caused 45,000 Guatemalan Indians to flee to Mexico's Chiapas state. The Guatemalan army raided the border camps during 1984, saying that rebels used them as bases; in a spring 1984 attack, six refugees were killed. The Mexican government and UNHCR announced plans in June 1984 to move the entire refugee population to camps far from the border; about half of the 45,000 were moved by mid-1985.

The government has offered amnesty to insurgents and has called for exiled Indians to return to government-built "model villages" in the highlands. In 1984 and the first half of 1985, nearly 1,000 Guatemalan Indians repatriated under UNHCR observation, but reports of persecution of some returnees and the harsh discipline imposed by the army on the villages continue to limit the number returning. Returnees in the villages have complained of over-crowding and of the army preventing them from leaving. The government's plans call for 74 such villages, which will include military personnel and equipment, to be built on the sites of some of the 440 villages destroyed in fighting between government troops and insurgents since 1981.

Military and police violence has caused the deaths of 100,000, the disappearance of 38,000, and the displacement of 400,000 Guatemalans since the military coup of 1954. By late 1985, estimates of the number of Guatemalans displaced within the country were around 250,000.

The Guatemalan government estimates there are 70,000 refugees, mostly from El Salvador, in the country. Small numbers of Nicaraguans who fled to Guatemala after the overthrow of the Somoza government in 1979 have been granted asylum.

[On January 14, 1986, Mario Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo was sworn in as president, the first elected nonmilitary official to rule the country in 15 years. He has stated that his government will end the military and police violence that has prevailed in Guatemala.]

Mexico

There are an estimated 175,000 refugees in Mexico. At least 120,000 are Salvadorans dispersed throughout the country, some making their way to the United States or other locations. With the exception of 100 political asylees, the government does not consider the Salvadorans refugees.

Following the spring 1984 killing of six Guatemalan refugees in an attack by Guatemalan forces on a Chiapas border camp, the Mexican government called for UNHCR cooperation in developing a plan to move the 45,000 Guatemalan refugees. The plan called for them to be relocated to four sites 600 miles from the border, two in Campeche and two in Quintana Roo states. The plan has met with numerous obstacles and considerable criticism. By mid-1985, some 18,000 had been relocated. However, many refugees have refused to leave the border camps. Critics allege that Mexican security forces removed some forcibly and that the sites, particulary in Campeche, were ill-prepared, lacking adequate housing, food, and seed for farming. Some refugees who were relocated wrote back to their families at the border telling them not to move. At least 20,000 remain there, and the Mexican government has apparently stopped pressuring them to move.

Meanwhile, Guatemala continues to make overtures to the refugees to convince them to return. While the Guatemalan government reported that as many as 8,000 had returned from Mexico by late 1984, UNHCR said only some 1,000 had voluntarily repatriated in 1984 and early 1985. Of an estimated 10,000 refugees from countries other than Guatemala and El Salvador, approximately 1,800, mostly Argentinians, Chileans, and Uruguayans, repatriated voluntarily in 1984 and the first quarter of 1985.

Nicaragua

In recent years, Nicaragua has generated and received flows of refugees. Sandinista government policies and fighting between Sandinista and opposition, or contra, forces have caused up to 90,000 Nicaraguans to flee to Honduras and Costa Rica. An estimated 170,000 more are displaced within Nicaragua. Approximately 30,000 of an estimated Nicaraguan Indian population of 90,000, mostly of the Miskito and Sumo tribes, have left Nicaragua since a government program in 1982 and 1983 moved 10,000 Indians away from their homeland on the Caribbean coast to settlements further inland. In 1984, more than 3,000 Indians entered Honduras. But the Sandinista government has admitted its policies toward the Indians were wrong and has improved its treat-

These Guatemalan children study Spanish at a refugee camp school in Mexico.
P. Jarbor/UNHCR

ment of them. There have been no further relocations since 1984; the government has begun to allow Indians to move back to their homelands and has announced plans to allow partial autonomy for the Indian regions. Miskito contra leaders are skeptical of the government's intentions. In 1985, as of mid-November, more than 500 Indians voluntarily repatriated from Honduras under UNHCR auspices, and another 500 had requested repatriation.

In 1984, Spanish-speaking, or Ladino, Nicaraguans began to flee intensified fighting. Disillusionment with the Sandinista government, a new military conscription begun at the end of 1983, an economy crippled, in part, by U.S. efforts to isolate Nicaragua, and a program begun in early 1985 to move as many as 100,000 peasants away from the northern highlands near the Honduran border, where much of the fighting is, have contributed to increasing Ladino departures. Up to 50,000 young Nicaraguan men may have fled the military draft since it began. Early in 1985, the government began moving peasants from the northern mountains in order to remove them from the war zone, give them better agricultural opportunities and services, and empty the area for an offensive against the contras. Some of the estimated 60,000 Ladinos who have entered Honduras fled the relocation program. While the government's human rights record improved since 1981 and 1982, according to human rights groups, contra abductions, death threats, killings of civilians and prisoners, and forced recruiting have increased.

The 18,500 refugees in Nicaragua, most of them Salvadorans, have largely achieved self-sufficiency and been integrated into Nicaraguan society. Many of them are on agricultural cooperatives, with populations of Nicaraguan citizens and refugees, land provided by the government, and financial assistance provided by UNHCR. Most of the refugees arrived in 1981 and early 1982, and very few continue to require UNHCR assistance. Nicaragua does not forcibly repatriate refugees, works closely with UNHCR, and grants refugees the same access to work, public schools, and government services as Nicaraguan citizens have. There have been very few refugee arrivals in recent years.

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Iran

Refugees crossed both into and out of Iran in 1984 and 1985, while growing numbers of civilians were internally displaced by the war with Iraq. A December 1984 U.S. Committee for Refugees report, *Iranian Refugees: The Many Faces of Persecution*, describes the persecution of political, ethnic, and religious groups that has caused the flight of one to two million refugees from Iran.

According to the government of Iran, about 1.9 million Afghans have found refuge in Iran. Outside sources estimate the number of refugees to be 780,000. More than half of them live in Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchistan provinces on the border with Afghanistan. Iranian government policy establishes refugee camps at least 30 kilometers from the Afghan border. Although Iran officially permits Afghans to resettle anywhere in Iran, the government has recently begun to distribute them among the provinces that do not border Afghanistan. There have been strains between refugees and the local population as both compete for scarce jobs. Refugees alleged in the spring of 1984 that they had been denied food rations and medical services. Iran coped with the refugee influx without international assistance from late 1979 until UNHCR involvement started in 1983. The UNHCR office did not open until October 1984. Most UNHCR funds from 1983-5 were committed to six quarantine/reception centers. Ten centers are now operating; there are plans for ten more.

On Iran's western border, the war with Iraq has created both refugee flows and displacement of civilians. Iraq has deported to Iran at least 100,000 Iranians and Iraqis of Iranian descent—Iranian government sources claim 500,000. Reports indicate that many Iraqi citizens, because of their suspect Iranian ancestry, have been stripped of their citizenship and possessions and sent on foot through the Zagros Mountains to the Iranian border. Because of Iran's unwillingness to accept the deportees for permanent resettlement, Iraq has turned to internment of some of those suspected of pro-Iranian sympathies. In March 1985, an Iranian foreign ministry official listed among Iran's demands for ending the war the repatriation to Iraq of 200,000 Iraqi "refugees."

At the same time, the Iranian news agency frequently reported new groups of Iraqi citizens crossing the border to seek asylum. The Iranian Red Crescent Society reported 274 Iraqi asylum seekers for the last two months of 1984.

The Iran-Iraq war has increased tension associated with the Kurdish minority's striving for greater autonomy in Kurdish areas of Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. About 30,000 Kurdish refugees from Iraq have remained in Iran since the unsuccessful uprising of 1974. On June 9 and July 1, 1985, Iraq conducted air strikes on the Kurdish refugee camp at Ziveh, near the Iraqi border, resulting in 162 casualties.

The intensification of Iraqi bombing of Iranian civilian population centers in 1985 caused increased homelessness and dislocation. Treatment of the 1.2 million persons the government estimates are displaced has been the subject of heated debate in the Majles, the Iranian parliament. Members have alleged that more than $20 million approved for services to displaced people were not spent and that conditions included rampant disease and malnutrition, evictions, inadequate temporary shelters, and unemployment.

Of the 263,600 Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA in Lebanon, 52 percent live in 13 refugee camps. Israel's invasion in 1982 and factional and sectarian violence within Lebanon since then have caused widespread destruction in the camps and displaced many of the refugees.
UNRWA/G. Nehmeh

Iraq

Most refugee movement to and from Iraq occurred across the border with Iran and was complicated and exacerbated by the continuing war with that country. An estimated 25,000 Iranian Kurds are detained by Iraq in a camp west of Baghdad; they have fled as the Iranian regime continues to battle Kurds seeking greater autonomy in its northwest province of Kurdistan. Clashes involving Kurds also occurred on the Iraq-Turkey border. In October 1984, Turkish troops crossed the border into Iraq, with the approval of the Iraqi government, in a large-scale military operation along a 75-mile front. A Kurdish resistance group reported in June 1985 that Iraqi forces had leveled 40 Kurdish villages in the country since January and that fighting between Iraqi and Kurdish forces was continuing. In effect, Kurds have no borders to cross to seek safety as the three countries in the area are all in conflict with their Kurdish minorities.

Hundreds of other Iranians have reportedly crossed the border seeking political asylum. Iraq's daily military communiques have regularly noted new influxes of Iranian refugees. These included deserters from the Iranian army, draft evaders, and other civilians.

A lack of information surrounds the estimated 30,000 ethnic Arab Iranians from Khuzistan province, many of whom have been in Iraq since the outbreak of the war in 1980. The U.S. State Department has said that they have largely been settled, but 235 civilians were reportedly among the 424 prisoners of war returned to Iran in late 1984.

Israel

Israel marked a new chapter in its history as a haven for persecuted Jews through a dramatic, secret airlift of 7,800 Ethiopian Jews late in 1984 and an additional 2,000 in 1985. The Ethiopian Jews joined about 6,000 others who had immigrated earlier. An estimated 8,000 Jews remain in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Jews not only have been victims of the drought that has afflicted much of Ethiopia, but have also been subject to religious persecution, arrests, torture, and disappearances, according to refugee accounts.

Resettlement of the Ethiopian Jews was marked by controversy. Some Ethiopians from previous influxes had been resettled in the occupied West Bank. A cabinet member announced that resettlement of the newly arrived Ethiopians would also be concentrated in the occupied territories. Following January 1985 inquiries by the United States, which contributes $15 million annually for refugee resettlement in Israel, the announcement was denied. However, in December, nine Ethiopian refugee families were reportedly moved to the West Bank as the first phase in a government plan to settle 65 Ethiopian immigrant families there. Another controversy arose when the orthodox chief rabbis of Israel demanded that the Ethiopians submit to ritual immersion to reaffirm their Judaism. The Ethiopian Jews, who trace their lineage to one of the ancient tribes of Israel, have protested the chief rabbis' stand.

Under the 1950 Law of Return, which abolishes all restrictions on Jewish immigration, and the 1952 Citizenship Law, which grants every Jew the right to citizenship upon arrival in Israel, Jews who find refuge in Israel are no longer considered as refugees. Immigration statistics do not, therefore, identify refugees *per se*, although certain inferences can be drawn from immigrants' countries of origin. Aside from the increase in Ethiopian immigrants, emigration from all other countries to Israel fell in 1984. The number of Soviet Jews immigrating to Israel was 348 in 1985, down from 390 in 1983. The Soviet Union permitted less than 900 Jews to emigrate in 1984 and 1,140 in 1985. This continues the sharp decline in Soviet exit permits granted since the height of Jewish emigration from the USSR in 1979; 51,320 exit visas were issued that year, though not all who emigrated went to Israel.

UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948, calls upon Israel to permit Arab refugees who left their homes in the 1947-1948 fighting to return, if they are willing to live in peace. In November 1985, hundreds of Israeli Arabs living in the Galilee held a demonstration calling upon the government to allow them to return to their villages, Bar'am and Iqrit, in the Galilee Heights, also part of Israel, from which they were expelled 36 years ago.

Occupied Territories

The number of Palestinian refugees in the West Bank registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) total 357,700, of whom about 25 percent live in 20 refugee camps. A 1984 Israeli census listed a total West Bank population of 766,000.

Tensions were particularly high between Israeli settlers and West Bank Palestinians during 1985. Both Jews and Arabs were arrested for terrorist acts. In December, the Israeli supreme court called upon the military government to show cause why it had not prevented Israeli settlers from harassing Dheisheh refugee camp residents and why it had imposed collective punishments, such as arbitrary curfews and the sealing off of access roads to the camp.

The first deportation order in five years against a resident of the occupied territories was issued in August 1985 against Khalil Abu Ziyad, accused of being a senior leader of Fatah, a pro-Arafat guerrilla faction of the PLO. Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin said deportation would be instituted "against those who instigate terror and who encourage terrorist actions through their words and deeds, although they do not necessarily take part in these activities." After the Israeli supreme court suspended the deportation order, Abu Ziyad agreed to leave for three years and was released from detention and given 48 hours to leave the country. On August 29, the day after his departure, military authorities issued an expulsion decree for three more Palestinians charged with subversive political activity; additional deportations were ordered during the rest of the year.

There are 427,900 UNRWA-registered refugees in the occupied Gaza Strip out of a total Gaza Strip population of 509,000. About 55 percent of the refugees live in eight crowded camps.

Although Israel and Egypt agreed in June 1985 to transfer 4,000 to 5,000 refugees from the "Canada" refugee camp in Egyptian territory back to the Gaza Strip, the move had not been carried out by the end of the year. Many refugee families remain separated as a result of the border reestablished by the Camp David agreement.

Jordan

Of the estimated one million Palestinians residing in Jordan—about 60 percent of Jordan's total population—759,700 are registered as refugees with UNRWA. One quarter of the registered Palestinians live in 10 refugee camps. There are no restrictions on moving out of the camps, and Jordan has offered full citizenship to Palestinian refugees, who are encouraged to participate fully in Jordanian economic and political life. Jordanian citizenship is also offered to Arabs in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Kuwait

As many as 15,000 expatriates were summarily deported in 1985 as part of a security crackdown following a series of terrorist bombings. Many deportees were Shi'ite Muslims from Iran, Lebanon, and Iraq, raising the possibility that significant numbers of these people could have well-founded fears of persecution upon return to their home countries. In April 1984, an undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior reportedly cited "political beliefs" among the reasons for deportation.

Kuwait is not a party to the UN convention or protocol on refugees and chooses not to recognize the existence of refugees among its foreign workers. Among the 400,000 Palestinians, 50,000 Armenians, 90,000 Iranians, 4,000 Afghans, and smaller contingents of Iraqis, Pakistanis, Lebanese, and Sri Lankans in Kuwait, there are probably many whose circumstances would qualify them as refugees. There are also 35,000 stateless persons in Kuwait. Expatriates comprise 59 percent of Kuwait's population, but are denied a voice in the country's affairs. Despite working and residing in Kuwait for decades, foreign workers are subject to deportation upon retirement or loss of employment. Naturalization is rare, even in the case of Kuwaiti-born children of expatriates.

Lebanon

In Lebanon, internecine violence continues to put refugees in jeopardy and displace Lebanese nationals.

An estimated 300,000 Palestinians live in Lebanon. UNRWA has registered 263,600, 52 percent of whom live in 13 refugee camps. During 1984 and 1985, Palestinian camps suffered violence from both within and without. In the prolonged "camps war," the predominantly Shi'ite Amal organization sought to prevent a return to the Palestinian "state within a state" that existed prior to the June 1982 Israeli invasion. By military force, Amal attempted to remove the presence of armed Palestinians in the refugee camps of Beirut and southern Lebanon. Palestinians maintained that only by possessing weapons could protection for refugees in the camps be provided.

The Beirut fighting reached its height during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, mid-May to mid-June 1985, reportedly leaving 638 Palestinians dead and more than 2,000 injured. A blockade of food and medicine was in effect during the month, and water tanks were blown up. Reports from Palestinians fleeing Burj el Barajenah camp indicated that refugees stayed in poorly ventilated air raid shelters with inadequate water and sanitation. Some children allegedly died from diseases due to the unsanitary conditions and lack of health care. Refugees also reported summary executions by Amal of wounded and disarmed fighters. Civilian targets, including a hospital and a mosque, were reportedly bombed. The Sabra camp was 30 percent destroyed. By August, roughly half of the camp population was estimated to have returned.

Despite a June 19 ceasefire, fighting continued throughout the summer and escalated again in September. The PLO alleges that hundreds of Palestinians sympathetic to Yasir Arafat were arrested during this period by Amal forces and turned over to Syrian agents. Syria has denied the allegation.

Clashes between Amal and the Palestinians were also reported in the Wavell refugee camp in the Beka'a valley and in the south, particularly in the Mieh Mieh and Ein El Hilweh camps near Sidon and the El Buss camp outside Tyre.

Violent incidents in and around the refugee camps in the Sidon area preceded the "camps war." Following the withdrawal of Israeli troops early in 1985, fighting raged between Christian and Muslim militias and between pro- and anti-Arafat factions within the refugee ranks, with heavy casualties reported in the Palestinian refugee camps. Roughly 40,000 people from the Mieh Mieh and Ein el-Hilweh camps were left homeless. Damage at the Mieh Mieh camp was particularly extensive. UNRWA observed destruction or damage to nearly all housing and severe damage to the UNRWA school and clinic.

In July 1985, UNRWA reported that 45,000 refugees had fled the April shelling in and around Sidon. But three weeks later, with the escalation of fighting in Beirut, UNRWA reported that nearly 10,000 returned to Sidon. More than 12,000 remained displaced in the Beirut area, and thousands more fled to Tyre and as far north as Tripoli.

In the turmoil and factional fighting that followed the Israeli withdrawal from Sidon and southern Lebanon, significant numbers of Lebanese civilians were also displaced. The Christian population in the Al-Shuf, Sidon, and Jazzin areas was particularly hard hit. After the collapse of Christian militia support, Christian refugees reported that Druze, Muslim, and Palestinian fighters looted and burned their villages. The Christians reportedly abandoned 57 villages in the vicinity of Sidon in April. Most of the 10,000 displaced families fled to Jazzin, but many continued on to Marjayoun and points south in the Israeli-dominated "security zone" near the border with Israel. The International Committee of the Red Cross provided aid to 26,200 displaced persons in southern Lebanon in the first two weeks of May. Israeli officials reported that some Christian refugees from the south were repatriated by ship to Beirut. But some 8,000 displaced persons, Shi'ites as well as Christians, remained in the security zone.

Fighting for control of Tripoli in the north intensified in mid-September and resulted in severe dislocations of noncombatants. Among the estimated 250,000 or more of Tripoli's 700,000 residents who fled the city were Palestinian refugees who sought shelter at the Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi refugee camps. In two weeks of fighting, 275 persons were reportedly killed and 650 wounded, and rocket and tank assaults caused extensive damage to the city. Tripoli was without water or electricity, and uncontrolled fires reportedly burned large sections of the city. Following an October 3 ceasefire, residents began returning to the city.

Israeli military attacks throughout 1985 also resulted in displacements. As the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon approached, after 33 months of occupation, clashes with the Lebanese population intensified. Israel's "iron fist" policy resulted in hundreds of arrests, raids on villages—usually Shi'ite—and the blowing up of homes. On March 21, Israeli raids on three villages in the vicinity of Sidon caused many of the predominantly Shi'ite population to flee as far north as Beirut. Israeli forces also attacked Palestinian refugee camps. In the spring, gunboat, army, and air attacks on camps took lives and destroyed homes.

International agencies continued the effort to aid refugees and displaced persons despite tremendous obstacles and danger. Between July 1984 and June 1985, 25 UNRWA staff were detained by various forces in Lebanon. Seven were still unaccounted for in June. In October, UNRWA reported that 100 of its local staff had been reported missing during the prior three years and re-



International assistance for Afghan refugees in Pakistan is shifting toward establishing self-reliance, including food production. UNHCR/H. Gloaguen

mained unaccounted for. Despite these problems, UNRWA continued to provide education for 34,600 Palestinian refugee school children and emergency relief for displaced persons.

UNHCR provided relief to 2,900 other refugees from various nationalities residing in Lebanon.

Pakistan

Afghan refugees in Pakistan represent the world's largest concentration of a single refugee nationality. Many of the 2.7 million refugees have lived in exile since the 1979 Soviet invasion of their country. In 1985, 45,000 to 50,000 additional refugees fled to Pakistan. Although tensions between the refugees and their host country are evident, Pakistan has dealt with them in a manner consistent with internationally accepted standards of refugee protection and assistance.

The refugees, almost three-quarters of whom are women, children, and the elderly, are generally in poor health. A UNHCR-commissioned study found infant mortality among Afghan refugees to be among the highest in the world and the rate of birth-related deaths among mothers to be the world's highest. The high death rates are attributed to diseases that could be avoided with proper medical care.

In a January 1985 report, *Afghan Refugees: Five Years Later*, the U.S. Committee for Refugees called upon the international community, including the United States, to provide adequate aid to preclude conflict between the Afghan refugees and their Pakistani hosts.

Iranian refugees number about 25,000, though only 4,000 have registered with UNHCR. Most of them are Baluchi tribesmen, ethnically and culturally linked to their counterparts in Pakistan's Baluchistan. As many as 10,000 of the remainder are middle class, Westernized Iranians from urban areas, most of whom are members of the Baha'i faith or young men escaping military conscription.

A smaller, but indeterminate number of Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans, and Bengalis reside in Pakistan. Though many are likely refugees, they are mostly considered "illegal" by the Pakistani authorities, and some have been subject to repatriation. Bengalis, in particular, have reportedly been subject to employment abuse and exploitation.

Sri Lanka

Ethnic strife between the dominant Sinhalese and minority Tamil communities has caused major population displacements and flight from Sri Lanka.

A sharp escalation of violence in May 1985, following a massacre of 146 Sinhalese pilgrims by Tamil separatists at a Buddhist shrine, left at least a hundred people killed, hundreds of homes destroyed, and thousands homeless. Some 11,500 Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim displaced persons were sheltered in 16 camps in the northeastern Trincomalee region. Government troops ordered 20,000 Tamils to evacuate the northeast. Reprisal killings, in some cases carried out by Sinhalese army personnel, included attacks on some of the 8,000 Tamils residing in camps since widespread rioting in 1983.

In addition to the estimated 100,000 Tamils displaced in the northeastern region since the 1983 rioting, an estimated 50,000 Tamils remained in southern India's Tamil Nadu province as of March 1985. In February, Indian officials said 500 to 600 Tamil boat refugees a day were again landing on the Indian coast.

As many as 40,000 Tamils have entered Europe, and several thousand are believed to reside in the United States. In its June 1985 report, *Time for Decision: Sri Lankan Tamils in the West*, the U.S. Committee for Refugees called upon governments, particularly those in Europe and North America, not to deport Tamils to Sri Lanka and urged UNHCR to provide these governments with advice on the validity of Tamil asylum claims.

Syria

Syria continues to host about 244,600 UNRWA-registered Palestinians. Another 35,000 unregistered Palestinians live in Syria. Palestinians have rights similar to those of Syrian citizens and are eligible for social benefits, such as national health insurance.

By backing a dissident Palestinian faction, the Syrian government of Hafiz al-Assad has introduced an element of uncertainty into the lives of those Palestinians still loyal to Yasir Arafat. About 30 percent of the refugees, some 79,300, are registered in UNRWA camps. Yarmouk, one of three other camps established by the refugees themselves, is a Palestinian quarter of Damascus, with a population of about 60,000. In June 1985, when Amal forces were attacking Palestinian camps in Beirut, hundreds of Palestinians from Yarmouk were reportedly arrested by Syrian security and military intelligence forces. According to Arabic-language press reports from the region, 1,700 to 3,000 Palestinians were detained by Syria.

By mid-1984, approximately 33,600 Lebanese had also taken refuge in Syria. Displaced Lebanese and Palestinians not registered by UNRWA were assisted by UNHCR and other international agencies in cooperation with Syrian relief authorities.

Syrian minority groups, such as Armenians, Circassians, Assyrians, and Syriac Christians continue to emigrate from Syria. Jews, numbering about 4,000, are prohibited from emigrating. Jewish families are prohibited from traveling together abroad, and individual Jews must pay a bond before being issued passports.

NORTH AMERICA

Canada

In the first eleven months of 1985, Canada admitted 18,700 refugees. The largest numbers came from Southeast Asia, some 6,000 people; Eastern Europe, 4,400; and Latin America, 4,100. They were accepted under three classes of refugee designation. "Convention" refugees—those meeting the UN definition—may be admitted with government sponsorship under an annual ceiling or with private sponsorship outside the ceiling limitations. In the other two categories are members of "designated classes"—those in refugee-like situations, but who fail to meet the UN definition—and beneficiaries of special humanitarian measures.

Canada has made it known, through voluntary organizations and through the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, that applications for immigration to Canada will be considered from Salvadorans with Canadian relatives or those in danger of involuntary return to El Salvador. Such individuals must be "convention" refugees and meet Canada's criteria for selecting refugees from El Salvador. With the cooperation of voluntary groups, Canada was able to resettle 653 Salvadoran refugees from the United States in 1985.

The asylum process in Canada generally takes from two to three years. In recent years, 30 to 35 percent of all cases have been approved. There have been almost 8,000 asylum applicants annually since 1983. Approximately 1,100 received asylum in 1984. In 1985, the Canadian government issued a report which was expected to form the basis for a major modification of the country's laws on internal refugee determination—the equivalent of U.S. asylum. The report assessed causes of Canada's refugee-claim backlog, estimated at 20,000 cases, and proposed options for improving the efficiency and the protection mechanisms of Canada's refugee-determination system. Legislation to alter the system has been introduced in Parliament.

A torture treatment center in Toronto, the only facility of its kind in North America, works with immigrants and refugees from a dozen countries, including Central America, Southeast Asia, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan, to overcome the physical and psychological effects of torture.

United States

Though refugee admissions from abroad continued to decline slowly, the United States remained the world's leading country of refugee resettlement as well as the leading contributor to international refugee assistance. More than a million refugees have been resettled in the United States since 1975, nearly three-quarters of them from Southeast Asia. In fiscal year 1985, 68,045 refugees arrived in the United States; this fell slightly short of the government's refugee admission ceiling of 70,000. These numbers compare to a 1984 ceiling of 72,000 and actual admissions that year of 71,113. The refugee admission ceiling for 1986 is 67,000. There are growing pressures to lower future refugee admissions; they include legislation to reduce the federal deficit and calls from some in the Congress and the administration for a shift in Southeast Asian admissions from the refugee program to regular immigration channels. This occurs at a time when the numbers of Southeast Asian refugees fitting current eligibility criteria for U.S. resettlement are dwindling.

The 1985 refugee admission ceiling included provisions for the resettlement from Vietnam, through UNHCR's Orderly Departure Program, of Amerasian children, current and former reeducation camp prisoners, and their qualifying family members. Both initiatives fell short of their goals; some 4,000 Amerasians and family members left Vietnam during the year, but the Vietnamese government pulled back from the willingness they had expressed earlier to allow reeducation prisoners to resettle in the United States.

A December 1984 immigration agreement with Cuba provided for the return to Cuba of some 3,000 Cubans from the 1980 Mariel boatlift who had been determined by the U.S. government to be excludable aliens. The agreement also provided for the eventual release to the United States of about 3,000 Cuban political prisoners. However, after a U.S. government-sponsored radio service directed at Cuba began broadcasts in May 1985, the Cuban government suspended the agreement. The first 11 political prisoners had arrived in the United States only hours before the suspension. Two hundred of the Cubans in the United States, many of them held in Atlanta federal penitentiary, had been returned to Cuba despite concerns about both their fate there and unresolved legal issues in the United States. Because the U.S. resettlement program for Latin America and the Caribbean has been limited almost entirely to Cubans, only 138 refugees from the region were admitted to the United States during fiscal year 1985.

The tenth anniversary of the first resettlement of Vietnamese refugees in the United States, 1985 brought media attention to the progress of Southeast Asian refugees. Much of the coverage focused on the great strides they have made, particularly in educational achievement. But the year also was noteworthy for the growing number of reports of anti-Asian violence and harassment in many communities. Refugees were often the victims of these incidents. While some of them seemed due to animosity toward Asians in general, some resentment of perceived refugee services and benefits may have contributed to the problem.

Meanwhile, legislative concern about the public assistance utilization rates among refugees brought pressure on the resettlement program to achieve early employment for refugees. These concerns also may have contributed to pressure to lower refugee admissions and to shift the admission of Southeast Asians toward regular immigration. Comprehensive immigration reform bills, which have included measures to stem undocumented immigration through employer sanctions and to legalize the status of many undocumented aliens already in the United States, did not gain Congressional approval in 1985.

While the United States continued to maintain its leadership in international refugee assistance and resettlement from abroad, its practices toward asylum seekers have not reflected the same standards and may be undercutting international standards of refugee protection. These practices include the interdiction of Haitians at sea—since 1981, over 6,000 Haitians have been questioned and returned to Haiti after their boats were stopped at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard, but none has been brought to the United States to pursue asylum claims; long-term detention of asylum seekers; and the deportation of Salvadorans to El Salvador, failing to grant asylum even to those who meet reasonable tests of their fear of personal jeopardy if returned. Criticism of U.S. asylum determination procedures has focused on their susceptibility to foreign policy biases—statistics show generally higher rates of approval for applicants from communist countries and particularly low rates for Salvadorans and Guatemalans. But there is additional concern that U.S. asylum policy has increasingly emphasized control and enforcement over humanitarian principles incorporated into international and U.S. law.

Concern about the fate of undocumented Central Americans has resulted in the so-called Moakley-DeConcini bill in the U.S. Congress—legislation that would temporarily suspend detention and deportation of Salvadorans pending a government study of conditions in El Salvador. It has also prompted the sanctuary movement—churches and synagogues throughout the United States providing sanctuary and assistance to undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans. Those active in the sanctuary movement have stated that they are acting upon their religious beliefs and in accordance with international and U.S. refugee law, but the U.S. government has insisted that they are simply guilty of smuggling and harboring undocumented aliens. The government has prosecuted 11 clergy and church members involved in the sanctuary movement in Arizona on charges of smuggling and conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens. The trial, which continued into 1986, is seen as a challenge to the movement. The government's prosecution was based largely on the accounts of a paid informer who attended and secretly taped sanctuary meetings.

Another controversial U.S. policy area affecting refugees has been assistance to forces in various parts of the world fighting against governments the United States opposes. Aid to Afghan, Nicaraguan, Angolan, and Cambodian resistance forces—all situations involving significant numbers of refugees—has been sometimes overt, sometimes covert, sometimes military, sometimes "nonlethal and humanitarian." Aid to each of these groups has aroused concern, different in each situation, about its effect on the security of refugees.

Sources

Survey statistics and country reports rely largely on information from the following sources:

Africa Confidential. London.
Amnesty International Report 1985. London. 1985. Also, 1984 report.
Christian Science Monitor. Boston.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985. U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C. February 1986. Also, reports for 1984.
Daily Report. Foreign Broadcast Information Service. U.S. Government. Washington, DC.
"Estimated Number of Refugees of Concern to UNHCR as of December 30, 1984." UNHCR Internal Memorandum. Geneva.
Far Eastern Economic Review. Hong Kong.
Human Rights Internet Reporter. Washington, D.C.
New African. London.
New York Times. New York.
Refugees. UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Geneva.
Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East: 1 July 1984-30 June 1985. General Assembly, Fortieth Session, Supplement No. 13 (A/40/13). New York. 1985.
Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1984-1985 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programmes and Budget for 1986. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. New York. August 1985. Also, report on 1983-84.
UNHCR Fact Sheets. Geneva.
UNRWA 1985. New York. 1985.
Washington Post. Washington, D.C.
World Refugee Report. Bureau for Refugee Programs. U.S. Department of State. Washington, D.C. September 1985. Also, 1984 report.

Glossary

1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees

These two international legal instruments adopted within the framework of the United Nations, govern refugee status on the universal level. Both provide for cooperation between signatories and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on various matters, including the determination of refugee status. The *Convention* was adopted by a conference of plenipotentiaries of the UN in 1951 and entered into force in 1954. It was intended to respond to a need, perceived after World War II, to replace previous ad hoc agreements adopted in relation to specific refugee situations with a new international agreement which provided a general definition of who was to be considered a refugee.

That definition terms a refugee a person who,

> *[a]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.*

In addition to the basic definition covering who is, who is not, and who has ceased to be a refugee, the 1951 *Convention* contains provisions defining the legal status of refugees and their rights and duties in their country of refuge. These include rights to personal status; acquisition of property; and access to courts, employment, housing, education, public relief, and social security, largely in accordance with the rights of nationals or aliens generally in the country of refuge.

The 1951 dateline came about at the request of governments, which, at the time the *Convention* was adopted, wished to limit their obligations to refugee situations known to exist then or those which might arise subsequently from events (e.g. World War II) that had already occurred. Further, each contracting state was to declare, at the time it acceded to the *Convention*, any geographic limitations it would apply with regard to its obligations under the *Convention*.

States were also permitted at the time of accession to declare reservations to articles of the *Convention*. No reservations by signatories, however, would be permitted with regard to the general definition or articles pertaining to nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion or country of origin; freedom to practice religion; access to courts of law; protection from expulsion or return; facilitation of assimilation and naturalization; or numerous administrative articles.

Article 33, the prohibition of expulsion or return, often referred to as "nonrefoulement," states:

> *No contracting state shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.*
>
> *The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.*

In later years, and with the emergence of new refugee situations, it was felt necessary to make the provisions of the 1951 *Convention* applicable to more recent refugees. As a result, a *Protocol* was prepared; it was opened for accession and entered into force in 1967. The *Protocol* is an independent instrument, and states which did not ratify the *Convention* may be signatories to the *Protocol* (as, for example, the U.S.). Nevertheless, the *Protocol* binds signatories to the same substantive obligations as does the *Convention*, but without the 1951 dateline of the earlier instrument. Specifically, the *Protocol* defines a refugee as the *Convention* does with the omission of the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and . . ." and the words ". . . as a result of such events." The *Protocol* continues that its provisions are to be applied by signatories without any geographic limitation, except that limits of obligations declared by *Convention* signatories also apply under the *Protocol*.

The 1951 *Convention* and/or the 1967 *Protocol* have been acceded to by more than 90 states (see list below).

Refugee Act of 1980

This act, also known as Public Law 96-212, is the first comprehensive legislative attempt by the U.S. to set national policy and administrative procedures for assistance, including domestic assistance to refugees. The act's objectives are "to provide a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the U.S. and to provide comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted."

The act defines a refugee as

> *. . . any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion; or in such special circumstances as the President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section 207(e) of this Act) may specify, any person who is within the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or political opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.*

List of State Parties to the 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (FRG), Federal Rep., Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United R[illegible]public of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yeme[illegible] (Arab Republic), Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Signatories to the *Convention* Only: Madagascar, Monaco, Mozambique.

Signatories to the *Protocol* Only: Swaziland, United States.

Directory of Organizations

International Organizations

Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WCIX 8DJ, United Kingdom. Secretary General: Thomas Hammarberg. US Section: Executive Director: John G. Healey, 322 8th Ave., New York, NY 10001.

International human rights organization working for the release of prisoners of conscience, for fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners, and to abolish torture and the executions worldwide. Provides information for political asylum applications and opposes refoulement of persons who might reasonably be expected to be imprisoned as prisoners of conscience, tortured, or killed. Publishes annual report, newsletter, and country and special reports on worldwide human rights conditions.

Human Rights Internet, 1502 Ogden St., NW, Washington, DC 20010. (202) 543-9200. Executive Director: Laurie S. Wiseberg.

An international communications network and clearinghouse which serves the information needs of the human rights community: scholars, activists, and policymakers concerned with the promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights. Publishes *Human Rights Internet Reporter*, a comprehensive reference work on humanitarian activity worldwide.

Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), 17, route des Morillons, P.O. Box 100, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (Telephone: (022) 980-066) Director General: James Carlin. Representatives: New York—Richard Scott, 60 E. 42nd St., Suite 2122, New York, NY 10165. (212) 599-0440; California—James Gildea, 2173 Francisco Blvd., Suite D, San Rafael, CA 94901 (415) 459-8035; Washington-Gretchen S. Brainerd, 440 National Press Bldg., 529 14th St., NW, Washington, DC 20045. (202) 662-7099.

Established in 1951 to arrange resettlement processing and transportation for refugees and migrants. Conducts related programs for medical screening, language training, and cultural orientation. Plans and implements programs for the transfer of specialized human resources through migration to developing countries. Represented in forty countries worldwide.

International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), 37-39 rue de Vermont, Case postale 96, CH-1211 Geneva 20 CIC, Switzerland. Secretary General: Dr. Elizabeth Winkler. President: John McCarthy. In the U.S., 1319 F St. NW, Suite 820, Washington, DC 20004.

Links Catholic assistance agencies in both first asylum and refugee resettlement countries, providing logistical and sometimes financial support for their emigration processing activities. Since 1951, has administered a series of travel loan funds for refugees and migrants. Acts as Joint Voluntary Agency Representative in six countries. Administers the U.S. component of the Orderly Departure Program. Promotes local settlement activities through project assistance and training of refugee officers.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 17 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland. Delegations in 36 countries. In the U.S., 780 Third Avenue, 28th floor, New York, NY 10017. President: Alexandre Hay.

Founder of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, promotes international humanitarian law. A Swiss, independent, neutral, humanitarian organization with the internationally recognized role of intermediary between belligerants during armed conflicts. Provides legal protection and material assistance to military and civilian victims of those conflicts, including medical aid, relief supplies, a tracing and information agency for prisoners of war and missing persons, a service for transmission of family messages and visits to civilian internees and prisoners of war.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 13 Rue Gautier, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. (022) 316-602 (Cable: VOLAG (Geneva), Telex: 22891 icva ch). Executive Director: Anthony Kozlowski.

Founded in 1962 to provide a forum for voluntary agencies active in the fields of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. At present, has 78 members comprising international and national voluntary agencies.

International Disaster Institute, (Relief and Development Institute), 85 Marylebone High St., London WIM 3DE, U.K. (Telephone: (01) 935-0756, Telex: DISINST 21879) Administrative Director: Christine Hogg. Research Director: Frances D'Souza.

Researches all aspects of disaster relief and management, including refugee communities. Runs workshops, briefing and training courses for field staff, and acts as an information center. Also publishes reports; the quarterly newsletter, *IDI News*; and the quarterly journal, *Disasters*. Has set up a Food Emergencies Research Unit in association with the Nutrition Department of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

International Refugee Integration Resource Center (IRIRC), 5-7 av. de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland. (Telephone: (022) 310-261)

Computer-based documentation center that gathers, stores, and disseminates information on all aspects of refugee reception, resettlement, and integration. Computer files available for information retrieval through the center. Publisher of ***Refugee Abstracts*** and ***International Bibliography of Refugee Literature***. A project of the UNHCR.

League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 17 chemin des Crêts, P.O. Box 372, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (Telephone: (022) 345-580) Telex 22555 lrcs ch) Secretary-General: Hans Hoegh.

Coordinates international Red Cross relief actions on behalf of refugees and displaced persons and in other emergency situations.

Minority Rights Group, 29 Craven St., London WC2N 5NT, U.K. (01) 930-6659. Director: Ben Whitaker. New York Branch: Sue Roff, 35 Claremont Ave., Suite 4S, New York, NY 10027. (212) 864-7986.

International human rights information and education body. Publishes reports on minority groups worldwide. Free list of reports and activities available.

Overseas Education Fund International (OEF), Refugee Women in Development Project, 2101 L St. NW, Suite 916, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 466-3430. Project Director: Sima Wali.

Major goal is to bring program and policy attention to economic development and adjustment needs of refugee women. Encourages links among them and women in receiving countries, and supports any self-help efforts initiated by refugee women.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Palais de Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. High Commissioner: Jean-Pierre Hocke, Regional Office: UN Headquarters, Rm. C-301, UN Bldg., New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-7600. Regional Office: Director: Fiorella Cappelli. UNHCR, 1718 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 387-8546.

Established in 1951 to provide international protection to refugees who fall within the scope of its statutes and to seek permanent solutions for the problems of refugees. Also coordinates assistance programs for displaced persons in accordance with various subsequent General Assembly resolutions. Representation in some 90 countries.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 866 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 415-8000. Executive Director: James Grant.

Since 1946, has cooperated with developing countries in providing child assistance programs involving nutrition, primary health care, water and sanitation, and education. Provides humanitarian assistance to emergency victims of natural and man-made disasters.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Vienna International Centre, P.O. Box 700 A 1400 Vienna, Austria. Commissioner-General: Olof Rydbeck. Commissioner-General Designate: Giorgio Giacomelli. New York Liaison Office: John Miles, UN Bldg., Rm. 937, New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-4214.

Since 1950, has provided assistance to registered Palestinian refugees, now numbering more than two million, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Offers basic health and relief services to eligible refugees, and education to children up to the lower secondary level as well as vocational and teacher training at eight centers. Also provides emergency relief services to Palestine refugees displaced by war and violence, as it has been doing continuously since 1982 in Lebanon.

World Food Program (WFP), Via delle Terme di Caracalla, 00100 Rome, Italy. Executive Director: Mr. James C. Ingram. (Telephone: 06-57971)

The largest development assistance body in the United Nations system, WFP became operational in 1963 to provide food aid for long-term development and emergency relief. The governing body, the Committeee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes is comprised of 30 member states of the United Nations. The Program's Secretariat is located in Rome; professional field officers in 83 developing countries.

U.S. Government Offices

Department of Education, Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs, Transition Program for Refugee Children, Division of State and Local Programs, 400 Maryland Ave. SW, Rm. 421, Reporters Building, Washington, DC 2020[illegible]. (202) 872-1842. Senior Program Officer: Jonathan H. Chang.

Administers federal grants to states for educational services to refugee and entrant children in public and private (nonprofit) local schools.

Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, 330 C St. SW, Room 1229, Washington, DC 20201. (202) 245-0418. Director: Philip Hawkes.

Provides assistance to refugees after initial placements in U.S. communities with federal funding through existing federal programs which are administered by states.

Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 425 Eye St. NW, Washington, DC 20536. (202) 633-2000. Commissioner: Alan C. Nelson.

Administers immigration and naturalization laws relating to the admission, exclusion, deportation, and naturalization of aliens.

Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Room 5214, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-5822. Director: James N. Purcell, Jr.

Formulates policy for and directs U.S. refugee and migration programs; assists refugees abroad and during reception and placement in the U.S.

House Judiciary Committee, 2137 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. (202) 225-3951. Chairman: Peter W. Rodino, Jr. Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law Chairman: Romano L. Mazzoli.

Studies and makes recommendations on immigration and naturalization, citizenship, admission of refugees, treaties and international agreements, and other appropriate matters.

Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State, (S/R) Rm. 7526, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-3964.

Formulates policy and plans for U.S. refugee and migration programs; acts as clearinghouse for information on refugee affairs.

Senate Judiciary Committee, 224 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-5225. Chairman: Strom Thurmond; Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy Chairman: Alan K. Simpson.

Studies and makes recommendations on the problems of refugees; has jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization legislation.

U.S. Resettlement Agencies

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies that participate in programs to resettle refugees. Readers may contact such agencies for information on sponsorship.

American Council for Nationalities Service, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 532-5858. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein.

Since 1975, actively engaged in the resettlement of refugees and entrants from Indochina, Cuba, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and other African countries. The U.S. Committee for Refugees is an ACNS public information program (see separate entry). ACNS publications include *Interpreter Releases*, a comprehensive weekly immigration law newsletter, and *Refugee Reports*, a monthly newsletter covering all aspects of refugee resettlement.

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc., 1776 Broadway, Room 2105, New York, NY 10019. (212) 265-1919. President: Dr. Jan Papanek.

Organized in 1948 to help resettle Czechoslovak and Central and Eastern European refugees. Since 1975, AFCR has participated in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

Buddhist Council for Refugee Rescue and Resettlement, City of 10,000 Buddhas, Box 217, Talmage, CA 95481. (707) 468-9155. Executive Director: Heng Shun.

Composed of Buddhist organizations and Asian-American civic associations in the U.S. Resettles Indochinese refugees and operates an English language and acculturation training program for newly arrived refugees.

Church World Service/Immigration and Refugee Program, 475 Riverside Dr., New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2164. Director: Dale S. de Haan.

Relief and development arm of the National Council of Churches. Provides refugee and first-asylum services in the U.S. and responds to human need around the world. Works closely with regional ecumenical colleague agencies, including the World Council of Churches.

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Inc. (HIAS), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 674-6800. Executive Vice President: Karl D. Zukerman.

The refugee and migration agency of the organized American Jewish community. Assists Jewish refugees and migrants from Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. Also assists Indochinese, Ethiopian, Afghan, and other non-Jewish refugees through programs in cooperation with the U.S. government. Global network of offices and affiliated organizations in 47 countries on six continents. Provides for premigration planning, visa documentation, reception, transport, etc.

International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Executive Director: Robert P. DeVecchi.

Nonsectarian, nonpartisan voluntary agency providing relief and resettlement services for refugees and displaced victims of war.

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service/Lutheran Council in the U.S.A., 360 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. (800) 223-7656. Director: The Rev. Dr. Donald H. Larsen.

Provides a full range of services to refugees and their sponsors from pre-arrival through initial resettlement, with a nationwide network of local offices, congregations, and community groups. Also provides immigration counseling. Since World War II, has resettled refugees from Eastern Europe, Indochina, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Africa on behalf of Lutheran church bodies in the U.S.

Migration and Refugee Services (MRS), United States Catholic Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 659-6618. Executive Director: Rev. Nicholas DiMarzio.

Responsible for all immigrant, migrant, and refugee activities conducted by the Catholic Church in the U.S. Coordinates a national network of more than 180 diocesan refugee resettlement offices and 40 local immigration offices. Works with public and private sector agencies to resettle and help assimilate individuals and families in American society.

The Presiding Bishop's Fund For World Relief/Episcopal Church, 815 Second Ave., New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-9454 or 55. Executive Director: The Reverend Canon Samir J. Habiby, D.D.; Assistant Director for Migration Affairs: Marion M. Dawson (Mrs. Robert J.)

Official channel through which the Episcopal Church responds to human need around the world, providing funding for Episcopal, Anglican, and ecumenical projects in relief, rehabilitation, development, and refugee migration. Conducts a program for refugee resettlement in the U.S. through Episcopal dioceses.

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., 250 W. 57th St., Suite 1101, New York, NY 10107-0144. (212) 247-2922. Executive Director: Leon O. Marion.

Founded in 1939 to assist Russian refugees. Scope has broadened to assist other refugees. Has a cultural center and field and regional offices in the U.S., operational offices in Europe and Latin America, and correspondents in the Middle East.

World Relief/Refugee Services Division: National Association of Evangelicals, P.O. Box WRC, Nyack, NY 10960. (914) 268-4135, (800) 431-2808. Program Director for Domestic Ministries and Refugee Resettlement Division: Dennis Ripley.

Provides comprehensive refugee services through an international network of offices, including both regional and satellite offices in the U.S. Overseas, provides relief and development assistance in countries of first asylum. Domestically, assists sponsoring churches, community groups, families, and individuals from prearrival through initial resettlement of Indochinese, Afghan, African, and Eastern European refugees. Provides ongoing services to Cuban and Haitian entrants, other refugee communities, and ethnic churches. Coordinates other refugee-related services in some localities.

U.S. Aid & Information Organizations

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies and human rights and educational organizations that provide assistance to or information about refugees.

Afghan Community in America, 139-15 95th Ave., Jamaica, NY 11435 (212) 658-3737. Chairman: Habib Mayar.

Provides nonmilitary assistance to those made needy by the present war in Afghanistan. Solicits contributions and gifts of any kind.

Afghanistan Relief Committee, Inc., 345 Park Ave., Suite 4100, New York, NY 10154. (212) 355-2931. Executive Director: Jenik Radon.

Provides charitable, educational, humanitarian, and benevolent assistance to the people of Afghanistan wherever they are located, either directly or through organizations with similar purposes. Solicits funds and in-kind medical donations.

Africare, Inc., 1601 Connecticut Ave. NW, Room 600. Washington, DC 20009. (202) 462-3614. Executive Director: C. Payne Lucas.

Dedicated to improving the quality of life in rural Africa through the development of water resources, increased food production, the delivery of health services and refugee assistance. Currently operates more than 80 programs in Africa and several public education programs in the United States. Refugee programs currently in East, Southern, and Francophone Africa.

Aid for Afghan Refugees (AFAR), 450 Hudson St., Oakland, CA 94618. (415) 658-4675. Executive Director: Winkie Campbell-Notar.

Founded in 1980 by Afghans and Americans. Raises funds for humanitarian aid for refugees in Pakistan; promotes public awareness of Afghanistan and refugees' situation; supports refugee community projects locally.

Alien Rights Law Project, 1400 Eye St. NW, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 682-5900. Director: Carolyn Waller.

Begun in 1978 by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law, the project provides legal assistance to aliens, focusing on asylum and refugee issues as well as those cases where aliens suffer discrimination or are deprived of civil rights because of immigration status.

American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction); 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210. Washington, DC Office—2101 L St. NW, Suite 916, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 822-8429. President, Chief Executive Officer: Peter J. Davies. Director, Washington Office: Dr. Christine Burbach.

InterAction is a broadly based, participatory association of 108 U.S. private and voluntary organizations working in international development, relief and reconstruction, migration, refugee assistance and resettlement, public policy and federal relations, and education on Third World issues. Member agencies participate in any or all of six working committees: Development Assistance, Migration and Refugee Affairs, Resources, Public Policy, Development Education, and Private Funding.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. (215) 241-7000. Executive Secretary: Asia Bennett.

Quaker organization that provides food, shelter, and supplies, especially in response to needs created by war, disaster, and gross violations of human rights, where provision of relief may lead to constructive community development. Advocacy for refugees in the United States.

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., 60 E. 42nd St., New York, NY 10165. (212) 687-6200. Executive Vice President: Dr. Saul B. Cohen.

Established in 1914, serves as the overseas arm of the organized American Jewish community and provides for the rescue, relief, and rehabilitation of Jewish communities around the world. Current programs in more than 30 countries are largely funded by the campaigns of the United Jewish Appeal. Nonsectarian activities have benefited people in Thailand, Italy, Romania, Yugoslavia, Tunisia, Lebanon, Ethiopia, and elsewhere.

American Jewish Philanthropic Fund, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. President: Charles J. Tanenbaum.

Provides relief, resettlement, and retraining services to Jewish refugees in Europe and the U.S. through programs administered by the International Rescue Committee.

American National Red Cross, 17th & D Sts. NW, Washington, DC 20006. (202) 737-8300. President: Richard F. Schubert. International Social Services Unit: Mary-Lou McCutcheon (202) 639-3308.

Assists refugees in cooperation with National Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Assists refugees in locating missing family members through its international tracing service. Also provides guidance and assistance in reuniting refugee families.

American Refugee Committee, Headquarters: 2344 Nicollet Ave., Rm. 350, Minneapolis, MN 55404. (612) 872-7060. Chicago Office: 317 Howard St., Evanston, IL 60202. Executive Director: Ronald L. Way.

Internationally, provides medical volunteers for refugee camps in Thailand and Sudan, East Africa, to provide direct care, medical training, and nutritional feeding for Indochinese and Ethiopian refugees and other famine victims. In U.S., provides resettlement assistance nurse-training for refugees, utilizing returned medical volunteers as instructors; training in English; training of mental health personnel working with refugees.

CARE, 660 First Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-3110. Executive Director: Dr. Philip Johnston.

An international aid and self-help development organization. Responds to needs of refugees in emergency situations through various repatriation and camp feeding programs and implements longer-term development programs to improve refugee living conditions and facilitate self-sufficiency. Has ongoing programs in Sudan, Chad, Somalia, and Thailand. CARE's long-term Programming for Somalia and Sudan includes reforestation, water supply, and cookstove projects.

Catholic Relief Services-USCC (CRS), 1101 First Ave., New York, NY 10022. (212) 838-4700. Executive Director: Mr. Lawrence A. Pezzullo.

Overseas relief and development agency of the American Catholic community. Active in 70 countries with nutrition, community development, self-sufficiency, emergency relief, refugee aid and rehabilitation projects. Major refugee foci this year are drought-affected Africa, Central America, and Thailand. Works only overseas.

Center for Applied Linguistics, 1118 22nd St., NW, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 429-9292. President: G. Richard Tucker.

Offers refugee education guides, including a bibliography of teaching materials and dictionaries, through the ERIC system's Clearinghouse on Languages and Linguistics. Provides language and cultural orientation information and assistance for a fee. Under a cooperative agreement with the Department of State, CAL operates the Refugee Service Center, with offices in Manila and Washington, DC. The Manila office serves the testing, materials, and information needs of the State Department's intensive training programs in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Europe, and the Sudan. The Washington office acts as liaison between the overseas programs and U.S. service providers.

Cultural Survival, Inc., 11 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 495-2562. President: David Maybury-Lewis.

Provides research and analysis concerning the survival of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. Examines ethnic persecution as cause of refugee flows. Involved in maintaining the land and health care necessary for the survival of threatened groups.

Direct Relief International, P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93130. (805) 687-3694. Executive Director: Dennis Karzag.

Receives and donates contributions of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment to assist needy health facilities in medically less developed areas of the world, as well as refugees and other victims of natural disaster and civil strife. Recruits, screens, and arranges assignments for volunteer doctors, nurses, and related personnel in these medically underserved locations.

Emergency Relief Fund International, P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93130. (415) 864-3734. Executive Director: Woody Carter, Jr.

A Bay Area-based agency that relies on volunteer help and individual contributions to alleviate sickness and suffering around the world. Nonsectarian, nonpartisan, with emphasis on medical assistance and aid to children. Current projects in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East.

Eritrean Relief Committee, Inc., 475 Riverside Drive, Rm. 769, New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2727. Executive Director: Tesfa A. Seyoum.

Founded in 1976, aids Eritreans displaced as a result of war and natural disaster, with major focus on emergency and development project assistance through the Eritrean Relief Association, based in Sudan. Program of assistance includes funds and material aid for food, medicine, clothing, and the provision of education in food production and agriculture.

The Experiment in International Living (EIL). Projects and Grants Division, Kipling Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301. (802) 257-4628. Director: Donald Batchelder.

As a member of a consortium of Save the Children Federation and World Education, EIL offers English as a Second Language, Cultural Orientation, and Pre-Employment Training in Phanat Nikhom, Thailand, and Galang, Indonesia, to assist adult Indochinese refugees in becoming self-sufficient upon their arrival in the U.S. EIL also provides technical assistance in the form of management training and training of trainers for refugee services providers and government ministries in Sudan and Somalia.

Freedom House, 48 East 21 St., New York, NY 10010. (212) 730-7744. Executive Director: Leonard R. Sussman.

Publishes a survey of freedom; monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords; publishes writing from individuals in countries where there is oppression; and has information and analysis programs on the Caribbean Basin, Central America, Afghanistan, and other countries.

Grassroots International, P.O. Box 312, Cambridge, MA 02139. (617) 497-9180.

An independent, nonprofit social-change agency which works in partnership with organizations in North America, Europe, and the Third World to provide emergency relief and development assistance in crisis areas. Active in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East. Researching the Philippines and South Africa. Supports projects which emphasize self-reliance and empowerment. Produces informational and educational resources for domestic use. Strong focus on media advocacy.

Georgetown University Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance (CIPRA), P.O. Box 2298, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. (202) 625-3545. Director: Fr. Harold Bradley, S.J.

Objective is to influence the choices which will be made in developing a humane, reasonable, and enforcible immigration policy for the U.S. Sponsors lectures, seminars, public meetings on refugee admissions and policy; and educational programs offering internships in refugee assistance and medicine, dental care, and nursing, small business training and leadership development. Tutorial program offers community service to refugees in local school systems. Conducts ongoing research on international migration in the Americas.

Holt International Children's Services, Inc., 1195 City View, Box 2880, Eugene, OR 97402. (503) 687-2202. Executive Director: David H. Kim.

Provides assistance in tracing legal status and documentation for Amerasian and other homeless children for the purpose of reunifying them with birth parents or resettlement in the U.S. under adoption, foster care, or sponsorship, as appropriate. Holt currently helps children in Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, India, El Salvador, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, and Bolivia.

Indochina Resource Action Center (IRAC), 1118 22nd St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 223-8866. Executive Director: Le Xuan Khoa.

Assists Southeast Asians in the U.S. to make the transition from the status of refugees to a productive Asian-American minority. Major activities include public education and advocacy, leadership and citizenship development, capacity-building for Indochinese self-help organizations, and economic development.

International Christian Aid, A Division of Inter-Aid, 5189 Verdugo Way, Camarillo, CA 93010. (805) 987-8888. President: Joe Bass. Contact: Nello Panelli, Director of Communications.

A nonsectarian international relief and development organization motivated by Christian principles, which provides assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and particularly children who are victims of natural and man-made disasters. While providing aid such as food, clothing, and medical care in crisis areas, strives to meet long-term needs through self-help agricultural, educational, medical and job training programs in Third World countries.

International Social Service—American Branch, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858. Executive Director, Wells C. Klein. Associate Director, Sidney Talisman.

Established in 1924. Liaison between social agencies in U.S. and agencies abroad to resolve on a case-by-case basis problems which derive from international migration and the separation of families by national boundaries. Special emphasis on services and protection for children in migration, inter-country adoption planning, and family reunification, including refugee families. Member of an international structure with General Secretariat in Geneva. Since 1983, affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 36 W. 44th St., Room 914, New York, NY 10036. (212) 921-2160. Executive Director: Michael Posner. Deputy Director: Diane Orentlicher. Director, Political Asylum Project: Arthur Helton.

Public interest law center in the fields of international human rights and refugee law. Monitors the U.S. government's human rights policy toward countries that receive foreign aid. Works to ensure that persons seeking refuge in the U.S. receive the protections they are guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and international law. Legal representation for individual asylum applicants provided by volunteer attorneys.

Lutheran World Relief, 360 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: Norman E. Barth.

Serves as the overseas development and relief agency on behalf of most U.S. Lutherans to assist with long-term and emergency help for people, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Refugee assistance is often channeled through programs of Lutheran World Federation.

Mennonite Central Committee, 21 S. 12th St., Akron, PA 17501. (717) 859-1151. Executive Secretary: John A. Lapp.

Cooperative relief and service agency for Mennonites and Brethren in Christ in North America. Provides material aid and development assistance to refugees from man-made and natural disasters. Current work includes assistance to refugees in the Horn of Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, and Lebanon. Arranges resettlement for refugees in the U.S. and Canada.

National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum, 533 8th St. SE, Washington, DC 20003. (202) 544-0004. President: Rick Swartz.

Stimulates and coordinates policy-focused working relationships and information networks spanning the range of issues and interest groups involved in immigration, refugees, and related foreign policy. Comprised of more than 90 groups, the Forum adopts no position on policy questions.

Operation California, Inc., 7615½ Melrose Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90046. (213) 658-8876. Telex 295252 OPCAUR. Executive Director: Richard Walden.

A nonprofit organization founded in 1979. Objectives are to collect and transport high-priority emergency relief supplies to areas of need. Has been active in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Lebanon, and Poland.

Oxfam America, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA 02116. (617) 482-1211. Executive Director: John Hammock.

Funds small-scale agricultural and technical assistance projects in Asia, Africa, and Latin America designed to increase self-reliance and promote lasting economic and social development. Also develops educational programs for Americans.

Polish-American Immigration and Relief Committee, 119 East 15th St., New York, NY 10003. (212) 254-2240. Executive Vice President: Janusz Krzyzanowski.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1947 to help displaced persons and political refugees. Field offices in Europe. Activities include resettlement, adjustment of status, family reunification, and social services.

Rav Tov, Inc., International Jewish Rescue Organization, 500 Bedford Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11211. (718) 963-1911. Executive Director: Rabbi David Niederman.

Through its network of overseas offices, has provided premigration planning, visa documentation, care and maintenance, and medical assistance to thousands of refugees while in transit. In countries of resettlement, provides a full range of services including reception, transportation, housing, medical care, language training, employment counseling, and maintenance assistance.

Refugees International, 220 I Street, NE, Suite 240, Washington, DC 20002, (202) 547-3785. Executive Director: Susan Goodwillie.

Monitors refugee situations worldwide to ensure that refugees' basic needs for protection and care are met. Provides information to policymakers and the public through national membership organization. Advocates fair refugee policy in U.S. and abroad.

Refugee Materials Center, U.S. Department of Education, 324 E. 11th St., 9th Floor, Kansas City, MO 64106. (816) 374-2276.

Provides bibliographies of free educational and resettlement materials concerning refugees.

Refugee Policy Group (RPG), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 401, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 387-3015. Executive Director: Dennis Gallagher.

Serves as an independent center of policy analysis and research on domestic and international refugee issues. Houses a refugee resource library and provides auspices for policy analysts, researchers, and program developers to meet and conduct their work.

The Salvation Army Service Office (SAWSO), 1025 Vermont Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 833-5646. Executive Director: Dean B. Seiler.

As a development arm of The Salvation Army, provides technical and financial assistance in support of self-help, relief, and training programs. Assistance, including aid to disaster victims, refugees, and displaced persons, is available to the 84 countries and territories in which The Salvation Army operates, focusing on approximately 50 of those which are developing countries.

Save the Children Federation, Inc., 54 Wilton Rd., Westport, CT 06880. (203) 226-7272. President: David L. Guyer.

Provides humanitarian aid with an emphasis on making refugees self-sufficient and providing a base on which long-term development can take place. Social services, education, potable water supply, development, and sanitation are program components in Sudan, Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Ethiopia. Training in literacy, language, cultural orientation, pre-employment skills, and secondary and primary education for U.S.-bound refugees are program components in Thailand and Indonesia.

Spanish Refugee Aid, a division of the International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Director: Margaret Childers.

Founded in 1953 to aid refugees from the Spanish Civil War, 25,000 of whom remained in France. Provides financial and counseling assistance to the aged and sick.

Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH), American Council of Voluntary International Action (Interaction), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210.

Through its Migration and Refugee Affairs Committee, provides a forum for exchange of information and coordination among its member agencies engaged in U.S. refugee resettlement. Focuses on the needs of refugees and is concerned with protecting the rights of displaced persons and refugees everywhere. Maintains close links with international and government agencies concerned with refugee issues.

United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, Inc., 2558 W. 69th St., Chicago, IL 60629. (312) 776-7582. President: Mary P. Rudis.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1944 to help political refugees and displaced persons. Provides immigrant relief, resettlement, rehabilitation and social welfare services, educational aid, and assistance to the needy.

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 815 15th St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 667-0782. Executive Director: Wells Klein; Director: Roger P. Winter.

Public information and advocacy program of the American Council for Nationalities Service. Issues publications and provides information about refugees worldwide. Participates actively as refugee advocate in development of U.S. policy with respect to refugees in U.S. and abroad. Supports specialized UN agencies working to alleviate world refugee problems.

U.S. Committee for Somali Refugee Relief, Inc., 1900 L St. NW, Suite 707, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 833-9542. Director: Martin R. Ganzglass.

Formed in 1979, major goals are to raise money to provide medicine and related medical supplies to refugees in Somalia and publicize the plight of refugees there.

U.S. Committee for UNICEF, 331 E. 38th St., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-5522. President: James R. Sheffield.

Established in 1947, informs Americans about UNICEF's efforts to meet the needs of the developing world's children and raises funds for UNICEF through greeting card sales, group fund-raising events, direct contributions, and special events.

World Concern International, P.O. Box 33000, 19303 Fremont Ave. North, Seattle, WA 98133. (206) 546-7201. President: Charles V. Morton.

Provides emergency relief and long-term development assistance to refugees in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Provides financial grants, emergency supplies, medical teams, public health workers, and economic development assistance. Can respond quickly to developing situations.

World Vision Inc., 919 W. Huntington Dr., Monrovia, CA 91016. (213) 357-7979. President: Dr. Ted W. Engstrom.

Founded in 1950. A Christian humanitarian organization active in 85 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the South Pacific, and U.S. Involved chiefly in community development, emergency relief, child care, and Christian outreach programs.

YMCA Refugee Resettlement Services, 101 N. Wacker Dr., Chicago, Ill. 60606. (312) 977-0031. Director: Boris Kazimiroff.

Directs national YMCA services for refugees. Acts as liaison for local YMCAs. Cooperates with other national voluntary agencies and appropriate government agencies.

Bibliography

This selected bibliography was prepared for the *World Refugee Survey* by the Refugee Policy Group. Generally, only materials published after 1982 have been chosen, except for some basic works of considerable importance in the field.

General Works

Adelman, Howard. "Defining Refugees." *Refuge*, v.2, n.4, April 1983, p. 1.

Coles, G.J.L. "Problems Arising from the Large Numbers of Asylum-Seekers; a Study of Protection Issues." Background paper prepared for the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy, June 1981.

Goodwin-Gil, Guy. *The Refugee in International Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983.

Grahl-Madsen, Atle. *The Status of Refugees in International Law*. 2 vols. Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1966.

Holborn, Louise W. *Refugees: A Problem of Our Time*. 2 vols. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1975.

International Institute of Humanitarian Law. "The Movements of People." Background Paper to the Conference on Movements of People, Florence, June 14-18, 1983.

Loescher, Gilburt D. and Scanlan, John A., eds. *The Global Refugee Problem: U.S. and World Response. Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. v. 467. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1983.

Melander, Goran. *Refugees in Orbit*. Geneva: International University Exchange Fund, 1978.

Refugee Policy Group. "Refugee Issues: Current Status and Directions for the Future." Washington, D.C.: RPG, 1983.

Smyser, W.R. "Refugees: A Never-Ending Story." *Foreign Affairs*, v.64, n.1, fall 1985, p. 154.

Stein, Barry N. and Tomasi, Sylvano M., eds. *Refugees Today*. Issue of *International Migration Review*, v.15, spring-summer 1981.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Collection of International Instruments Concerning Refugees*. Geneva: UNHCR, 1979.

______. *Directory of Non-Governmental Organizations*. Geneva: UNHCR, 1982.

______. *Handbook for Social Services*. (Provisional Edition.) Geneva: UNHCR, 1984.

______. *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. Geneva: UNHCR, 1979.

United States Committee for Refugees. *World Refugee Survey*. Washington, D.C.: USCR, 1984.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs. *World Refugee Report*. Washington, D.C.: DOS, 1985.

Political Asylum and Refugee Admissions in Industrialized Nations

Aleinikoff, Alexander. "Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of France: Lessons for the United States." *Michigan Journal of Law Reform*, v.17, 1984, p. 183.

______ and Martin, David. *Immigration: Process and Policy.* St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1985.

American Civil Liberties Union of the National Capital Area, Political Asylum Project. *Salvadorans in the United States: The Case for Extended Voluntary Departure.* National Immigration and Alien Rights Project Report No.1, Washington, D.C.: ACLU, 1983.

American Friends Service Committee, Church World Service, Inter-Religious Task Force on El Salvador and Central America, and Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service. *Seeking Safe Haven: A Congregational Guide to Helping Central American Refugees in the United States.* New York, etc.: available from publishers, 1983.

Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission. *Background Paper on Future Immigration Levels: A Companion Document to the Annual Report to Parliament on Future Immigration Levels.* Canada: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985.

______. *Report to Parliament on the Review of Future Directions for Immigration Levels.* Canada: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985.

European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles. *Asylum in Europe: A Handbook for Agencies Assisting Refugees.* 3rd ed. Amsterdam: European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, 1983.

Fagen, Patricia Weiss. *Applying for Political Asylum in New York: Law, Policy, and Administrative Practice.* New York Research Program in Inter-American Affairs Occasional Paper No. 41. New York: New York University, 1984. Also available from Refugee Policy Group.

______. "Resource Paper on Political Asylum and Refugee Status in the United States." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1985.

______. "U.S. Refugee Admissions: Processing in Europe." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1985.

Forbes, Susan and Fagen, Patricia Weiss. "Unaccompanied Refugee Children: The Evolution of U.S. Policies, 1939–1984." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1984.

Gallagher, Dennis; Forbes, Susan; Fagen, Patricia Weiss. "Of Special Humanitarian Concern: U.S. Refugee Admissions Since Passage of the Refugee Act." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1985.

Helton, Arthur C. *Manual on Representing Asylum Applicants.* New York: Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, 1984.

Kritz, Mary M., ed. *U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books/D.C. Heath, 1983.

Leibowitz, Arnold H. "The Refugee Act of 1980: Four Years Later." Parts I-V. *Federal Immigration Law Reporter*, v.2, n.35, 1984.

LeMaster, Roger J. and Zall, Barnaby. "Compassion Fatigue: The Expansion of Refugee Admissions to the United States." *Boston College International and Comparative Law Review*, v.6, n.2. spring 1983.

Levine, Daniel B.; Hill, Kenneth; and Warren, Robert; eds. *Immigration Statistics, A Story of Neglect.* Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985.

MacEoin, Gary and Riley, Nivita. *No Promised Land: American Refugee Policies and the Rule of Law.* Boston: distributed by Oxfam America, 1982.

Martin, David A. "Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond." *University of Pittsburgh Law Review*, v.44, n.2, winter 1983, p. 165.

Plaut, W. Gunther. *Refugee Determination in Canada: Proposals for a New System. A Report to the Honorable Flora MacDonald, Minister of Employment.* Canada: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985.

Rose, Peter I. "The Politics and Morality of U.S. Refugee Policy." *Center Magazine*, v.18, n.5, Sept./Oct. 1985, p. 2.

Teitelbaum, Michael S. "Political Asylum in Theory and Practice." *Public Interest*, n.76, summer 1984, p. 74.

Tomasi, Lydio F., ed. *In Defense of the Alien*, v. V. Proceedings of the Annual Legal Conference on Refugees and Territorial Asylum, 1982. New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1983.

______. *In Defense of the Alien*, vols. VI and VII. Proceedings of the Annual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1983 and 1984. New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1984 and 1985.

United States Committee for Refugees. *The Asylum Challenge to Western Nations.* By Gary Rubin. USCR Issue Paper. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1984.

U.S. Congress. *Refugee Act of 1980.* Public Law 96-212, 96th Congress, March 17, 1980.

U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. "Proposed Refugee Admissions and Allocations for Fiscal Year 1986, in Accordance with the Refugee Act of 1980." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1985.

U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service. *Worldwide Guidelines for Overseas Refugee Processing.* Washington, D.C.: INS, 1983.

U.S. General Accounting Office. *Detention Policies Affecting Haitian Nationals.* GAO/GGD-83-68. Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1983.

West, S.J. "Ministerial Statement on Australia's 1984/85 Immigration Program—by the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs." Australia: Ministry for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 1984.

York University, Refugee Documentation Project. *Unaccompanied Children in Emergencies: The Canadian Experience.* Downsview, Ontario: York University, 1984.

Adaptation and Integration

Asian American Community Mental Health Training Center. *Bridging Cultures: Southeast Asian Refugees in America, Social Work with Southeast Asian Refugees.* Los Angeles, Calif.: AACMHTC, 1983.

August, Lynn. "Health Service Utilization Patterns of Southeast Asian Refugees: Rhode Island Medicaid/Refugee Medical Assistance." A paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1984.

Bach, Robert L. "Labor Force Participation and Employment of Southeast Asian Refugees in the United States." A paper prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1984.

______ and Seguin, Rita Carroll. "Labor Force Participation of Southeast Asian Refugees in the United States." Binghamton, N.Y.: State University of New York, 1985.

Baker, Reginald P. and North, David S. "The 1975 Refugees: The First Five Years in America." Washington, D.C.: The New TransCentury Foundation, 1984.

Baker, Ron, ed. *The Psychosocial Problems of Refugees.* London: British Refugee Council and the European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles, 1983.

Berkeley Planning Associates. "An Evaluation of the Favorable Alternative Sites Project. Final Report." A report prepared for the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1984.

Caplan, Nathan; Whitmore, John K.; and Bui, Quang L. *Southeast Asian Refugee Self-Sufficiency Study.* Paper submitted to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1985.

Church World Service, Immigration and Refugee Program. "Making It on Their Own: From Refugee Sponsorship to Self-Sufficiency." New York: CWS, 1983.

Estarlik, John Van. "A Study to Provide Understanding of the Individual, Social and Cultural Characteristics of Adjustment and Refugee Program Use of Laotian Refugees. Final Report." Submitted to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1983.

Feingold, David A.; Peters, Heather; Scheifflen, Bambi; and Sexton, Lorraine. "Who are the Sino-Vietnamese? Culture, Ethnicity and Social Categories. Final Report of Adjustment Strategies of Sino-Vietnamese Refugees." Philadelphia Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983.

Forbes, Susan. "Adaptation and Integration of Recent Refugees to the United States." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1985.

______. "Medical Assistance for Refugees: Options for Change." *Migration News*, April-June 1984. Available from Refugee Policy Group.

______. "Residency Patterns and Secondary Migration of Refugees: A State of the Information Paper." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1984.

______; Eckels, Timothy; Kogan, Deborah; and Vencill, Mary. *Unrealized Potential: Case Management in the U.S. Refugee Program.* Washington, D.C.: Lewin and Associates, Inc., 1985.

Fraas, Charlotte Jones. *Refugees in the United States: Background and Current Policy.* CRS Report No. 83-54 EPW. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1983

Ima, Kenji; Velasco, Alfredo F.; Ou, Kota; and Yip, Beverly C. "Adjustment Strategies of the Khmer Refugees in San Diego, California: Six Ethnographic Case Histories." San Diego: Union of Pan Asian Communities, 1983.

Indochinese Community Center. "Entrepreneurship among Southeast Asian Refugees." Paper submitted to the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: ICC, 1983.

Jaeger, Gilbert. "The Integration of Refugees in Europe." Paper prepared for the Seminar on the Integration of Refugees in Europe. Geneva: UNHCR, 1983.

Laguerre, Michel S. *American Odyssey: Haitians in New York City.* Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1984.

Mien, Nguyen Van; Bui, Diana; and Khoa, Le Xuan. "Ethnic Self-Help Organizations. Final Report." Paper submitted to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1983.

North, David S. "Refugee Earnings and Utilization of Financial Assistance Programs." Washington, D.C.: The New TransCentury Foundation, 1984.

Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory. "A Study of English Language Training for Refugees in the United States." vols. I-III. Portland, Oregon: NREL, 1984.

______. "The Hmong Resettlement Study," vols. I-III. Final Report." Report for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1985.

Portes, Alejandro and Bach, Robert L. *Latin Journey: Cuban and Mexican Immigrants in the United States.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.

Simmonds, Stephanie; Vaughan, Patrick; and Gunn, S. Williams, eds. *Refugee Community Health Care.* Oxford University Press, 1983.

Stanford Research Institute International. "Southeast Asian Refugee Resettlement at the Local Level: The Role of the Ethnic Community and the Nature of the Refugee Impact." Stanford, Calif.: SRII, 1983.

Stepick, Alex. *Haitians Released from Krome: Their Prospects for Adaptation and Integration in South Florida.* Occasional Papers Series, Dialogue No. 24. Miami: Latin American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, 1984.

Taft, Julia V.; North, David S.; and Ford, David A. *Refugee Resettlement in the U.S.: Time for a New Focus.* Washington, D.C.: New TransCentury Foundation, 1979.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Report on the 1983 Seminar on the Integration of Refugees in Europe. INT.REF/EUR/28. Geneva: UNHCR, 1983.

United States Catholic Conference, Migration and Refugee Services. *Voyagers in the Land: A Report on Unaccompanied Southeast Asian Refugee Children.* Washington, D.C./New York: USCC, 1983.

United States Committee for Refugees. "A Survey of Public Attitudes toward Refugees and Immigrants: Report of Findings." USCR Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1984.

______. "U.S. Voluntary Resettlement Agencies' Programs for Refugee Women: A Directory." Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1985.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement. *Refugee Resettlement Program: Report to the Congress.* Washington, D.C.: HHS, 1985.

U.S. General Accounting Office. *Greater Emphasis on Early Employment and Better Monitoring Needed in Indochinese Refugee Resettlement Program.* GAO/HRD-83-15. Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1983.

Refugee Relief, Assistance, and Protection

Aga Khan, Sadruddin. *Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories.* Study on Human Rights and Massive Exoduses. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights. E/CN.4/1503; December 31, 1981.

Cuny, Frederick C. *Disasters and Development* New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Goodwillie, Susan. "Refugees in the Developing World: A Challenge to the International Community." Prepared for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Meeting of Experts on Refugee Aid and Development. A/AC.96/627, Annex III. Geneva: United Nations General Assembly, 1983.

International Disaster Institute. "Special Report on the Oxford Refugee Conference." *Disasters,* v.8, n.4, 1984, p. 249.

Refugee Policy Group. "Key Issues Facing Refugee Women in the Developing World." Washington, D.C.: RPG, 1985

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Handbook for Emergencies. Part One: Field Operations.* Geneva: UNHCR, 1982.

______. *Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1984-1985 and Proposed Voluntary Funds Programs and Budget for 1986.* A/AC.96/639; August 1, 1984. Geneva: UNHCR, 1984.

______, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme. *Refugee Aid and Development.* Report of the Meeting of Experts on Refugee Aid and Development. A/AC.96/627. Geneva: United Nations General Assembly, 1983.

United States Committee for Refugees. *Refugee Protection: An Analysis and Action Proposal.* By Gary Rubin. USCR *Issue Brief.* New York: USCR/ACNS, 1983.

______. "Refugee Protection in Africa: Current Trends." USCR Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1984.

—Africa

Christensen, Hanne. "Survival Strategies for and by Camp Refugees: Report on a Six-Week Exploratory Sociological Field Study into the Food Situation of Refugees in Camps in Somalia." Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1982.

Clark, D. Lance and Stein, Barry N. "ICARA II and Refugee Aid and Development." *Migration Today,* v.13, n.1, 1985, p. 33.

Gasarasi, Charles P. "The Tripartite Approach to the Resettlement and Integration of Rural Refugees in Tanzania." Research Report No. 71. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1984.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies. *Assistance to African Refugees by Voluntary Organizations.* Geneva: ICVA, 1983.

International Labour Organization and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *A Programme of Action for Refugees in Eastern and Central Sudan.* Agita Berar Awad, ed. Geneva: ILO, 1984.

Kibreab, Gaim. *Reflections on the African Refugee Problem: A Critical Analysis of Some Basic Assumptions.* Research Report No. 67. Uppsala, Sweden: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1983.

United Nations General Assembly, Second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa. *Detailed Description of Needs, Project Outlines and Background Information on the Refugee Situation.* Report of the Secretary General. A/Conf. 125/2; March 23, 1984. Geneva: U.N. 1984.

United States Committee for Refugees. *Human Rights in Uganda: The Reasons for Refugees.* USCR Issue Paper. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1985.

—Middle East and South Asia

Christensen, Hanne. *Sustaining Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Report on the Food Situation and Related Social Aspects.* Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1983.

______. *Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: From Emergency Towards Self-Reliance.* Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1984.

Cuny, Frederick C. "Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinians: An Assessment of Options and American Policy." Dallas: INTERTECT, 1982.

International Labour Office and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Tradition and Dynamism among Afghan Refugees: Report of an ILO Mission in Pakistan on Income-Generating Activities for Afghan Refugees.* Geneva ILO/UNHCR, 1983.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East. *UNRWA: A Brief History, 1950–1982.* Vienna: UNRWA, 1983.

______. UNESCO Department of Education. *Statistical Yearbook 1983–84.* Vienna: UNRWA-UNESCO Department of Education, 1985.

United States Committee for Refugees: *Afghan Refugees: Five Years Later.* By Allen K. Jones. USCR Issue Paper. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1985.

______. *Iranian Refugees: The Many Faces of Persecution.* By Allen K. Jones. USCR Issue Paper. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1985.

______. *Time for Decision: Sri Lankan Tamils in the West.* By Allen K. Jones. USCR Issue Paper. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1985.

—Southeast Asia

British Refugee Council. "Behind Barbed Wire: Vietnamese Refugees in the Closed Camps of Hong Kong." London: BRC, 1984.

Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand. *The CCSDPT Handbook: Refugee Services in Thailand.* Rev. ed. Bangkok: CCSDPT, 1983.

Gallagher, Dennis. "The Refugee Situation in Thailand." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1985.

______, with the assistance of Forbes, Susan. "Refugees in Southeast Asia: Toward a More Comprehensive Strategy." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1985.

Shawcross, William. *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

United States Committee for Refugees. *Cambodians in Thailand: People on the Edge.* USCR Issue Paper. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1985.

______. "Refugees from Irian Jaya in Papua New Guinea: A Trip Report." By Allen K. Jones. USCR Issue Brief. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1985.

______. *Vietnamese Boat People: Pirates' Vulnerable Prey.* By Joseph Cerquone. USCR Issue Paper. Washington, D.C.: USCR/ACNS, 1984.

—Latin America

Agency for International Development, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. *Displaced Persons in El Salvador: An Assessment.* Washington, D.C.: AID, 1984.

Aguayo, Sergio. *El Exodo Centroamericano. Consecuencias de un Conflicto.* Mexico City: Ministry of Public Education, 1985.

Americas Watch Committee. *Guatemalan Refugees in Mexico, 1980–1984.* New York: AWC, 1984.

Central America Resource Center. *Directory of Central America Organizations.* Austin, Texas: CARC, 1985.

Fagen, Patricia Weiss. "Refugee and Asylum Issues in Inter-American Relations." Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, 1983.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. *Honduras: A Crisis on the Border.* A Report on Salvadoran Refugees in Honduras. New York: LCHR, 1985.

______ and Americas Watch Committee. *El Salvador's Other Victims: The War on the Displaced.* New York: LCHR and AWC, 1984.

Teitelbaum, Michael S. *Latin Migration North: The Problem for U.S. Foreign Policy.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1985.

Torres-Rivas, Edelberto. *Report on the Condition of Central American Refugees and Migrants.* Hemispheric Migration Project Occasional Paper Series. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance, 1985.

U.S. Agency for International Development, Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. *Displaced Persons in El Salvador: An Assessment.* Washington, D.C.: USAID, 1984.

United States Committee for Refugees. *Aiding the Desplazados of El Salvador: The Complexity of Humanitarian Assistance.* By John Mullaney. USCR/ACNS, 1984.

U.S. Congress. *Refugee Problems in Central America.* Staff Report, 98th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983.

U.S. General Accounting Office. *Central American Refugees: Regional Conditions and Prospects and Potential Impact on the United States.* GAO/NSIAD 84-106. Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1984.

Bibliographies

African Bibliographic Center. *African Refugees: A Guide to Contemporary Information Sources.* Washington, D.C.: African Bibliographic Center, 1983.

Ashmun, Lawrence. *Resettlement of Indochinese Refugees in the United States: A Selective and Annotated Bibliography.* Occasional Paper No. 10. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1983.

Gutierrez, Margo; Jamail, Milton; Stolp, Chandler. *Sourcebook on Central American Refugee Policy: A Bibliography with Subject and Country Index.* Austin, Texas: Central American Refugee Policy Research Project and Central America Resource Center, 1985.

International Refugee Integration Resource Center. *International Bibliography of Refugee Literature.* Working edition. Geneva: IRIRC, 1985.

Olney, Douglas P. *A Bibliography of the Hmong (Miao).* SARS Occasional Papers, No. 1, 2nd ed. Minneapolis, Minn.: Southeast Asian Refugee Studies Project, Univ. of Minnesota, 1983.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and Refugee Policy Group. *A Selected and Annotated Bibliography on Refugee Women.* Geneva: Refugee Documentation Center, 1985.

United States Catholic Conference. Migration and Refugee Services. *Resource Bibliography: A Compilation of Resources and Program Materials.* Washington, D.C.: USCC, 1984.

U.S. Department of Education, Refugee Materials Center. *Bibliography.* Kansas City, Missouri: U.S. Department of Education, 1984.

Periodicals

American Council for Nationalities Service. *Interpreter Releases.* Weekly information service on asylum, immigration, naturalization, and related matters. Washington, D.C.: ACNS.

______. *Refugee Reports.* Monthly newsletter on national and international refugee issues. Washington, D.C.: ACNS.

Center for Migration Studies. *International Migration Review.* Quarterly journal of human migration and refugee movements. A special issue on refugees is forthcoming. Staten Island, New York: Center for Migration Studies.

______. *Migration Today.* Bimonthly magazine on migration and refugees. Staten Island, NY: CMS.

Church World Service Immigration and Refugee Program. *Monday.* A weekly newsletter on refugee and immigration issues; free, but donations are requested. New York: CWS.

International Catholic Migration Commission. *Migration News.* Quarterly review devoted to migration, population, land settlement, and refugees. Geneva: ICMC.

Intergovernmental Committee for Migration and the Research Group for European Migration Problems. *International Migration.* Quarterly review on the role of migratory movements in the contemporary world. In English/French/Spanish. Geneva: ICM.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies. *ICVA News.* Newsletter on humanitarian assistance and development cooperation; contains listings of recent publications. Geneva: ICVA.

Refugee Documentation Project. *Refuge.* Published five times a year as a forum for discussing Canadian and international refugee issues. Toronto: York University, Refugee Documentation Project.

Relief and Development Institute (formerly International Disaster Institute). *Disasters.* International journal of relief studies and practice. London: RDI.

______. *IDI News.* Newsletter on international relief matters. London: Relief and Development Institute.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Refugees.* Monthly magazine on international refugee situations and issues. Geneva: UNHCR. U.S. subscriptions available through the UNHCR Washington office.

______, Refugee Documentation Center. *Refugee Abstracts.* Quarterly abstracts of international literature on refugees. Geneva: UNHCR RDC.

Further information about the world refugee situation may be obtained from: **U.S. Committee for Refugees**, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858; or 815 15th St. NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 667-0782; or from one of the following local agencies affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

AKRON
International Institute
207 East Tallmadge Avenue
Akron, OH 44310
(216) 376-5106

ALBANY
Albany International Center
Wellington Hotel—Room 202
136 State Street
Albany, NY 12207
(518) 436-9741

BINGHAMTON
American Civic Association
131 Front Street
Binghamton, NY 13905
(607) 723-9419

BOSTON
International Institute of Boston
287 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 536-1081

BRIDGEPORT
International Institute of Connecticut
670 Clinton Avenue
Bridgeport, CT 06605
(203) 336-0141

BUFFALO
International Institute of Buffalo
864 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14209
(716) 883-1900

CHICAGO
Travelers and Immigrants Aid of Chicago
327 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 435-4500

CINCINNATI
Travelers Aid-Int'l Inst. of Cincinnati
19 Garfield Place, Suite 750
Cincinnati, OH 45202
(513) 721-7660

CLEVELAND
The Nationalities Service Center
1001 Huron Road
Room 315
Cleveland, OH 44115
(216) 781-4560

DETROIT
International Institute of Met. Detroit
111 East Kirby Avenue
Detroit, MI 48202
(313) 871-8600

ERIE
International Institute of Erie Pennsylvania
330 Holland Street
Erie, PA 16507
(814) 452-3935

FLINT
International Institute
515 Stevens Street
Flint, MI 48502
(313) 767-0720

FRESNO
Nationalities Service of Central California
1118 N. Fulton
Fresno, CA 93728
(209) 237-8361

GARY
International Institute of Northwest Indiana, Inc.
4433 Broadway
Gary, IN 46409
(219) 980-4636

HONOLULU
Kalihi Palama Immigrant Service Center
720 North King Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
(808) 845-3918

HOUSTON
YMCA International Services
YMCA of the Greater Houston Area
2903 W. Dallas Street
Houston, TX 77019
(713) 527-8690

JERSEY CITY
International Institute of New Jersey
880 Bergen Avenue
Jersey City, NJ 07306
(201) 653-3888

LAWRENCE
International Institute of Greater Lawrence, Inc.
454 Canal St.
Lawrence MA 01840
(617) 687-0981

LOS ANGELES
International Institute of Los Angeles
435 South Boyle Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90033
(213) 264-6210

LOWELL
International Institute of Lowell
79 High Street
Lowell, MA 01852
(617) 459-9031

MANCHESTER
International Center, Inc.
102 N. Main Street
Manchester, NH 03102
(603) 668-8602

MILWAUKEE
International Institute of Milwaukee County
2810 West Highland Boulevard
Milwaukee, WI 53208
(414) 933-0521

OAKLAND
International Institute of East Bay
297 Lee Street
Oakland, CA 94610
(415) 451-2846

PHILADELPHIA
Nationalities Service Center of Philadelphia
1300 Spruce Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 893-8400

PROVIDENCE
International Institute of Rhode Island, Inc.
421 Elmwood Avenue
Providence, RI 02907
(401) 461-5940

ST. LOUIS
International Institute of Metropolitan St. Louis
3800 Park Avenue
St. Louis, MO 63110
(314) 773-9090

ST. PAUL
International Institute of Minnesota
1694 Como Avenue
St. Paul, MN 55108
(612) 647-0191

SAN FRANCISCO
International Institute of San Francisco
2209 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94109
(415) 673-1720

SAN JOSE
ACNS Field Office
1691 The Alameda
San Jose, CA 95126
(408) 280-1551

SANTA ROSA
Indochinese-American Council
709 Davis, Room 204
Santa Rosa, CA 95401
(707) 542-3773

TOLEDO
International Institute of Toledo
2040 Scottwood Avenue
Toledo, OH 43620
(419) 241-9178

WASHINGTON, DC
Travelers Aid Society of Washington, DC
1015 12th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 347-0101

YOUNGSTOWN
International Institute of Youngstown
661 Wick Avenue
Youngstown, OH 44502
(216) 743-5189

In addition to the *World Refugee Survey*, the U.S. Committee for Refugees produces the following publications on refugee issues. Please use the enclosed card for further information.

USCR's Issue Paper series includes

- *Flight to Uncertainty: Poles outside Poland*
- *Cambodian Refugees in Thailand: The Limits of Asylum*
- *Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Will They Go Home Again?*
- *Vietnamese Boat People: Pirates' Vulnerable Prey*
- *The Asylum Challenge to Western Nations*
- *Iranian Refugees: The Many Faces of Persecution*
- *Afghan Refugees: Five Years Later*
- *Time for Decision: Sri Lankan Tamils in the West*
- *Human Rights in Uganda: The Reasons for Refugees*
- *Cambodians in Thailand: People on the Edge*

Refugee Reports. Monthly. $28.00 per year for subscription. Focuses on refugees in the United States. It includes information about policy, legislation, programs, resources to assist refugees or inform the public, and research on refugee resettlement. It also contains articles on international refugee developments and statistics on refugee populations.

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES
815 Fifteenth Street NW, Suite 610
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 667-0782